Introduction
A social dilemma refers to a situation where multiple economic factors are acting in self-interest although not completely cognizant of the influence such actions have on the group. Precisely, they could infer circumstances in which someone’s rationality results in shared irrationality. Such situations are challenging since acting on individual interest can be tempting to other persons engaged in such acts although other people benefit in the long run. For instance, relationships tend to thrive if partners embrace one another’s likings. Companies are also more productive if the workforce extemporaneously discusses one another’s expertise.
It is evident that social dilemma creates a situation where everybody benefits from cooperation, but people gain unreasonably from acts of non-compliant behavior. Social dilemmas can also occur from rules and social constraints that reward self-interested conduct or even fail to incentivize trust. Social dilemmas are normally characterized by two outcome-oriented aspects. Firstly, every person has a rational strategy that produces the best result (payoff) under all scenarios, which is better known as a non-cooperative or dominating strategy (Grønbæk et al., 2019). Secondly, if every person follows this tactic, it leads to a deficient communal outcome – the group would gain by cooperating (the scarce equilibrium). Experimental games are used to study the concept of social dilemma and it is normally depicted by outcome matrix. The policy explores the case of overfishing in Mauritania and employs game theory to understand and formulate solutions for managing the social dilemma.
Overfishing as a Social Dilemma in Mauritania
A sharp reduction in aquatic biodiversity has been noted in Mauritanian waters in the last few decades. Specifically, demersal fishes, which are the highly targeted species by artisanal and industrial fisheries in Mauritania, have been predominantly wrecked by overfishing (Kane, Ball, and Brehmer, 2022, p. 1). The act has resulted in their reduced population and the associated ruin of their habitat (Harris, 2022). To avert further ecosystem impacts and increase populations, the government of Mauritania must create a sustainable fishery that emphasizes economic benefits and upholds exploited fish stocks.
Overfishing is a real-world social dilemma, especially in fishing nations today. The phrase, overfishing can be defined as the process of catching excessive fish at a go that exceeds the breeding rate. The circumstance established a fish population disproportion that slowly depletes the food web. Overfishing also results in the loss of other essential aquatic life such as corals and turtles (Grønbæk et al., 2020). Various factors such as wastefulness lead to overfishing and the rapid depletion of other marine life. Other aspects such as commercial fisheries always engage in excessive fishing and then release undersized fish back into the water while others might not return them. Other elements such as poor fishing management also contribute to overfishing.
Applying Social Interactions and Game Theory to Overfishing
Rule of the Game and Player
Whereas every fisherman might be attracted to catch as much fish as possible, if all fishermen followed the same, the fish numbers would drain, which is damaging to the players. Moreover, fishers do not independently own the whole water body where they fish but share the same environment with other fishermen. Therefore, it can be seen that every fisherman is a core player in this game (Grønbæk et al., 2020). The fishermen and even other fisheries try to endure their fishing conduct in a manner that does not entirely damage the food chain and ecosystem but it is often not simple to regulate nature. In many circumstances, fish migrate and enter territorial boundaries or even behave in some erratic manner.
Overfishing can be explained using social interactions and game theories. An individual fisher or fishery can overcatch to realize more profits and yield. However, in making this greedy choice, they damage the net fish ecosystem. If too many fisheries follow that route of overfishing, the entire ecosystem would be depleted with detrimental outcomes to their economic situation as well as the marine life’s well-being (Flender, 2019). Normally, when both participants do not admit, the net advantage is often highest, but individual gain is correspondingly spread and is lower compared to a confessed situation, the same is similar for fishing.
Dominant Strategies, Nash Equilibrium, and Self-interested Behaviour
In game theory, the dominant strategy posits that the selected approach of a player will result in a better outcome of every possible tactic available, irrespective of the plan used by the rival. In this case of fishing, the dominant strategy is simply to overfish. The self-interested behavior is to accumulate more fish resources for the overall profit gain as well as to remain operationally feasible in the undertaking (Grønbæk et al., 2020). Contrarily, the Nash equilibrium for the ideal strategy for the player is to remain on the course of their primary approach while cognizant of the challenger’s strategy. In the context of fishing, if all fishers agree to work together, they conserve the ecosystem. However, the Nash equilibrium here is where all fisheries select to overcatch to gain more profit and remain competitive, but in the long end, their action will negatively impact the aquatic ecosystem and the environment.
Outcome
In this fishing game, it is appropriate for both players to choose strategy X and receive 1 point for cooperation to establish long-term benefits in the utilization of marine sources such as fish. The selection of strategy Y by both players means they lose 1 point each, denoting the negative consequences of overfishing. In the circumstance that you tell player A the strategy employed by player B and vice versa, there would be no aberration from the original choice. Therefore, knowing the strategy of other players carries no significance since it does not change either actor’s behavior.
Solving the Social Dilemma
Enhancing Cooperation among Players
Analyzing social dilemmas from a structural perspective would infer solving the situations by implementing interventions that emphasize the behaviors of cooperation. In this case, the behavior of overfishing forms the center stage of action. According to Lindroos and Pintassilgo, non-cooperative actions also largely impact the outcome of the game and through the suggested interventions, although the situation can be contained. Therefore, the formulation of interventions such as smart fishing management systems and enforcement of rules can go a long way in averting overfishing since they enhance cooperation strategies. The deployment of smart systems would instill confidence among players since they are cognizant of an equal playing field, hence, leading to more socially-optimal results.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the concept of game theory can be used to illustrate real-world dilemmas such as that of overfishing while facilitating the reaching of strategic decisions on the issue. In Mauritania, the government is struggling to ensure sustained usage of marine resources to the social dilemma of overfishing. Self-interested behaviors among players make it hard to practice ethical fishing. In this kind of game, the players are fishers and the outcome of their strategic selections can influence their financial gains and the marine environment. Moreover, the Nash equilibrium in this game will result in long-lasting detrimental effects if interventions to the effect are not implemented. Games theory becomes instrumental in comprehending the situation and formulating interventions aimed at creating cooperation for sustained fishing.
Reference List
Flender, S. (2019). ‘Blame the game, not the player: How Game Theory helps us understand why sometimes everyone loses’, Towards Data Science, Web.
Grønbæk, L., Lindroos, M., Munro, G. and Pintassilgo, P., 2020. Game theory and fisheries management. New York: Springer Books.
Harris, P.C (2022). ‘How China’s fishing fleet is devastating ecosystems, harming poor countries and contributing to conflict’, Hong Kong Free Press, Web.
Kane, E.A., Ball, A.C. and Brehmer, P., 2022 ‘Dilemma of total allowable catch (TACs) allocated as shareable quotas: applying a bio-economic game-theoretical approach to euro-Mauritanian fisheries agreements’, Aquaculture and Fisheries, 1(1), pp. 1-8.
Lindroos, M and Pintassilgo, P. (n.d.). ‘Game theory and fisheries’, Fisheries and Aquaculture, 5(1). Web.