The intractability of the mind-body problem arises from consciousness as it is a concept that cannot be discussed exhaustively. With consciousness being an important component of the mind-body problem, then the latter becomes even more complicated to debunk. Therefore, without debunking consciousness, the mind-body problem also remains unsolved. According to Nagel, mental consciousness only occurs when there is “something that it is like to be” for the organism (Nagel 436). In other words, consciousness is generated when there is a subjective way that the world appears mentally or experimentally.
Nagel uses the term “reduction” to refer to an idea where complex-level concepts can be reduced to and given lower-level properties. For instance, the laws of chemistry can be reduced and then applied to physics, and this is also true when biological cells are reduced to molecules or atoms. Reductionism allows for analogies to be used to break down complex debates into smaller ones. In the case of Nagel, reductionist theories have been used to deconstruct the mind-body problem unsuccessfully. He refutes that reductionist theories can be useful when shedding light on the relationship between the brain and mind. Therefore, while reductionism should be used to explain the mind-body problem, it has not been applied appropriately.
Nagel uses the batting analogy because, unlike whales, wasps, or other creatures, they are higher up the phylogenetic tree which makes them more relatable to human beings. The other reason Nagel uses bats is that most people agree that bats have experiences and are thus conscious. However, the difficulty in understanding the experiences of bats by a human is because their consciousness is alien to humans. Similarly, the restricted resources of the human mind make them inadequate to grasp what it is like for a bat to be a bat (Nagel 439). The conclusion of the batting analogy is that understanding the bat from a human mind is “incompletable” as one can only ascribe certain experiences of the animal-based on its behavior and structure.
Nagel admits that physicalism has to be recognized because all phenomenological features have to be accorded a physical account. However, he undertakes subjective reasoning in analyzing physicalism depicting that it is impossible to tie a phenomenon to a single point of view. Even though physicalism portrays mental events as physical events, it would be insufficient to have this as the conclusion (Nagel 437). The principle of this theory should not limit us to hypothesize beyond the physical because there is more to the mind being a physical structure such as the brain. To this effect, consciousness is subjective to the beings that experience it and negates from the concept of physicalism. As such, Nagel concludes that physicalism is a point in which we cannot truly comprehend because we lack the conception of how true it is.
Reality is dualistic in nature. It consists of the physical and the nonphysical, which have a two-way interaction. It is easy for any philosopher to make the conclusion on reality being monism – only having the physical constituents. However, the intangible and invisible have often been of interest to humanity. A prime example of this is the search for happiness which is an abstract feeling whose absence leads to a sense of incompleteness. In essence, the physical and nonphysical dimensions of reality have to coexist and attain a certain level of interaction to provide logical equilibrium.
Work Cited
Nagel, Thomas. “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” The Philosophical Review, vol. 83, no. 4, 1974, pp. 435-450.