Introduction
For decades, the question of whether knowledge can be equated with sound faith has been relevant and interesting to humanity. Edmund Gettier’s influential 1963 paper, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” has become a real challenge to the classical understanding of what knowledge is and how it relates to sound faith. I am sure that knowledge cannot be equated with true belief, and the author of the article proved the irrelevance of this definition during his philosophical discussion in the work.
Although the traditional approach is a valid argument, I do not find the completeness and complexity of the knowledge described in Edmund Gettier. I want to demonstrate that knowledge requires much more than the justification of true faith, and humanity needs to work on a new epistemic structure. Knowledge is not just a valid faith but requires an additional element.
Traditional Definition of Knowledge
According to Plato’s definition, which laid the foundation for the traditional understanding of knowledge, it is an object of truth, faith, and justification. That is, for an expression to be considered knowledge, one must believe in it, it must be true, and this truthfulness must have an evidential basis and justification (Plato & Burnyeat, 1990). This definition is quite classical and quickly became known among the philosopher’s contemporaries and followers.
Gettier’s Understanding of Knowledge
Edmund Gettier’s examples, however, demonstrate the lack of relevance of this traditional definition, and the author criticizes the classical version. He suggests for consideration cases when a person has some true belief but it is not knowledge (Gettier, 1963). This argument is a challenge to the traditional understanding of knowledge, as in the classical version, only the existence of justification was necessary to provide knowledge. Thus, it is necessary to examine in more detail the shortcomings of the classical definition and to consider why true faith may not be sufficient to obtain knowledge.
The Gettier examples show that knowledge cannot be guaranteed only by sound beliefs. For example, a situation may be described where a man has the true conviction that his colleague will definitely get a job, as he has coins in his pocket. However, a colleague cannot get a job just because he has coins in his pocket, as he only gets a job on the condition that the director of the company likes the coins of colleagues (Gettier, 1963). I mean, in this case, you can see that the man has a true belief that the situation will go according to his scenario, and others may believe it. However, faith alone is not enough to know exactly what will happen next.
The problem described by Edmund Gettier in his work may arise if a person has beliefs but does not have the knowledge to prove those beliefs. The classical concept of knowledge as the true faith of man is undermined by the fact of the existence of accidents in this case. The author emphasizes that in modern philosophical science it is necessary to develop some criterion that would allow to separate true belief from knowledge (Gettier, 1963). In this case, the person could more easily distinguish, in what situation information is faith and in what knowledge, which is supported by evidence.
To solve the problem, it is necessary to consider the research motive to find out why humanity should think that it needs more knowledge. The examples Gettier cited in his article may be called exceptional cases in the traditional determinants of knowledge. However, these examples cannot be considered individual cases, which are isolated and arise only in a particular context. These cases reveal the main problem that lies in the most classical definition of the concept of knowledge. This problem of lack of argumentation forces a person to rethink his or her traditional understanding of knowledge and what he or she considers to be knowledge. The justification of knowledge may depend on external factors that one cannot influence and control, and this is shown in the scenarios proposed by Gettier. In order to consider knowledge to be reliable and to maintain its integrity to the maximum, all possible means of removing existing limitations should be explored.
With regard to the counterarguments that argue a valid true faith, it is important to say that the study should also consider the opposite view. It can be assumed that the Gettier examples are not a pattern but rather a pure coincidence, so the traditional view must, in any case, be the same. Proponents of classical theory argue that the existence of these exceptions does not show that knowledge is a valid belief. In addition, proponents of traditional beliefs believe that the additional element that Gettier proposes to introduce may further complicate the concept and the philosophy of science as a whole. Proponents argue that these actions will create some ambiguity in the definition of knowledge, and creating such difficulties is unnecessary. Thus, the basis of this counterargument is simplicity and clarity of expression.
Critique of Gettier’s Argumentation
In response to the arguments presented by Gettier, some philosophers have advanced their own theories about what man can understand as knowledge. One of the theories is the conclusion for a better explanation, according to which knowledge should convey the most accessible explanation of a belief that a person has. Although this theory is attractive enough from a philosophical point of view, it does not answer the question of how to remove the limitations of true beliefs. Moreover, this theory does not reflect the full satisfaction of the need to create an additional element that would define knowledge.
Critics of the arguments presented by Gettier in his work argue that one must rely on one’s current beliefs to make decisions. Thus, everyone must act as he or she thinks is right, even if one cannot be completely sure of the right thing. The requirement of an additional parameter, which would define knowledge, will make human life more complex, and in practice, this implementation will be quite difficult to apply.
In response to critics’ claims that adding an additional parameter would complicate the definition of knowledge, I believe that the requirement for knowledge should be certainty. Knowledge must exclude the possibility of coincidence and chance but leaves truth and faith. Nor are assertions that additional criteria are not needed in this context as a solution to the problems facing classical theory. It is, therefore, important to recognize the need to find alternative propositions that best reflect the essence of knowledge.
Conclusion
Finally, the traditional notion of knowledge faced criticism from Edmund Gettier, who proposed his own way of determining. Examples of the author of the article demonstrate that due to coincidence and coincidence of circumstances, a person can not always obtain true knowledge, as he can confuse it with his true beliefs. Thus, knowledge cannot be defined solely as one’s faith.
Although classical theory is still relevant for philosophical researchers, the correct definition of knowledge requires the absence of an additional element that could specify the concept. Denial of the possibilities of chance and coincidence is one of the possible options for specifying knowledge and recognizing the limitations of classical understanding; man will be able to develop a new epistemic structure that will better reflect the essence of the concept.
References
Gettier, E. (1963). Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis, 23(6), 121–123.
Plato, & Burnyeat, M. (1990). The Theaetetus of Plato (M. J. Levett, Trans.). Hackett Publishing.