Introduction
Since disputes and conflicts are an integral part of a given society, they have led to development of various negotiation theories in a bid to ease their resolution. Resolution of conflicts and disputes is a process that requires strategies and tactics to enhance fair settlements and satisfaction of the parties involved. Throughout the centuries, negotiators and diplomats have been grappling with the challenge of settling national and international disputes that arise from political, economic and social pressures that cause people to have divergent views on certain decisive issues. Davis and Weller (2001) argue that major public decisions and policies are the product of “…complex round of negotiation between interests, choices between values and competition between resources… there are no single ‘best’ options for any player in this game, for the ‘best’ outcome depends on what others do and what deals are possible” (p. 9). Due to the complexity of negotiations, negotiators face critical challenge in choosing appropriate negotiation theory with certain strategies and tactics that effectively addresses specific conflicts. Usually, conflicts arise due to diversity of interests at various levels of interaction such as intrapersonal, between persons, within groups and between groups. To explore the effectiveness of negotiation theory in the settlement of conflicts, this essay analyzes distributive bargaining as one of the negotiation theories.
History of Distributive Bargaining
The origin of the negotiation theory of distributive bargaining dates back to 1930s where it was applicable in-game and economic theories. During that time, there were rampant developments of games in which at times resulted in conflict due to the unfairness of players. To resolve conflicts that arose during the game, players developed mechanisms of negotiation that involved collective bargaining that would eventually lead to the effective settlement of the issues for the gaming to continue (Ebner & Efron, 2009, p. 7). Moreover, during the early 20th century, many nations were grappling with industrialization as a means of gaining economic power and subsequent political dominance. Due to economic competition among nations and individuals, economic conflicts did arise because there were common resources that required common utilization and benefits (Albert, 2000, p. 11). Thus, games and economic conflicts led to the development of distributive bargaining theory that has become one of the key theories of conflict resolution and settlement in the modern society.
Nash bargaining game is the game that illustrates how distributive bargaining works as it portrays how players negotiate on the portion of money each one can obtain bearing in mind that they can only obtain their stated amount based on the available amount of money. Distributive bargaining also derived its strategies and tactics from Zeuthen’s exposition on economic problems and theory of wages by Hicks. Early evolution of distributive bargaining theory-based its development on major characteristics, which included reasonable bargain, win and lose situations, and limited maximum concession that a party can make. Leventhal argues that, “Zeuthen and Nash’s contribution to this theory was the actual prediction of where within the range of practical bargains the agreement would fall,…was determined by two variables being: propensity to risk and conditions of transfer of economic values” (2006, p. 72). The bargainers focused on attaining maximum benefits while minimizing the losses that each party could incur. Hence, distributive bargaining theory emerged and facilitated resolution of conflicts through mutual agreements of the parties after making demands and concessions for the benefit of all parties.
Distributive bargaining theory grew gradually in the 20th century when philosophers, economists, psychologists, political scientists and sociologists among other parties merged their bargaining ideologies and improved application of the theory. Based on the Nash bargaining game, they all subscribed to the principle that unequal share of benefit and loss is the fairest way of settling conflicts that entails compensation. According to Leventhal, “historically, distributive bargaining has been adopted throughout the legal institutions of the modern era” (2006, p. 72). Before formation of elaborate justice system, early societies depended on their tribes, elders and families in resolutions of conflicts. The resolution of conflicts entailed negotiation that required proper settlement of conflicts to avoid future occurrence and the best way was through bargaining. The interested parties bargained their demands as they made necessary concessions to resolve conflicts.
As conflicts in society became more complex with time, they demanded elaborate bargaining strategies and tactics that would enable conflicting parties to resolve their differences amicably. Realizing the relevance of distributive bargaining, the justice system adopted its principles and strategies, and employed them in the resolution of increasing cases of conflicts that entailed compensation. In the modern society, distributive bargaining is becoming the most effective approach to resolving conflicts together with integrative negotiation. Druckman argues that, “over 90% of modern litigations disputes are settled outside the court through a process of negotiation… as lawyers commonly negotiate ‘in the shadow’ of the courts, the process that was adopted for negotiation has been distributive bargaining” (1997, p. 251). Thus, modern courts have adopted distributive bargaining as a means of resolving conflicts and ensuring that parties involved are satisfied. Usually, the rulings of the courts determine who is right and who is wrong, thus creating a sense of win-lose situation that result in conflict resolution, while the distributive bargaining aims at making each party attain the appropriate position as either a winner or a loser at the end of the resolution (Avruch, 2006, p. 576). Currently, distributive bargaining is the best approach of reaching consensus in decision-making, formulation of policies and resolution of diverse conflicts in the society as it yields maximum benefits to the conflicting parties.
Characteristics of Distributive Bargaining
Competition of limited resources is the major characteristics of distributive bargaining since conflicting parties demand maximum available resources. Craver (2010) argues that, “competitors move psychologically against their opponents, seek to maximize their own side returns, begin with more extreme opening positions, seek more extreme results favoring their own side, behave less courteously, and are closed, untrusting, and manipulative” (p. 104). Due to the competitive nature of the conflicting parties, the negotiators have a daunting task when bargaining for concession ground. The conflicting parties in some instances fail to make any concessions because they are competing for the limited resources that can neither satisfy the demands of each of them. The distributive bargaining assumes that in any conflict, the conflicting parties are competitive because they demand similar resources, objectives, and values.
Another characteristic of distributive bargaining is that proper resolution of conflict entails sharing of the limited resources after the parties make necessary concessions. Since the conflicting parties demand maximum benefit from the limited resources yet it is impossible to satisfy both of them, the best alternative for proper resolution of conflict is sharing (Ware & Barnes, 2004, p. 4). The conflicting parties receive maximum benefit from the limited resources depending on their win-loss balance. Distributive bargaining does not seek to achieve the best solution that can satisfy both partners as integrative bargaining, but it seeks to achieve a solution where the conflicting partners maximize their benefits according to their demands and create a win-lose situation. Walter (2001) argues that, “distributive bargainers try to keep the opposing side from gaining information about their position or ‘bottom-line’ while trying to collect information about the resistance point of the other party” (p. 9). Secret of bargaining lies in unraveling the information of the conflicting party for it enhances foundation of negotiation and thus better bargain of the share.
Since limited resources make the conflicting parties compete and employ adversarial orientation as the perspective of negotiating for their maximum benefits, settlement of the conflict requires compromise of the parties. To achieve compromise, negotiators need to convince the conflicting parties to make some critical concessions that will eventually lead to fruitful compromise. “The distributive bargainers develop their position by using more and more facts to build the case for the validity of their proposals,” (Wilson, 2001, p. 3). It is difficult to resolve a conflict in a situation where the conflicting partners hold onto their facts and demand for maximum benefit yet the resources are limited to satisfy the demand of both. Thus, the main objective of distributive bargaining is to ensure that the conflicting parties make the critical concession that eventually leads to compromise as a solution to the conflict.
Process of Distributive Bargaining
Process of distributive bargaining is like a relationship between a buyer and a seller in the market. In the first instance, the sellers state how much they are willing to receive to offer certain products to the customers. On the other hand, the customers too state how much amount of money they are willing to give in exchange for the product. The buyers’ value and customers’ value create a bargaining range that needs both partners to make concessions for them to reach a point of compromise so that the business transaction completes. Likewise, distributive bargaining has four consecutive stages that lead to settlements of conflicts and this includes preliminary negotiation, making the first concession, negotiation dance and reaching compromise. In the preliminary stage, the conflicting parties prepare their demands, accustom to the demands of their competitive partner so that they can arrive at the negotiation table with reasonable demands, and at the same time obtain maximum benefits out of the conflict. Coleman and Fraser (2011) argue that, “the challenging part of the distributive bargaining process is when conflicting partners come into the negotiating table with unreasonable demands that create great bargaining range that is practically impossible for either party to concede” (p. 554). Greater range of bargaining complicates the work of negotiators and minimizes the chances of effective resolution of conflict.
After making the preliminary negotiation to accustom with the demands necessary for the resolution of conflict, the conflicting parties then enter into the negotiating table where they make the first concession, which sets the process of distributive bargaining rolling. The first concession reduces the bargaining range and encourages the conflicting parties to continue with the bargaining process with the objective of reaching compromise. “The first concession in distributive bargaining is imperative as it determines the course of the bargaining process,” (Volkema, Fleck, & Hofmeister, 2010, p. 271). The greater the concession of either party, the higher the probability of resolving the conflict and vice versa. After the first concession has set the stage for the bargaining, the resolution of conflict enters into the stage of negotiation dance where conflicting parties negotiate through the give and take process. This stage takes longer period compared to other stages since the conflicting parties seek to reach compromise by bridging the bargaining range. The longer the bargaining range, the harder the process of bargaining at the negotiation dance since conflicting parties need to make great concessions to achieve compromise. Eventually, when the parties make enough concessions to bridge the bargaining range, they attain the point of compromise where resolution of conflict occurs.
Legal Negotiation and Distributive Bargaining: Court case
Distributive bargaining is applicable in legal negotiations when resolving conflicts that end in win-lose situations. Since some legal cases require conflicting parties to make unequal compromises as means of achieving resolution of conflicts, distributive bargaining forms the basis of making such settlements. Smith and Carson (2009) argue that, “the goal in distributive bargaining is not to assure both sides win, but rather that one side wins as much as it can, which generally means that the other side will lose or at least get less than it had wanted” ( p. 4). In the legal system, distributive bargaining is appropriate in resolution of conflicts that require one party to compensate the other. Distributive bargaining is also applicable in cases that a partner in conflict needs more compensation relative to the other.
Distributive bargaining is an important approach that the legal system employs when resolving various conflicts that occur at individual, national and international levels of conflicts. Fisher (1983) reports that, “it has been argued that policy formation related to international trade agreements should take into account broader issues of public welfare, natural resource management and local subsistence economies in order not to avoid an increase in domestic conflicts” (p. 163). The legal system has realized that distributive bargaining is an inevitable approach that the courts need in resolution of conflicts to ensure fairness to the plaintiff and defendant. It is impossible to give equal compensation to the plaintiff and defendant since legal cases that require compensation demand that one party loses while the other one gains (Berton, 1999, p. 6). In such a situation, distributive bargaining comes in handy to determine common ground for both parties. In legal negotiation, the critical objective is to ascertain how much the plaintiff is willing to accept and how much is defendant willing to give. The court ensures that both demands are reasonable to allow bargaining process to continue.
In courts, lawyers aid the disputing parties in making reasonable demands with the view of limiting bargaining range as it forms basis and determines the course of negotiation. Reasonable bargaining range gives zone of possible agreement in the negotiation (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1981, p. 22). The greater the bargaining range, the greater the possible zone of agreement and the complex the course of negotiation. Thus, the legal negotiations ensure that conflicting parties make reasonable demands to minimize the bargaining range and zone of possible agreement. Existence of zone of possible agreement in the negotiating table means that there is higher probability that the disputing parties may reach the point of compromise and thus makes the negotiation course easier. Alfredson and Cungu (2008) argue that, “calculating where the zone of possible agreement lies is a critical step for the negotiator and can be a difficult task given possible gaps in information, uncertainties about true values and the need for estimations” (p. 15). Therefore, setting the zone of possible agreement is the critical work for the courts for it is the basis of distributive bargaining where their competitive negotiation takes place, as each party demands for maximum benefit from the settlement.
For instance, an individual can file a case due to medical malpractice and demand compensation for the pain and suffering endured. In the distributive bargaining, the claimant demands the maximum amount of compensation while the defendant is willing to give minimum compensation possible. Such demands by the two parties are very competitive since each one of them requires maximum benefits at the end of the settlement. The legal aspect comes in to ensure that the demands that the parties are reasonable in that the claimant can obtain maximum compensation for the damages suffered while the defendant gives minimum compensation to avoid unnecessary exploitation by the claimant (Raiffa, 2002, p. 5). Distributive bargaining is very effective in settling such kinds of cases in courts since it requires a win-lose resolution. Paquet, Gaetan & Bergeron (2000) assert that, “competitive or adversarial ‘win-lose’ litigators tend to view almost all settlement discussions as zero-sum endeavors, ignoring the possibility for joint gains” (p. 192). The parties involved in conflict assume that proper settlement of the conflict should focus on enhancing their benefits while minimizing their losses. In this case, the claimant focuses on maximizing benefits while the defendant focuses on minimizing the losses, in that at the end of the settlement each of them obtains some benefits from the bargaining process.
The distributive bargaining process provides an opportunity for the claimant and defendant to present their demands and negotiate effectively through the process of bargaining where they make series of concessions leading to the settlement of the conflict. In this instance, the claimant may demand a compensation sum of $50 000 due to medical malpractice from the filed case against the defendant who is willing to compensate $30 000. In the negotiating table, the negotiation starts with the bargaining range of $20 000, which requires the two parties to make necessary concessions to attain point of agreement and settle their case. “During bargaining process, the conflicting partners are expected to make reasonable concessions that would encourage both partners to continue engaging in the bargaining process until viable and fair settlement is arrived at” (William, 2002, p. 45). The probable settlement, in this case, requires that the claimant cede the demands to about $40 000 and the defendant increase compensation to the same amount, thus bridging the bargaining range and eventually settling the matter. Legal negotiation is very important in distributive bargaining as it sets limits of reasonable compensation and provides guidelines of bargaining process leading to effective settlement of conflicts through distributive bargaining.
Power and Trust in Distributive Bargaining
Distributive bargaining is a competitive form of negotiation in that the conflicting parties demand that settlement of the dispute should result in a win-lose situation. Resolution of conflicts that involves power struggles needs distributive bargaining because effective conflict resolution requires one party to obtain more power than the other. For instance, in European Union, decision-making and formulation of policies by the council demand wide consultation among member states, the European parliament and the commission. The wide consultation employs distributive bargaining where the three parties come into the negotiating table with varied demands and stand on political, social and economic issues that relate to power struggles among states. “Governance by bargaining in the council is characterized by compromise solutions that reconcile the different negotiating positions of the national governments, the European Commission and the European Parliament representatives” (Conceicao-Heldt, 2006, p. 146). Three institutions enter into distributive bargaining thus providing every state with equal chance of making demands and recommendations that enable effective formulations of policies and decisions. Due to distributive bargaining, the member states of European Union have been able to share power equally because they have equal bargaining power on the negotiation table. Moreover, the need to make concessions in the distributive bargaining process gives flexibility to the demands leading to comprise at the end of the negotiation.
The competitive characteristic of distributive bargaining makes it suitable for addressing power struggle conflicts in organizational or political circles. The conflicting parties due to power struggles demand maximum power according to their stands. Since none of them can attain power without making reasonable concessions, they must enter into negotiation that effectively satisfies their needs. In this case, distributive bargaining is the appropriate approach to settle the dispute. Shapiro (2006) asserts that, “distributive bargaining is an effective negotiation approach that is important in settling of disputes that involves political power struggles as win-lose outcomes characterize political contests” (107). Cases that involve election contests need distributive bargaining so that each party can obtain a share of power that is commensurate with a number of votes. Distributive bargaining provides an opportunity for the conflicting parties to make critical concessions according to their demands and reach compromising point where they experience satisfaction. Thus, competitive conflicts need distributive bargaining process as means of settling the dispute according to inherent powers and demands of the parties involved.
In the process of distributive bargaining, there is no trust between the conflicting parties since each one of them seeks maximum benefit from the settlement by employing many strategies and tactics that involve secrecy. The smartest party who gains the most out of the settlement is the one who conceals tactics and strategies that are essential in overcoming the demands of the other party. “Distributive bargainers misrepresent and withhold information as well as make exaggerated statements about their positions in order to mislead people about their true objectives” (Zartman, & Saner, 2000, p. 36). Exaggeration of demands and withholding objectives are tactics and strategies that are applicable in the distributive bargaining process, hence negotiators should be wary of the demands that their opponents disclose at the negotiating table since it just represents part of information. As negotiation process progress, each party gradually reveals their secret information and makes concessions that eventually lead to effective settlement of the dispute through a win-lose situation.
Distributive versus Integrative Bargaining
Distributive bargaining and integrative bargaining are contrasting approaches to negotiation. The main objective of distributive bargaining is to ensure maximum benefit of one party and minimum loss of the other thus creating win-lose settlement of conflict. On the other hand, integrative bargaining focuses on creating a win-win settlement for both parties by satisfaction of prime needs. The two contrasting objectives differentiate how the two theories of negotiation resolve conflict through the process of bargaining. According to the distributive bargaining theory, the parties who enter negotiating table have adversarial orientation that makes them view conflict resolution through a competitive perspective (Gourlay, 1987, p. 14). Due to competitive behavior, the conflicting parties struggle against each other to attain maximum benefit from the settlement. Since their demands cannot make them attain maximum benefits, they undergo bargaining process where they make series of concessions until they bridge the bargaining range and eventually arrive at a compromising situation where resolution of conflict occurs. Coleman and Fraser (2011) argue that, “essentially, the distributive model assumes that the primary concern for each party is deriving a maximum share of a solution or, more appropriately settlement” (p. 548). The appropriate settlement in the distributive bargaining results in a win-lose scenario where the smartest and powerful party achieves maximum benefits while the other party suffers some losses.
In contrast with the distributive bargaining, integrative bargaining assumes that parties in conflict have common needs that require mutual satisfaction. In view of this assumption, integrative bargaining seeks to satisfy the common needs of the parties by creating a win-win settlement. According to Kimura (2003), “the principle underpinning integrative negotiation is to find the underlying needs and objectives of the parties to a dispute and to satisfy them without causing loss to the other party” (p. 7). Thus, prime objective of integrative bargaining is to ensure that none of the parties involved in a conflict bear the greatest burden since they have common needs that need satisfaction through interactive settlement. In integrative bargaining, the conflicting parties approach negotiating table knowing that they have common demands that need mutual resolution. To achieve mutual resolution of their conflict, the parties cooperatively devise solutions that would guide them in attaining their objective.
Comparative analysis of the distributive and integrative bargaining shows that they have a different process of bargaining, assumptions, and characteristic that makes them suitable in resolving certain cases of conflicts. Since distributive bargaining aims at resolving conflicts in a win-lose settlement, it is applicable in cases that involve compensation in terms of property and wealth. Distributive bargaining does not consider the relationship of the partners because after settlement, there is disparity in the benefits obtained as one party loses and the other gains. While distributive bargaining involves competitive negotiation with the objective of achieving maximum benefits, integrative bargaining entails cooperative negotiation where parties seek possible solutions and eventually adopt the most appropriate one. “Integrative bargaining assumes that both parties share multiple overlapping issues and that the best way to deal with the multiple issues is to be flexible in one’s position and to engage in cooperative problem solving,” (Levinson, & Wilson, 1999, p.13). While integrative bargaining focuses on cooperative negotiation and problem solving by formulating possible solutions, the distributive bargaining concentrates on competitive negotiation, which results in compromise as a resolution of the conflict.
The two theories of negotiation have different assumptions and characteristics that underlie their principles in resolution of conflicts. The major characteristic of distributive bargaining is that the conflicting parties need to achieve maximum benefit in the case of winner and minimum benefit in the case of loser since the resolution of conflict results in win-lose settlement (Landau, 2000, p. 27). Comparatively, integrative bargaining aims at maximizing benefits for the conflicting parties by ensuring that the resolution creates a win-win settlement. Other contrasting features in the negotiation theories are assumptions that underlie their approaches. Distributive bargaining assumes a ‘fixed’ pie approach in that solution of the conflict lie within the limited resources, hence win-lose scenario is the only possible way of resolving the conflict. In contrast, integrative bargaining assumes that, “by engaging in cooperative problem solving the pie becomes expandable, as the focus becomes on developing creative solutions that expand the pie in ways that ensure both parties can get what they need” (Barry, 2007, p. 11). Based on this assumption, conflicting parties through cooperative problem solving come up with some possible solutions and select the most appropriate one that effectively resolves the conflict. Hence, distributive bargaining and integrative bargaining differ in their approach to negotiations in terms of assumptions, process, and the outcomes.
Issues of Distributive Bargaining
Many critics argue that distributive bargaining is not an effective approach to addressing conflicts because it results in win-lose settlement. They assert that win-lose settlement enhances conflicts as the emergent loser after resolution of conflict may tend to revive the conflict in a bid to recover the loss incurred. According to Thomason (2005), “…win-lose settlement of distributive bargaining does not solve the conflict effectively since there is a high probability that the parties are going to conflict in future” (p. 5). The conflict recurs because distributive bargaining provided a competitive settlement where the best negotiator maximizes the benefit leaving the other party at a loss. For instance, a defendant can negotiate to pay the least compensation leaving the claimant at a loss or a claimant can negotiate to receive maximum compensation possible making defendant incur a lot of losses (Gelfand, & Brett, 2004, p. 123). Even though there is resolution of conflict during negotiation, the loser becomes dissatisfied with the settlement and may plan to retaliate to satisfy the demands lost during negotiation.
Critics also argue that distributive bargaining gives negotiating partners a chance to expand their state of conflict rather than toresolve it. The freedom of partners to argue competitively while focusing on achieving maximum benefits is detrimental to the process of conflict resolution. Due to the competitive nature of the bargaining process, the parties make impractical demands thus complicating the bargaining process. The impractical demands that are too high or too low for the claimant and defendant respectively stall the negotiation process, as the bargaining range is too wide for one to make reasonable concessions. Pruitt (1983) asserts that, “…agreements are sometimes not reached in the distributive bargaining because parties become rigid in their positions and when agreements are reached, they are low-level compromises because the parties have not been able to do any creative thinking” (p. 181). Agreements in distributive bargaining depend on the concessions that the competitive parties make, which is very difficult since they all need to make maximum benefit out of the settlement; none of them wants to be a loser.
As compared with the integrative bargaining, distributive bargaining does not focus on generating solutions that will effectively resolve the conflict and satisfy both parties, but instead it focuses on making compromises as a product of painful concessions that the parties make. The competitive behavior of the conflicting parties obstructs generation of creative solutions as in the case of cooperative behavior in integrative bargaining process (Mckersie, & Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 2009, p. 510). Compromises achieved in the distributive bargaining process are not effective in resolving other cases of disputes that do not require compensation. Moreover, critics argue that distributive bargaining is a time-consuming process that does not yield many benefits at the end of the settlement, the parties still contend with the resolution due to the extent of concessions they have made. According to Donohue (1981), “the distributive bargaining process has attracted many criticisms which include unwise approach, inefficient resolution, destroy relationships, low level of compromises, lack of creativity, poor mutual beneficial and outcomes” (p. 274). These criticisms of distributive bargaining are the merits of the integrative bargaining since they have contrasting principles, characteristics, and assumptions.
Future of Distributive Bargaining
Since many critics have argued that distributive bargaining is inefficient method of resolving conflicts, others have suggested that a combination of the distributive and integrative approaches will result in efficient settlements of the conflicts. However, proponents of distributive bargaining argue that there are still special cases of conflicts that require win-lose settlement, hence no other method of settlement is appropriate except distributive bargaining. Davidson (2002) argues that, “integrative bargaining supplement the effectiveness of distributive bargaining and vice versa, hence, for effective resolution of conflicts, negotiators need to consider employing both approaches” (p. 14). Thus, the effectiveness of distributive bargaining depends on its integration with other effective models of resolving conflicts like the integrative bargaining. Given that integrative bargaining complements the effectiveness of distributive bargaining, combination of the two approaches of conflict resolution will result in effective bargaining process and resolution of disputes.
Conflict theorists argue that there is no single model of negotiation that can effectively resolve conflicts on its own, because all models have inefficiencies that need complementary models to enhance effectiveness. Since inefficiencies of distributive bargaining are the strengths of the integrative bargaining, the combination of the two models of negotiations translates into effective resolution of conflicts. Sebenius (1992) explains that, “…most negotiations involve both integrative and distributive bargaining… negotiators should do as much as they can to ‘create value,’ once the pie is as big enough, they should claim as much of the value they can for themselves” (p. 34). Thus, the process of bargaining should involve integrative bargaining, which enlarges the limited resources of conflict, then followed by distributive bargaining where the conflicting parties competitively strive to gain maximum benefit from the expanded resources. Since no single theory of negotiation can effectively resolve all conflicts at all times, the future of distributive bargaining lies in its ability to integrate other theories like integrative bargaining into its principles and negotiation process.
Conclusion
The constant emergence of conflicts between individuals, groups of people and nations has compelled peacemakers, negotiators, mediators, arbitrators and lawyers among other parties to formulate theories that would effectively address the emerging conflicts. Distributive bargaining is one of the theories, which elucidates the process of resolving conflicts that result in a win-lose settlement. The theory developed from Nash bargaining game and economic theories in 1930s and has gradually transformed with time into the present society. Distributive bargaining theory is widely applicable in the resolution of conflicts that involve compensation and business contracts. Competitive negotiation and win-lose settlement of disputes are the major characteristics of the distributive bargaining, but many critics perceive them are inherent weaknesses of the theory relative to the integrative bargaining theory. Comparative studies reveal that the effectiveness of distributive bargaining can significantly improve if it utilizes integrative bargaining principles in the resolution of conflicts.
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