Introduction
The issue of free will has been discussed in philosophy since Aristotle. A tremendous literature has been devoted to it, perhaps more extensive than that dedicated to any other philosophical question. There is no wonder that the fate of higher values and sanctities is closely connected with a beginning as freedom. Thus, some philosophers are passionately opposed to the doctrine of free will because, in their view, liberty is incompatible with the conditions of scientific possibility. The approaches are varied, and the positive answer to the question of free will can be given only based on a whole definite worldview with a complex system of notions.
Determinism
Philosophers are divided into two opposing camps on this question: compatibilists, who think it is possible to combine free will with determinism, and incompatibilists, who deny this possibility. For a better understanding of these concepts, one can turn to the philosophical thoughts of Stace, who was a compatibilist. According to his vision, everything that happens in human life is the direct result of past actions, and therefore free will is necessarily associated with the theory of determinism (Stace 252). Moreover, this category is directly related to moral objectivity and the consequences for the individual.
Compatibilism
The fact that many people do not believe in free will is contrary to reality because actual actions always prove otherwise. Free activities are caused by desires, motives, or inner psychological states present in a person’s mind. In contrast, non-free actions are driven by physical forces or conditions present outside a person (Stace 252). Thus, free will correlates with determinism because human behavior and actions are always conditioned by desires and have caused.
On the other hand, if the occasion itself is not an unrestricted motion and no free movement is conducted to the affair, one could declare that it is not up to the agent whether the matter happens. For example, Rove considers that if one occasion defines another, it is not up to anyone whether the other event will occur if the first has ensued. If it does not rely on the agent to cause a particular event, then it does not depend on the agent to do that action (Rowe 19). With this principle in mind, one would have to admit that some decisions considered by proponents of indeterminism theories to be accessible to deliberate are independent of those who make those decisions.
Rationality of Concepts
The situation of freedom of choice contains an obviousness that proves to be stronger than any deterministic schemes. At least as far as practical thinking is concerned, the subjectivist justification for causal determinism fails. Meanwhile, if there are insufficient objective reasons to accept the doctrine of causal determinism, it subjectively has no place in a choice situation (Vaughn 232). Again, what difference does it make it compatible with? The question of compatibility loses the existential significance it has in the case of blindly accepting the dogma of causal determinism, and the questioner gains a more detached perspective. Conquering such a perspective seems to be the most essential and justified.
Conclusion
Thus, free will is the ability to influence events, make choices, to act independently of constraints. The notion of free will lies at the foundation of morals, law, and religion since it is believed that a person makes all decisions consciously. Despite this, there are situations in everyone’s life in which the possibilities for action are limited, thus calling into question the absoluteness of free choice. Nevertheless, everyone influences his destiny, and it is impossible to deny this completely.
Works Cited
Rowe, William L. “Two Concepts of Freedom.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, vol. 61, no. 1. American Philosophical Association, 1987, pp. 1-22.
Stace, Walter Terence. Religion and the modern mind. Macmillan, 1953.
Vaughn, Lewis. Philosophy Here and Now: Powerful Ideas in Everyday Life. Oxford University Press, 2013.