In the article titled “Divine Foreknowledge, Divine Constancy, and the Rejection of Saul’s Kingship,” Fretheim discusses the implications of God rejecting Saul’s kingship and anointing David. First and foremost, the author aims to clarify the seeming contradiction regarding divine repentance in 1 Samuel 15. According to Fretheim, the passages about God never intending to repent relate to David’s kingship specifically but do not mean that He “never repents with regard to anything.” Fretheim then deduces that God was willing to shift from Saul’s conditional rule to David’s unconditional kingship based on the results of his “experiment” with Saul. This interpretation necessarily presupposes that God could not foresee the results of Saul’s leadership, thus raising questions about the limits of divine foreknowledge.
The main implication for this interpretation of 1 Samuel 15 is portraying God’s foreknowledge as limited. According to Fretheim, God’s willingness to place David’s rule “on an entirely new footing compared to that of Saul” stemmed from Him learning something from his experience with Israel’s first king. This perspective only makes sense if one assumes that God did not know in advance how Saul’s kingship would turn out to be. As Fretheim sees it, God knows all the branching possibilities and the implications of each but does not foresee which of them would be realized in practice due to the free will of human beings.
The main strength of this argument is that it allows making sense of certain seeming contradictions in the biblical text. Firstly, it explains why 1 Samuel 15 alternates between passages about God repenting or not repenting by showing that the passage about never repenting relates to the decision on David’s kingship specifically. Secondly, Fretheim’s argument potentially explains why God “becomes fiercely loyal” to the idea of monarchy even though it was not His first choice. According to Fretheim, God works with the humanity He has at the moment, “within existing societal structures and possibilities.” Finally, yet another strength of the argument is that it substantiates the case for limited divine foreknowledge by grounding it in the free will that makes Saul’s kingship less than desirable. Boyd reiterated the same approach by pointing out that God’s decision was not the only variable in the matter, and Saul’s free will played its role. Overall, the strength of Fretheim’s article is that it is a well-rounded argument for open theism.
The weakness of the article is twofold, as one can challenge it in terms of terminology and interpretation at once. First of all, it is true that the verb form “nifal,” as used in the Hebrew Bible, is usually translated as “to repent” for one’s own actions. However, it can also mean “be moved to compassion” toward others and their suffering. Thus, in Saul’s case, God does not necessarily repent because he could not foresee the negative results of Saul’s kingship – he may simply feel sorry for the king who strayed from the path. Fretheim’s argument presupposes that God “could only see the possibilities” but not the predetermined outcome of Saul’s rule, which is why the realization of negative possibility brings Him sorrow. However, even if God expected Saul to fail from the beginning, and the latter confirmed divine expectations – that is, if God had perfect and exhaustive foreknowledge – He would still pity the stray king. Simply put, God’s sorrow does not necessarily mean the absence of perfect foreknowledge.
Overall, the article provides a mixed impression on the reader. It offers an effective analysis of God’s shifting attitude toward Saul’s and David’s kingship, with which one can easily agree. On the other hand, the central argument about limited foreknowledge does not necessarily stem from the premise of God’s sorrow upon seeing Saul’s kingship. In my opinion, the article may serve as a useful exercise for distinguishing between what is actually proven in the text – such as God’s willingness to change the divine arrangement of monarchy based on existing historical conditions – and what is extrapolated from these proofs – such as the idea that God’s disappointment in Saul necessarily signifies limited foreknowledge.
Bibliography
Borgman, Paul. David, Saul, and God: Rediscovering an Ancient Story. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008.
Boyd, “The Open-Theism View.” In Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, edited by James K. Beilby et al., 13-64. Downers Grove, IL.: InterVarsity Press, 2001.
Erickson, Millard J. What Does God Know and When Does He Know It? The Current Controversy over Divine Foreknowledge. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2003.
Fretheim, Terence E. “Divine Foreknowledge, Divine Constancy, and the Rejection of Saul’s Kingship.” The Catholic Biblical Quarterly 47 (1985): 595-602.
Sonnet, Jean-Pierre. “God’s Repentance And ‘False Starts’ In Biblical History (Genesis 6–9; Exodus 32–34; 1 Samuel 15 And 2 Samuel 7).” In Congress Volume Ljubljana 2007, edited by André Lemaire, 469-494. Leiden: Brill, 2009.