Emerging Terrorist Threat in Africa

Introduction

If judging terrorism only by the media, its face is always changing. In that regard, it can be stated that its most recent face seems to be in Africa. The African terrorism threat is different and its difference is not a positive one. Judging such threat through the media, it can be stated that newspapers’ headlines largely oversimplify the threat of terrorism. One reason can be seen in that the emergence of the terrorist threat in Africa coincided with terrorists’ attacks originating from other continents, although their hideouts led to Africa. Additionally, before 2001, there were no designated terrorists groups in Africa, which can be mainly explained through political reasons, as it was stated in Lyman and Morrison (2004) that the United States was hesitant to make political labels.¹ At the same time, the geopolitical nature of many African countries, their internal conflicts and economic struggles made many African countries an easy target to capitalize on by international terrorist organizations. The threat of terrorism is nevertheless, started to appear at the end of the last century when in 1998 two bombs exploded outside of US embassies in Dar es Salam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, leading to 224 people being killed.² Being linked to al-Qaeda, it can be stated that the threat which the United Stated was previously hesitant to recognize started to emerge. In that regard, the United States needed to shift its focus toward such emergent threat. Thus, the present paper will provide an analysis of the major sources of terrorists’ threat in Africa, providing an overview of the US initiatives in the region. The choice of Somalia as one of the centers of focus can be explained by its recent occupation at the top of the list of countries at risk for extreme terrorism. According to the most recent update by Maplecroft, a UK organization that rates terrorism risks, Somalia, has “overtaken Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan and the Palestinian territories as the country most at risk for ‘extreme terrorism’”.³ Thus, analyzing the sources and the manifestations of terrorism in Africa along with the way the United States dealt with them through diplomatic and military interventions, this paper states that dealing with such emergent threat, the approach taken by the United States Foreign policy focused mostly on military interventions, either following or preceding humanitarian and diplomatic initiatives, while in order to eliminate the threat the administrative and diplomatic interventions should be combined at the same time, focusing on long term objectives in the region.

Terrorism and Sources of Threat

The first source of threat can be linked to Somalia. The unrest in Somalia is characteristic of its local politics, in which the United States did not take a decisive role. An overview of the terrorism in Africa, provided in Piombo (2007), explained such fact by the difficulty to distinguish between terrorism, as it was designated by area governments, and political groups standing in opposition to this same government.⁴ Accordingly, the definition of terrorism might have an important role in such matter, where according to the government of the United States terrorism refers to “the use of force or violence against persons or property in violation of the criminal laws of a state, for purposes of intimidation, coercion or ransom, by groups or individuals whose terrorist activities are foreign-based or whose activities transcend national boundaries.⁵ For many countries in Africa, such definition is unambiguous, where it is argued in Wanta and Kalyango (2007) that the regimes in such countries do not distinguish between the targets of the Global War on Terror and “domestic political insurgents or vigilante criminals”.⁶ Thus, such fact explains the confusion in labeling terrorists in many African countries. Accordingly, prior to 2000, the role of the United States can be described as leading a humanitarian mission, and part of the peace keeping interventions.

The situation started to change radically when the followers of General Mohamed Farah Aideed initiated protests and started bombing roads, which accordingly, contributed to the US transformation from humanitarian efforts into military. The situation escalated in Somalia with the incident of shooting two Black Hawk helicopters. As described in the book title Black Hawk Down by Mark Bowden (1999), such incident showed the US admitting the failure of their policy toward Somalia, after which the United States forces left the country.⁷ Such fact contributes to explaining the approach that the United States took toward the instability in the region, where such incident can be narrated through the way the foreign policy of the United States was shaped between two extremes, humanitarian efforts, which were unable to counter Somali militias, and the military interventions that followed afterwards.

The responsibility for shooting the two helicopters was taken by Osama bin Laden, a claim which required the United States a period between 1994 and 2001 to be taken seriously. At the same time, the threat was raised through the integration of Islamic movements in Horn of Africa. Somalia along with the rest of the Horn of Africa had a long history with Islam. However, it was the rise of Radical Islamist groups such as Al-Itahad al-Islamiya, which was considered as threat. Islamists, including Al-Itahad al-Islamiya, were soon neutralized in the region through the efforts of the native forces of Somalia and Ethiopia. Nevertheless, the occurrence of such group, although for a limited time, raised the likelihood of instability in the whole region, where they imposed Islamic Sharia laws, and participating in many confrontations with the clans, which accordingly led to losses of many lives. It can be stated that the occurrence of such organization shows that the emergence of a threat was more likely connected to the creation of a favorable breeding ground to groups that attack US targets, rather than the local political situation. In that regard, the demonstration of such threat was shown on August 7, 1998, when two bombs exploded outside of US embassies. The link to Somalia was mentioned in a statement that bin Laden’s International Islamic Front for Holy War against Jews and Crusaders issued several days after the east Africa bombings.⁸ Such fact emphasizes how local and regional turbulences in Somalia started to take the shape of terrorism against the United States. The bombings were tracked to Somalia indirectly, as in his statement Ben Laden’s organization cited killings in Somalia as a reason for which the embassies were attacked, accusing the embassies of supervising such activity. There are other links to the involvement of Somalia through. One aspect is that Somalia was used as a training ground for those responsible for bombings. The rationale might be understandable, as an environment such as the one in Somalia was lacking any law enforcement and was politically instable, enabling recruiting, training, and planning attacks. A favorable ground was already created through such organization as Al-Itahad al-Islamiya. A review of Islamist radicalism in Somalia and Al-Itahad al-Islamiya emphasized that the latter was distinguished among other Islamist and political organizations for its advocacy for direct violence in achieving their objectives. ⁹ Despite the fact that such organization was neutralized their members still posed a threat, where their relationship with Al-Qaeda was established through sources citing that “between 3,000 and 5,000 members of the al Qa’eda and al-Itihad partnership are operating in Somalia, with 50,000 to 60,000 supporters and reservists”.¹⁰ Intelligence sources also indicated through the Washington Times that “[t]here are indications bin Laden is setting up a new base of operations in Somalia”.¹¹

Al-Qaeda was also linked to other terrorism activities in Africa, among which was firing missiles in Mombasa’s airport, where it is stated that the operational base for this operation was located in Somalia. The selection of the country as a target can be explained the same way as the embassies in Tanzania and Kenya and just as any other country in the Horn of Africa – feasibility of operation given the local infrastructure and perceived vulnerability of the targets. ¹² The activities of Al-Qaeda can be linked to another African country, which contributes greatly to the emergence of a terrorism threat –Sudan.

Sudan is no different than many other countries in the same region in terms of instability, and it served as Osama bin Laden’s base from 1991 to 1996. ¹³ Nevertheless, there are many unique factors for making Sudan also a source of the emergent terrorism threat. First of all, the support of Sudan’s National Islamic Front and its leader Hassan al Turabi helped establishing Al-Qaeda bases and training camps, all of which served as a coordinating unit for terrorist groups allied to bin Laden.¹⁴ The perspective of Sudan’s relation to terrorism was enforced with the suspicion of hosting a chemical weapons plant, the reaction to which was among the US military intervention activities. At the end of that period, due to the reason of a terrorist threat, the United States vacated its embassy in Sudan, although formally, diplomatic relations was not broken. At the same time, the role of Sudan was also emphasized along with Libya as the only two African countries that were listed as sponsors of terrorism in 2000. ¹⁵ Similarly, such classification to the situation in Sudan did not occur from a vacuum, where one of the factors contributing to such classification was the Islamist-dominated regime, which host elements of many terrorist groups, including “Hizballah, al-Gama’at al-Islamiya, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and the Abu Nidal organizations”.¹⁶ A corrupt political regime, an endless civil war between Muslims and non-Muslims, and human rights abuse, all can be seen as factors the outline the role of Sudan in the emergence of an African threat of terrorism.

It should be mentioned that the human rights abuse is a serious issue in Sudan, which in turn influenced the stability in the country, and contribute to Sudan being a source of emergent terrorism threat. According to UN estimations, as of 2006, over 200,000 persons died as a result of conflicts in Sudan, a number which might have increased to 100,000 by 2008.¹⁷ The list of human abuses in Sudan includes violations such as the following:

[A]bridgement of citizens’ right to change their government; extrajudicial and other unlawful killings by government forces and other government-aligned groups throughout the country; torture, beatings, rape, and other cruel, inhumane treatment or punishment by security forces; harsh prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention, incommunicado detention of suspected government opponents, and prolonged pretrial detention; executive interference with the judiciary and denial of due process; obstruction of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the expulsion of humanitarian NGOs; restrictions on privacy; restrictions on freedom of speech; restrictions on the press, including direct censorship; restrictions on freedoms of assembly, association, religion, and movement; harassment of IDPs; harassment and closure of human rights organizations; violence and discrimination against women, including female genital mutilation (FGM); child abuse, including sexual violence and recruitment of child soldiers, particularly in Darfur; preventing international human rights observers from traveling to/within Sudan; trafficking in persons; discrimination and violence against ethnic minorities; denial of workers’ rights; and forced and child labor.¹⁸

Those abuses can be linked to the way Thomas Barnett, a US strategists, divided the countries into developing ones – the core, and the non-integrating “Gap” in his book The Pentagon’s New Map (2004).¹⁹ He linked gap countries to a strategic threat environment posed toward the United States, and in that regard, human rights abuse can be seen among the characteristic elements of those countries, if taking Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Somalia, and the aforementioned Sudan, as examples.

All of the later occurred within a failed political regime which corruption can be seen through the fact that the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for President Bashir as an indirect perpetrator of crimes against humanity. It can be stated that threat of terrorism although varied in the last decade, the recent reports only confirm that Sudan still poses a threat. At the start of 2010, the American embassy in Khartoum cited the existence of terrorism threat in air flights between Juba in Sudan and Kampala in Uganda.²⁰ As of 2011, the Department of State officially warned US citizens of travelling to Sudan due to political tensions and a critical level of terrorist threat in the Khartoum area and Darfur region.²¹ The killing of US embassy employees in 2008 at the hand of Sudanese extremists and the cases of kidnapping made the area highly instable.

Differentiating the sources of threat in Africa, several distinctions should be made. The first is related to the geographical locations of the threat; in Southern Central Africa, for example, such threat is almost inexistent. Accordingly, the stability of the countries in which terrorists can be located might contain variations. Although mostly countries such as Sudan and Somalia are exemplary in terms of showing the relation between instability and terrorism risks, there are exceptions, which can be seen through countries with advanced infrastructures such as South Africa and Nigeria, and one of the most politically stable countries in the region –Kenya, in which the largest al-Qaeda network in East Africa was uncovered. ²² Such distinction can be explained through the difference between bases as training camps in failed states, and organizational and financial centers in stable countries.

The list of African Countries that might pose a terrorist threat includes states in which the common conditions are “the lack of economic perspectives, social deprivation, a loss of cultural identity, political repression, and dysfunctional states”.²³ Such conditions conform to several other African countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, along with countries which are expected to advance in disintegration such as Guinea, Chad, Angola, and Cote d’Ivoire.²⁴ Thus, it can be assumed that many of the countries which were not involved in attacking US targets are listed as potential for the emergence of terrorism. The state of internal instability, and foreign policy and security are linked in the same way chaos and instability connected Afghanistan to the attack on the United States. The disorder in Africa might be connected to threats to the United States and the developed world, just as history of violence and terrorism attacks already shown. The progression from local warlords, religious groups, and militarized opposition to experiencing 556 terrorist attacks in the period of one year, is a vivid example of the way Somalia became the number one in the list of countries at the risk of extreme terrorism, overtaking countries with an ongoing military operations, such as Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. ²⁵ Many of the factors that contribute to Somalia taking such position is connected to Al-Shabaab or “the Youth”, Islamic extremists who control much of the country, and also ”the growing pirate-networks that hijacked cargo ships passing through the Gulf of Aden en route to the Indian Ocean”.²⁶ Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for several terrorism acts, among which five suicide bombings in northern Somalia. The role of such group can be seen taking the lead from Al-Qaeda in the number of terrorism attacks. Accordingly, with the move of Somalia to the top of the terrorist threat index, it can be stated that the existence of such organization will ensure that the region will remain disintegrated, nullifying any efforts to change such situation. With the threat in the region being obvious more than ever, the actions of the United States regarding such group needs a strong emphasis.

Diplomatic Interventions and Funding

Diplomatic and political efforts of the US can be seen on many directions. The military efforts, as explained, mainly went forward after the main terrorist attack on 9/11, 2001. Training and providing aid to counterterrorism efforts can be seen as a political approach, as opposed to direct military interventions. Additional, agenda building can be seen as one way of creating attention to critical issues in Africa, such as terrorism. An analysis of the sources of agenda building indicated that the impact of political figures in their statement and media appearances participate in the agenda building process involving terrorism and African nations.

Humanitarian interventions can be also seen among the political decision which can be related to diplomacy and at the same time directly correlate with terrorism acts. In that regard, it can be stated that the general diplomatic policy of the United States focused mainly on avoiding conflict, rather than initiating military attacks. The operation Restore Hope is one of those operations, which can be primarily characterized as humanitarian. Operation Restore Hope was a code name for Unified Task Force (UNITAF) – unified international forces led by the United States with the aim of securing the environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid.²⁷ The end of the operation resulted in the withdrawal of the United States forces, where such operation provides an example of the way the military and the humanitarian interventions were provided in sequences, rather than combined. Although the operation was considered military, it was shifted toward humanitarian through the United Nations Operation in Somalia UNOSOM I and II. Such shift ended with two Black Hawk helicopters being shot down, which as previously mentioned led to the withdrawal of UNOSOM forces, including those of the United States.

After the 9/11 attack, the position of the United States in Africa did not change much, where the conflicts that occurred, such as Ethiopian-Eritrean Border crisis and developments in Somalia, threatened the situation in the region. Meetings with Ethiopian leaders were attempts of an improvised unilateral initiative to break the impasse that occurred. ²⁸ Other initiatives include meetings with official representatives of the government, the UN secretary, EU, and others. In general, diplomacy failed in the peace process in the region, mainly due to the lack of mechanism for multilateral involvement. At the same time, the diplomatic mission was followed by the introduction of the Ethiopia Freedom, Democracy, and Human Rights Advancement Act of 2006, a “legislation places limits on security assistance, calls for visa restrictions against anyone involved in killing demonstrators, and authorizes $20 million over two years to assist political prisoners, human rights organizations, and other programs to strengthen the rule of law”.²⁹ Considering the link of the events in Ethiopia and Eritrea to the situation in Somalia and Sudan, it can be stated that the direction of the US foreign policy in dealing with the increased tension lacks focus. In that regard, even the recommendations of Council on Foreign Relations, published in 2006 on the situation in the Horn of Africa can be seen lacking the enforcement elements, mainly revolving around diplomatic attention, willingness to take risks and accept costs, and promoting peaceful political change.

One important component of non-military interventions can be seen through the measures targeting the financial aspects of terrorist organizations. An example of such initiatives is the FBI’s Terrorist Finance Operations Section (FTOS), whose aim is combating terrorist finance around the globe. The focus on Africa is limited, where Kenya was the only country in which such training was delivered. ³⁰ In that regard, it can be stated that when designing a broad approach to counter terrorism, the financial aspects are significant. The current implementation of such financial inspection involve cooperating with regional organizations that fight money laundering, such as East and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) and the Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering (GIABA) of West Africa.³¹ Thus, those facts show a limited effort in the financial inspection field, which therewith was taken independently in a narrowly focused fashion.

Military Interventions

Considering the US diplomatic and humanitarian initiatives, it can be stated that there were also direct military attacks on emergent threats from states in Africa. The success of those interventions cannot be taken unambiguously as well. On the one hand, the responses were direct and quick, according to asymmetry warfare rules, but at the same time, in the long perspective, the threat in Africa was not eradicated in most of the countries that posed danger to the United States in a span of 10-15 years. On the contrary, with Somalia moving to the top of the list, and the emergent threat of a civil war in Egypt, with Muslim Brotherhood coming to power, it can be stated that Africa might be strategically important to US foreign policy more than ever.

Taking short term military responses such as firing cruise missiles into Al-shifa aspirin factory in Khartoum in 1998, it can be stated that it was a military intervention that did not take the root cause of the situation in a failed state. In addition to the aforementioned, the United States conducted at least 20 military operations in Africa during the 1990s.³² One of those integrative military approaches can be seen through the creation of Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF –HOA). ³³ The military presence in the region was not supported by a diplomatic and intelligence presence on the ground. Other military programs can be seen through Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), and the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA), which focus was on creating regional peacekeeping forces, training battalions and companies from approximately 13 African countries. ³⁴ Those too initiatives are more of a humanitarian representations, although they are related to the military and peace keeping efforts. Explicit counter terrorism initiatives can be seen, in addition to CJTF –HOA, through “Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), Joint Task force AZTEK SILENCE, and the East African Counter-Terrorism Initiative (EACTI)”.³⁵ Nevertheless, the initiative that can demonstrate the focus of the United States on the African security problems and the specific approach it requires can be seen through the launch of Department of Defense Unified Combatant Command for Africa (AFRICOM) in 2007.

The aim of such initiative was two-fold, a military intervention and a humanitarian aid. It should be mentioned that such shift in focus was also caused by the increased strategic interest of the United States in the region, with Africa surpassing the Middle East as the ”largest U.S. regional supplier of crude oil”.³⁶ Nevertheless, it can be stated that the shift in priorities in Africa, as opposed to Iraq for example, implies different kinds of goals, such as “hunger, disease, internecine warfare, oppressive regimes, and crushing poverty”.³⁷ The problem of AFRICOM, in that matter, can be seen through aggregating the terrorist threat into a single “monolithic enemy”.³⁸ Thus, those facts indicate that even with an approach such as AFRICOM, the US policies failed to recognize the unique characteristics of such threat, acting more through short-term response, rather than focusing on long term objectives.

Discussion

The direction that should be taken to counter terrorism must employ a broader approach. That is, the approaches taken by US intervention should focus on solving long term strategic objectives. A good example of such combination can be seen through two distinct objectives, security assistance and capacity building. Those objectives can be reflected in different ways, where the main point is that they should be employed simultaneously. One definition of such “broader” approach can be seen through matching two of the United States main means of achieving foreign policy goals, military and economic power. Another definition, although differing in terminology, yet might imply the same, is the one outlined by Thomas Barnett, which is the use of leviathan force and system administrators.³⁹ The leviathan force refers to the brute military power used by the United Stated in asymmetric warfare to achieve fast victories, while administrators refer to those who manage the transition period afterwards. Matching all of the aforementioned, it can be stated that the military power- the leviathan force will be connected to security assistance, while system administrators, who are supported by the US economic power, will focus on capacity building in failed states, or Barnett’s gap.⁴⁰ Analyzing the emergence of threats in Africa, mixing the responsibilities of those two forces or abandoning one of them can lead to several unfavorable results. One result can be seen through the end of the operation Restore Hope and the American Forces leaving the country, which is an example in which despite both forces being combined, the military and the humanitarian, the leviathan force did not complete it job before the administrators took their responsibility. Both forces can be identified, although not in the same manner of operation, in UNOSOM and UNITAF operating in Somalia, as administrators and leviathan force respectively. The end of the operation Restore Hope can be attributed to the leviathan force pulling out, before the environment was secure.⁴¹ It should be mentioned that Barnett’s vision of the system of administrators is still militarized, where it is a military department, although with different personnel and other functions. It might be expanded to include organizational and managerial staff as well. Accordingly, one important condition for such “capacity building” mission is its collective nature. In operation Restore Hope it was the United States that was leading in numbers. For example, although UNITAF was named as a multinational force, the number of American troops was almost double all the international forces combined. ⁴² The latter leads to recommending the new integrative initiative to be formed within the governance of international community and equally distributed international involvement..

Such approach is recommended to be used as a blueprint whenever an emergent threat of terrorism occurs in an ungoverned space, i.e. a space where there is “an absence of state capacity or political will to exercise control”.⁴³ Such space was in Iraq and Afghanistan, and now will be in Somalia, Sudan, and other countries in Africa. Such approach can be linked to the strategy of the United States, operating within the selective engagement strategy. Such strategy implies that the United States would retain its alliances and forward bases, “keep US troops deployed in Eurasia, [and] embrace all of [its] national interests”.⁴⁴ Such strategy is argued to be more expensive, but at the same time more reliable in protecting the security and the national interests of the United States on several dimensions, such as controlling the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, defending against terror attacks, protecting American economic interests, advancing America’s democratic and humanitarian values, and what is most applicable in this case “hedging against future uncertainties”.⁴⁵ As it might be assumed such role will be taken by the leviathan force described by Barnett, and in this case, it is applicable to AFRICOM, to a more or less degree. The difference can be seen in that AFRICOM is an integrative command of the United States military forces, whereas the administrative system proposed presupposes international collaborations in building the capacity in a failed state. Nevertheless, it can be seen that integrating AFRICOM into the blueprint outlined can be seen achievable. The priorities of operations in countering an emergent terrorist threat can be seen through two stages. The first stage is securing the environment, while the second stage collaborative international administrative efforts are building the capacity of the state, in order to remove the underlying causes of the threat.

Conclusion

The present paper provided an analysis of the threat of terrorism in Africa and the US initiatives in that matter. The paper stated the in order to counter terrorism threat the military involvement of the United States should be combined with administrative and diplomatic interventions, operating within an international coalition. The changes in the region still demonstrate threats in failed states for more than 15 years, for which it can be stated that the approaches implemented by the United States were not sufficient. At the same time, the focus on Africa as a source of emergent threat as well as its increased strategic importance emphasizes the need for modifying the strategy. The paper proposes the integration of the military and administrative intervention in accordance to the approach proposed by Thomas Barnett, in which two operating unit will counter terrorism in failed states, a security unit –a leviathan force, and a capacity building unit – system administrators.

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Footnotes

1. Jessica R. Piombo, “Terrorism and U.S. Counter-Terrorism Programs in Africa: An Overview,” Strategic Insights 6, no. 1 (2007). Web.
2. P. N. Lyman and S.T. Morrison, “The Terrorist Threat in Africa,” FOREIGN AFFAIRS 83, no. 1 (2004).
3. Aimée Kligman, “Somalia Heads the Maplecroft Terrorist Index”. Web.
4. Piombo.
5. Wayne Wanta and Yusuf Kalyango, “Terrorism and Africa: A Study of Agenda Building in the United States,” International Journal of Public Opinion Research 19, no. 4 (2007).
6. Ibid.
7. Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down : A Story of Modern War, 1st ed. (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999).
8. Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, Pbk. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003).
9. Andre Le Sage, “Prospects for Al Itihad and Islamist Radicalism in Somalia,” Review of African Political Economy 89, no. 27 (2001). Web.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Pillar.
13. Lyman and Morrison.
14. Piombo.
15. Pillar.
16. Ibid., 160.
17. US Department of State, “2009 Human Rights Report: Sudan”. Web.
18. Ibid.
19. Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map : War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004).
20. Alex Thurston, “Terrorism in East Africa: Sudan, Uganda, and the Us on Different Pages”. Web.
21. Bureau of Consular Affairs, “Travel Warning U.S. Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs”. Web.
22. Piombo.
23. STEFAN MAIR, “Terrorism and Africa: On the Danger of Further Attacks in Sub-Saharan Africa,” African Security Review 12, no. 1 (2003): 108.
24. Ibid.
25. Kligman.
26. Mohamed A. Mohamed, “Thesis – U.S. Strategic Interest in Somalia: From Cold War Era to War on Terror”. Web.
27. UN Department of Public Information, “United Nations Operation in Somalia I”. Web.
28. Terrence Lyons, Avoiding Conflict in the Horn of Africa: U.S. Policy toward Ethiopia and Eritrea (THE CENTER FOR PREVENTIVE ACTION, 2006).
29. Ibid., 23.
30. Piombo.
31. Ibid.
32. Robert G. Berschinski, Africom’s Dilemma: The “Global War on Terrorism,” “Capacity Building,” Humanitarianism, and the Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa (U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2007).
33. Lyman and Morrison.
34. Piombo.
35. Ibid., 7.
36. Berschinski.
37. Ibid., 10.
38. Ibid.
39. Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map : War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004).
40. Ibid.
41. Laura L. Miller and Charles Moskos, “Humanitarians or Warriors?: Race, Gender, and Combat Status in Operation Restore Hope,” Armed Forces & Society 21, no. 4 (1995).
42. UN Department of Public Information, “United Nations Operation in Somalia I”. Web.
43. Piombo.
44. Robert J. Art, A Grand Strategy for America, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).
45. Ibid., 199.