An ontological argument set forth by Descartes is among the most exciting while also improperly understood aspects in his philosophy. The interest in the argument is associated with the effort to prove that God exists based on simple but significant premises. Descartes was unsuccessful in proving the existence of God with his ontological argument due to the ambiguity in premises’ formulation. Thus, this paper aims to explore the success of Descartes’ ontological argument for the existence of good. It is imperative to reconstruct it and discuss its significance to philosophy. Moreover, the paper will discuss the limitations of the argument as well as the suggestions for addressing them. At the final stage, the paper will be summarized to note its main takeaways.
Descartes’ ontological argument sets a logical chain that one may follow when proving the existence of God. It suggests that there is an idea of a God as a supremely perfect being, and existence is a perfection; therefore, God must exist (Nolan). Looking at this argument, one may suggest that the logic is flawed. If to reconstruct it and use another subject other than God, it is possible to prove the existence of other supremely perfect beings or objects. For instance, there is an idea of a supremely perfect cow. As existence is a perfection, a supremely perfect cow therefore exists. Since it is possible to run similar versions of the argument for other supremely perfect objects, both live and inanimate, something is flawed in Descartes’ ontological argument.
There is a misunderstanding that the ontological argument for the existence of God is more complicated than the three steps outlined earlier. The main point of the argument is claiming that it is a contradiction to suppose that God does not exist, the same way that it is contradicting to presume that a square has three sides. When arguing in support of God’s existence, the contradiction that appears is the following: if there is no God, then he is not a supremely perfect being (Banach). This means that if God does not exist, then it is possible to imagine some other being that is more perfect than God. However, this presents a contradiction because God is seen as the most perfect being that has ever existed. Thus, Descartes’ argument can be referred to as reductio ad absurdum, a mode of argumentation that establishes contention by deriving an absurdity from denial, arguing that a thesis must be accepted because rejecting it is untenable (The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica).
To break the argument further, it is necessary to look at it from the reductio standpoint. Descartes argument is the following:
- P1. God is the most perfect being, and no other more perfect being can be conceived.
- P2. One can conceive such an incredibly perfect being to exist in real life.
- P3. What exists in the tangible world is more perfect than what only exists in conception.
Drawing from the three premises above, the reductio process is the following:
- A. One should suppose that God does not exist.
- B. Then, one can conceive of a being that is more perfect than God.
- C. However, this is contradictory because no other being more perfect than God can be conceived.
- D. Thus, God must exist.
At step C of the reductio, one arrives at a contradiction because of the conclusion that it is possible to imagine a being that is more perfect than God even though P1 suggests that it is something that one cannot do, and there is no being more perfect than God. Therefore, the immediate conclusion made in step B of the reductio contradicts P1, which means that the supposition in step A must also be rejected. There is a significant problem with Descartes’ argument, and it is concerned with the first premise (P1) because of its ambiguity. On the one hand, it is possible to think that one cannot conceive of a being more perfect than one conceives of God as being (P1-A). On the other hand, it may mean that one cannot imagine a being that is more perfect than God really is (P1-B).
Looking back at steps B and C in the reductio, a contradiction emerges because, based on the hypothesis that there is no God, it is possible to conceive a being as more perfect than God. Thus, since God does not exist, his perfection is less than other beings’ of which one imagines. After all, what exists in real life is far more perfect than what exists in conception. The conclusion that can be made regarding this is that P1-B must replace P1 to reduce the ambiguity of Descartes’ argument.
Further issues arise when looking closer at P1-B as it cannot be accepted as a premise. Taking into account P3, what exists in reality is more perfect than what only exists in conception, one does not accept the premise that it is impossible to conceive of a being more perfect than God unless being already convinced that there is God. Put differently, the supposition that there is no God does drive a contradiction, but the paradox involves a question-begging premise (Texas State University). P1-A appears to be a better premise in this case. If there is an idea of God as the most perfect being, P1-A seems to be true. However, suppose it is the very first premise to be used in the argument. In that case, Descartes’ argument for the existence of God is invalid because the conclusion in Step B of the reductio does not contradict P1-A. Drawing from the supposition that there is no God, it does not follow that one cannot conceive of a more perfect being than God. Thus, if there is a contradiction in the premises, there is no need to reject the supposition that God does not exist. Descartes may respond to the criticism by stating that the argument is much simpler than put in the analysis. He may say that if there is an idea of God, then all other objections will collapse inevitably.
Replying to Descartes’ objection, one may state that the argument appears acceptable at first, but upon further analysis, it has shown to be unsuccessful at proving that God exists. The premise P1-A is acceptable, and that is how P1 is at first being presented. Although, in step C of the reductio, the argument relies on P1-B. Therefore, a seemingly sound argument is constructed on one interpretation of P1 first, followed by its other interpretation later. Such ambiguity is unacceptable in arguments for God’s existence because the differences in interpretations yield varied results. However, if one is to use the same interpretation of the first premise, P1, then the entire argument presents a problem. If P1-A is the first premise to be applied, then the argument is invalid; if one uses P1-B as the first premise, the argument presents as question-begging. Either way, Descartes was unsuccessful in proving the existence of God with his ontological argument.
Works Cited
Banach, David. “Descartes’ Ontological Argument.” DBanach, Web.
Nolan, Lawrence. “Descartes’ Ontological Argument.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Web.
Texas State University. “Begging the Question.” TXState, Web.
The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. “Reductio Ad Absurdum.” Britannica, Web.