Introduction
Eternal life, and the value of such an experience – this question has always worried philosophers of antiquity and modernity. Besides, since it is linked with the problem of life’s meaning, the question of immortality is one of the fundamental dilemmas of philosophy. In his article Williams (2010) presents the opinion that immortality is not desirable since the endless repetition of the same experiences inevitably makes life boring and deprives a person of the meaning of life. Bortolotti and Nagasawa (2009) disagree with this view, as they do not believe Williams (2010) has presented enough arguments to defend his point. This paper aims to discuss whether the philosophers were right or not and suggest that changing categorical desires is possible and implies identity change.
Williams’ Arguments
Williams (2010) argues that immortality is not necessarily good, or is not good at all, and gives the example of Elina Makropulos, a heroine of a play by Karel Čapek and a subsequent opera by Janaček. The philosopher presents the plot, according to which Elina received the elixir of immortality from her father, the Court physician to a sixteenth-century Emperor. Elina lived a long and eventful life, but she decides to die, refusing a new portion of the elixir. The heroine explains her act by the fact that it is not the length of life that makes it meaningful. The heroine also destroys the elixir’s recipe not to condemn anyone to the suffering that she experienced. Therefore, Williams concludes that Elina made this choice because she was tired of repeated experiences and because her life lost its meaning.
Bortolotti and Nagasawa’s Arguments
Scholars Bortolotti and Nagasawa (2009) objected to Williams (2010), pointing out that he was not clear enough about his arguments. In particular, the scholars emphasize that Williams meant that Elina was not tired of life with its fleeting desires, but that she had exhausted her categorical desires, which fill any person’s experience with meaning and are part of human identity. Bortolotti and Nagasawa also present a broad discussion about the nature of desire and boredom. Specifically, scientists suggest that “the type of boredom that brings about loss of meaning and detachment from one’s life ensues in the absence of life goals or failure in pursuing the life goals” (Bortolotti and Nagasawa, 2009, p. 277). In conclusion, scientists draw an analogy between categorical and habitual desires, suggesting that immortals may have problems with categorical desires that could correlate with regular boredom.
Inexhaustibility of Categorical Desires
Bortolotti and Nagasawa (2009) would probably agree with the inexhaustibility and infinity of categorical desires, analogous to habitual desires’ inexhaustibility. However, one must agree with scientists that categorical desires are different from regular ones and are more related to the setting and achievement of goals. Besides, I dare to suggest that, despite the great difficulties that a person may have with the emergence or formation of such desires and their achievement, it is unlikely that such problems can cause satiety with life.
To illustrate my point of view, I will give an example associated with the formation, acquisition, and subsequent change of identity. Throughout life, all people go through stages of growing up, and during these stages, dramatic changes usually occur to a person. That is, there is a change in human identity, which is the key to the search and achievement of new categorical desires, which may be completely different from the previous ones. If humans were unable to cope with the emptiness and hopelessness that arises due to the exhaustion of the meaning of the latest categorical desires, most people would never survive adolescence. However, there are other turning points in traditional human life, including the stage of growing up, a midlife crisis, the onset of old age, and, finally, preparation for death.
Noteworthy, Williams (2010) gives an example where immortality comes along with a pause in growing up. In this way, the philosopher talks about the connection between the absence of physical aging and the changes that determine inner age. On the one hand, there is some truth in this assumption. After all, external circumstances, such as the need to have children and gain independence, and the fear of the body’s aging push people to re-evaluate their categorical desires repeatedly. However, it cannot be said with complete certainty that changes in the physical body and the associated social status changes are the only reasons for growing up.
Many people from childhood have shown the restraint and judgment that is characteristic of old age. Others remain frivolous youths, obsessed with the thirst for life and all its changeable pleasures until the very end. Both the former and the latter experience changes in internal age, which may not be related to physical changes in the body but are due to personal motives. Therefore, the presented play about Elina Makropulos may not reveal the question of immortality. It can instead be a witty, expressive, and vivid illustration of what happens to a person who does not want to grow old and die, experiencing changes in identity. One can also note a particular analogy between identity change and death. Perhaps identity change or growing up is a “little death,” and we all experience these little deaths many times. Therefore, death may be somewhat similar to the final reassessment of categorical human desires.
Williams (2010) further notes that the change in identity must be perceived as that we are dealing with another person, and therefore, in the presented case of Elina Makropulos, it must be taken for granted that her identity does not change, and thus her categorical desires remain unchanged. However, in this case, it turns out that the conditions of the problem determine its solution. Nevertheless, this is hardly possible in real life, and there is hardly a person who is entirely unable to change. Therefore, the presented case should be perceived as a purely theoretical, artificial example given to reviving the discussion.
Conclusion
Thus was discussed the rightness of the assumption that immortality is undesirable, as it leads to the exhaustion of the categorical desires and the loss of life’s meaning. From my perspective, such a statement is not valid, since it overlooks the inexhaustibility of such desires, and the infinite ability of a person to grow, mature and change their identity. On the one hand, this ability gives life meaning; on the other hand, the change of identity during life is a “little death,” which is consistent with the statement that death gives meaning to life. Besides, despite the proposed conditions, according to which the personality of Elina Makropulos cannot change, in all likelihood, she chooses death because she does not want to change, and perhaps over a long-life course, she loses fear of death.
References
Bortolotti, L., & Nagasawa, Y. (2009). Immortality without boredom. Ratio, 22(3), 261-277.
Williams, B. (2010). The Makropulos case: reflections on the tedium of immortality. In D. Benatar (Ed.), life, death, and meaning: Key philosophical readings on the big questions (pp. 345-362). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.