September 11, 2001, is considered by many the official date of the Global War started. This war is tightly intertwined with irregular warfare (IW), which is a set of military conflicts hard to explain and even more challenging to implement. The incorporation of irregular warfare required the development of new capabilities from the US forces. As the West struggled to overcome existing presumptions surrounding military conflict, new jargon started to develop, including terms like ‘the gray war’ and ‘hybrid zone.’ Irregular warfare implies that states generate strategies to “separate instruments of power to offset military weakness, weaponize narratives to ease strategic progress, and exploit social and political contradictions to undermine and divide target societies” (Ucko, 2020). Sociology, psychology, and history, rather than an arsenal of weapons, define the intensity and outcomes of irregular conflict. This essay examines the modern geopolitical climate and explores the implications of leadership in irregular warfare.
The United States is a country, which has always struggled to retain its legitimacy in a global arena. The events of the 20th century aided America to reach a new economic and military status, which has made it into one of the biggest threats in modern politics. Nowadays, power shifts are more discreet and multifaceted, which poses a great challenge for anyone trying to understand the world of modern warfare. The prominent struggle today is one of influence, manipulation, and ambiguity. Irregular warfare is an unorthodox approach to military conflict, which makes use of counter-insurgency, sabotage, and counter-terrorism. IW Joint Operating Concept defines the term as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations” (as cited in Stevenson et al., 2008). Irregular warfare is used primarily against violent extremist organizations, which makes it extremely relevant in an ongoing fight with al-Qa-idea. Over the past couple of decades, irregular conflicts have included Afghanistan Civil War, guerrilla wars in Sudan, First Chechen War, as well as civil wars in Syria and Libya. It is crucial to understand that irregular warfare is, in fact, nothing but rare; this type of conflict defines the military dynamics 21st century.
One of the main challenges of irregular warfare is operational environments, also referred to as ‘microclimates,’ that have to be meticulously studied by commanders. These environments include geography, ethnicity, religion, ecology, and other elements, which attract the attention of military intelligence in irregular warfare. Moreover, each aspect has extremely important nuances, which can be crucial in strategizing. Jeffrey B. White (2007) notes that “collecting, analyzing, and assimilating information at this level of detail is a formidable challenge for intelligence analysts, policymakers, and warfighters alike.” The unique environment of irregular warfare requires soldiers to be highly adaptable to be ready for any changes and new developments. Irregular conflicts force units to adopt a set of responsibilities that go beyond the core military demands. They rarely feature conventional combat and do not have an articulated doctrine. In addition, this type of warfare is intellectually more difficult and implies a lot of independence in decision-making because commanders are not the only ones, who participate in planning.
In order to succeed in irregular military operations, the United States needs to invest in the human capital it sends to these kinds of missions. Since the microclimates are highly nuanced and comprised of various different factors, soldiers have to acquire a certain level of proficiency in terms of their linguistic and political skills. Furthermore, there is a disciplinary challenge in an environment, which rarely implies trenches and battlefields (Mehta, 2020). Commanders have to assert their dominance using numerous tactics; they cannot just point at the enemy, which often remains invisible or hard to identify.
Sergeant majors (SGMs) and command sergeant majors (CSMs) have to utilize effective strategies to ensure a high level of efficiency in a counterinsurgent environment of irregular warfare. Military leaders find themselves in a position, where they have to clearly identify the objectives of ‘war’ without escalating the conflict. Firstly, sergeants have to engage soldiers in planning and generating strategies to demonstrate them the logistics and importance of what they are doing. With no trenches or battlefields, it is hard for soldiers to visualize the significance of their actions. In addition, military leaders participating in irregular warfare have to enforce disciplinary boundaries to ensure compliance and organizational preparedness. Another strategy to foster discipline is giving soldiers responsibility for others. When it comes to developing flexibility in new environments, sergeants need to put more focus on educating their subordinates on the political, ethnic, and cultural nuances of the region.
In conclusion, it is important to understand that irregular warfare is the dominant form of military conflict, which is inescapable in today’s geopolitical realities. Governments have to invest in training and educating leaders, who would ensure the country’s forces meet their objectives and are adaptable enough to remain agile in new environments. Therefore, irregular conflicts require a high level of organizational readiness and fundamental intellectual abilities. The global democratic community took a trajectory towards eliminating terroristic organizations and starting an expanding war on terror, which is why irregular war strategies are now more crucial than ever.
References
Mehta, A. (2020). Irregular warfare strategies must move beyond special forces, Pentagon says. Defense News. Web.
Stevenson, W., Ecklund, M., Kim, H. S., & Billings, R. (2008). Irregular warfare: Everything yet nothing. Small Wars Journal. Web.
Ucko, D. H., & Marks, T. A. (2020). Crafting strategy for irregular warfare: A framework for analysis and action. National Defense UP.
White, J. B. (2007). Some thoughts on irregular warfare: A different kind of threat. Central Intelligence Agency. Web.