James Madison has been extensively criticized by the adversaries of the Constitution he authored. The bulk of this criticism involved the critics’ dissatisfaction with the fact that the new government would introduce national elements to the existing federal foundation. Critics, such as Brutus (1787), argued that the legislative power of the new federal government would supersede that of states, thus impairing people’s representation. In his response as of 1788, Madison attempted to clarify the new government’s nature and purpose.
Madison’s reply to the critics of the brand-new version of the Constitution consisted of a thorough dissection of national and confederal elements of the then-recently established system. Madison established several critical components of the government’s character, such as “its foundation; the sources of its ordinary powers; the operation of those powers; the extent of them; and the authority by which future changes in the government” (Madison, 1788, p. 3). He then proceeds to identify to which extent the confederal and national elements are represented with respect to each aspect.
Firstly, he argues that the foundation is inherently confederal, not national. Madison (1788) points out that the citizens approve of the Constitution not as comprising a national whole, but as comprising a state. Each state in this system is an independent, sovereign political body with its own laws. Secondly, Madison describes the government as partially national and confederal in relation to the power source. He justifies this by assuming two institutions of power, the national House of Representatives and the confederal Senate. Thirdly, he understands power operation to be national, as the government proceeds on the individual level. Fourthly, the proposed government is confederal in relation to the extent of its authority, as “its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects” (Madison, 1788, p. 5). Lastly, Madison declares that this system is neither national nor confederal to an absolute extent relative to how it will proceed with future amendments. According to the author, it is not entirely national since its ultimate authority does not reside in the majority of the state’s populace. It is not a wholly confederal establishment either, as legislative alterations do not require the consent of every single state.
Although Madison’s critics did not lack scholarly prowess, their arguments did not stand out as more persuasive ones. Such critics as Brutus (1787) appealed to the inevitable tyranny large republics eventually succumb to once they grow too large. This argument corresponded to the Machiavellian dilemma of the state’s size, which states that a republic too little would be deficient at self-defense. In contrast, states too large are doomed to turn despotic. Brutus supported this idea, borrowed directly from Montesquieu, by bringing up the example of Greek and Roman states turning despotic as they expanded. He stated that “both extended their conquests over large territories of country; and the consequence was, that their governments were changed from that of free governments to those of the most tyrannical that ever existed in the world” (Brutus, 1787, p. 3). Madison successfully parried this point by providing examples of smaller republics being more oppressive due to lower diversity of thought, flipping Montesquieu’s view on its head. He provided a thorough and well-educated account that exceeded the simple “federalism is bad” notion with numerous historical evidence of the contrary.
References
Madison, J. (1788). The Federalist No. 39: Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles. Independent Journal, 1-8.
Brutus. (1787). “Brutus I”. Essay. Web.