Argument of the Materialistic Theory of Consciousness
The materialistic theory of consciousness focuses on the idea that consciousness is material and ceases to exist with the annihilation of the body. Remarkably, there are three types of arguments supporting the materialist theory of consciousness. These are panpsychism, illusionism, and arguments suggesting that consciousness has an emergent property. Although the materialist theory of consciousness has no definitive evidence for its position, there is also counter-argumentation from dualistic theories of consciousness, such as presented by Churchland. Therefore, materialism cannot be seen as the right theory of consciousness. This paper will present the arguments against the materialistic theory of consciousness, objections to these arguments, and the responses to such objections.
Explanations of the Materialistic Theory of Consciousness
To start with, the main positions of the materialist theory of consciousness should be presented. Firstly, the panpsychism view implies that people are conscious because everything is conscious. This position does not prove that consciousness is a matter or obeys already discovered physical laws, but it is part of the materialist theory. Secondly, illusionism explains consciousness as an illusion, but such argumentation is a denial of the existence of consciousness, and therefore also does not prove its materialistic nature. Thirdly, there is the idea that consciousness has emergent properties, and arises in a complex structure of matter – the human or animal body. The last argument is the most stable and gives a more logically coherent explanation. It considers the existence of complex organisms and the fact that more complex organisms have more complex forms of consciousness.
Counter-Arguments from the Dualism Theory Perspective
Churchland presents several of the most common argumentation or subtypes of the theory of dualism of consciousness. These are substance dualism, property dualism or epiphenomenalism, interactionist property dualism, and elemental-property dualism. It is noteworthy that the fundamental position of this theory is that consciousness and matter are not united and do not have commonly studied physical properties. However, there are specific arguments to describe the characteristics of differences between matter and consciousness.
- For example, substance dualism proceeds from the premise of the existence of a substance, the main characteristic of which is thinking. The possibility of the consciousness or mind to reasoning and using language is considered proof of this theory. However, Churchland refutes this objection with a counter-argument, according to which computers also can reason, for example, when performing mathematical calculations, as well as to use the language, in particular programming languages.
- Such counter-argumentation is correct but does not refute the assumptions about the existence of the substance of thinking. This assumption is refuted by another counter-argument presented by Churchland – he recalls that earlier radio waves were considered as merely mechanical electromagnetic waves existing in the ether, but later it was proved that there is no such substance as ether, and radio waves are a separate independent phenomenon.
- Interestingly, according to Churchland, both the theory of materialism and the dualism of consciousness view the brain as an organ of the human body, which performs the mediating function between the mind and the body. Churchland criticizes this position, explaining that in this case “we could expect the reason, emotion, and consciousness to be relatively invulnerable to direct control or pathology by manipulation or damage to the brain” (p. 151). In reality, however, exposure to drugs or physical trauma can have a significant impact on a person’s ability to experience emotion or think coherently. This Churchland’s objection, however, does not disprove the possibility that the brain performs the mediating function between the mind and body. On the contrary, this objection supports this line of reasoning. After all, if the brain performs a connecting function between the body and the mind, it is logical that its damage harms the emotional and thinking abilities of the mind.
The presented arguments, objections, and contra-objections are logical and have good reasons. However, this reasoning is not exhaustive and does not answer the original question of what consciousness is, no matter in the material or immaterial expression of existence. Some of the arguments of the theory of dualism can be developed, as well as the objections presented by Churchland. For example, the objection to the existence of consciousness as an independent physical phenomenon, following the example of radio waves, can be considered from the positions of the interactionist property dualism. The latter recognizes that electrical impulses between neurons in the brain are determined by our desires and volitional decisions. This position supports the idea of the independent nature of thinking and allows applying introspection and reflecting on whether desires and volitional decisions are a property of the mind.
Thus, materialism does not provide sufficient argumentation to consider consciousness as a purely physical phenomenon that functions in accordance with the already studied and explained physical laws. The theory of dualism presents objections that allow to expand and synthesize ideas about the substance of consciousness. It is noteworthy that at the intersection of these two theories, one can look for the most plausible answers to the question posed about the material or immaterial nature of consciousness.