The Cold War’s closest encounter between the United States and the Soviet Union happened during the Cuban Missile Crisis, a pivotal moment in history. For decades, the problem has captivated historians and political scientists across the world, inspiring a profusion of scholarly work (Colman, 2019). Given the size of the Cuban Missile Crisis and its possible global repercussions, historians have examined how other Commonwealth nations that were not directly engaged responded. In this context, it is crucial to inquire about Australia’s attitude and response to the Cuban Missile Crisis for various reasons. What was Australia’s response to the crisis, and more crucially, how did the nation respond in light of the relationship between Australia and the US? Gaining a deeper and more thorough knowledge of the Menzies government’s vision of American relations will demonstrate how it affected Australian approach to the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Common misconception dictates that Australia was positively aligned with US policy during the Cold War. While many countries were unsure of the necessity of joining a side in this instance, the Menzies government took a constrained approach rarely mentioned in history books. This outlook is related to the fact that Australia lied closer to the communist countries (McIntosh, 2018). In this case, the Menzies government developed a policy to aid Australian citizens, limiting their involvement in the Cuban Missile crisis. However, it is crucial to note the Menzies Administration’s promise to support Kennedy’s Presidency regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis. It is prudent to showcase how Australia handled the Cuban Missile Crisis, strengthening the country’s ties with the US.
The Menzies Administration promised thoughtful support to the Kennedy Presidency. This demonstrated the necessity to balance its goals of boosting Australia’s defense capacity to deal with the expanding threat, maybe through offensive weapons and bases (Bickerton, 2019). This reflects the government’s fears that South-East Asia’s peace and security were threatened by communism. The country’s government gave Australia’s dependence on the American alliance for defense priority. This shows that the Menzies Administration believed Australia’s national interest lay in successfully aligning its relations with America’s interests.
Few Members of Parliament (MPs) in Menzies’ government commented on the Cuban Missile Crisis in their memoirs. Those who have remarked on the crisis have not offered any insightful analysis of Australia’s reaction that has any real substance. Instead, they have provided thought-provoking, albeit sporadic, reflections on how American President John F. Kennedy handled the crisis and the significance of this incident in the Cold War (Doyle, 2018). Even in retrospect, this is useful for identifying the attitudes and views of persons participating in politics. Nonetheless, their reflections produce more problems than they do answers.
The Australian Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, expressed his respect for Kennedy and his handling of the crisis in his first biography, “Afternoon Light.” According to him, the Bay of Pigs incident, in which Kennedy and his administration “had gone wrong, grievously wrong,” served as a lesson for them (Toohey, 2019). He claimed that the crisis embodied those lessons (Toohey, 2019). Menzies believed Kennedy “acted with boldness and haste against Soviet expansionism that has been struck in post-war history” when he faced Soviet leader Khrushchev (Ibrahim et al., 2020). Menzies noted that tensions between the West and the Soviet Union were remarkably reduced due to the coup in Cuba.
Menzies claimed to have held the prior opinion; thus, he had been waiting for such a coup. He felt that the Soviet leadership would disintegrate if the Soviet Chairman faced opposition from a democratic leader, such as the President of the United States (Llewellyn et al., 2019). Menzies, a self-described anglophile, had tremendous and ardent faith in the American presidency in general and in Kennedy (McIntosh, 2018). This thesis shows how much the Menzies government believed in America in October 1962 before attempting to show who and what impacted Australian foreign policy during this time. In hindsight, Menzies seemed to have more faith in Kennedy and his decisions than Beale, his American envoy.
Malcolm Fraser was a backbencher for the Liberal Party during the crisis, and some political biographies of Fraser have focused on his parliamentary address on March 5, 1964, in which he discussed the Crisis’ significance concerning the Vietnam War. According to Philip Ayres in “Malcolm Fraser: A Biography and Alan Renouf in Malcolm Fraser & Australian Foreign Policy,” this speech expressed Fraser’s concern for Australia’s national security (Doyle, 2018). Contrary to popular belief, Renouf said that Fraser gained little consolation from the crisis resolution, echoing Beale. According to Renouf and Ayres’ analysis, the crisis represented the willingness of the United States and the Soviet Union to utilize their nuclear weapons for their objectives while steering clear of interactions that would trigger a nuclear reaction, according to Fraser.
America would therefore be prone backing down what it viewed as minor conflicts. According to Fraser, such disputes might put Australian interests in danger (SHAFR, 2022). According to Ayres, this speech emphasized Australia’s reliance on its allies, showing that the Australian-American alliance was a crucial part of Australian foreign policy in the 1960s (Piccini et al., 2019). The Daniel Mannix Memorial Lecture, which Fraser gave at the University of Melbourne in 1987, reflected this (Lipski & Rutland, 2018). In it, he recalled hearing Menzies describes the ostensibly private Cabinet talks about how Australia should respond to the crisis.
Menzies’ government discerned the importance of supporting Kennedy’s decisions concerning the Cuban Missile Crisis. It considered this was the only course of action Australia could have followed. After extensive discussion among Cabinet members, he proclaimed that it was in Australia’s interest to help its American ally (Colman, 2019). The Menzies Government’s approach to the crisis, and subsequently Australian foreign policy during this time, was determined by several elements, including concerns and dependencies regarding Australia’s national interest.
In conclusion, Menzies’ government provided solutions for American and Soviet aggression during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The administration argued that each country used underhanded methods to deal with its enemies. Nonetheless, the government supported America’s position due to the influence of communism in Southeast Asia. Its potential to posit a problem for Australia’s security necessitated keeping Kennedy’s administration to curb the growth of communism influence. The crisis demonstrated to Australia that it could rely on America to protect it from the Soviet menace (Chiam, 2021). The Menzies government’s backing for American action in Southeast Asia at the time was evidence of its reliance on the American alliance. Its worries about the potential effects of these crises on his national interests highlighted Australia’s need to continue to manage its relationship with the United States carefully. In this case, the importance of Australia’s defense reliance on the American alliance should be emphasized. This research demonstrated the Menzies administration’s belief that successfully managing Australia’s ties with the United States was in the country’s best interests.
References
Bickerton, I. J. (2019). John F. Kennedy: A reference guide to his life and works. Rowman et Littlefield.
Chiam, M. (2021). International law in public debate. Cambridge University Press.
Colman, J. (2019). Toward “World support” and “The ultimate judgment of history”: The US legal case for the blockade of Cuba during the Missile Crisis, October–November 1962. Journal of Cold War Studies, 21(2), 150–173.
Doyle, R. J. (2018). Australian Nexus: At the center of the storm. Lexington Books.
Ibrahim, S. G., Bibi-Farouk, I., & Chinelo, O. (2020). Impact of the American Attack on Cuba at the Bay of Pigs on the United States and International Relations. African Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Research, 3(4), 1–9.
Lipski, S., & Rutland, S. D. (2018). Let my people go: The untold story of Australia and the Soviet Jews 1959-89. Hybrid Publishers.
Llewellyn, J., Southey, J., & Thompson, S. (2019). Cold War Timeline: 1960 to 1969. Alpha History.
McIntosh, R. V. (2018). An Australian’s story. Matador.
SHAFR (2022). The nuisance of Decision: Jupiter missiles and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Journal of Strategic Studies, 14(1), 1-26.
Piccini, J., Smith, E., & Worley, M. (2019). The Far Left in Australia Since 1945. Routledge.
Toohey, B. (2019). Secret: The Making of Australia’s Security State. Melbourne University Publishing.