Introduction
Many people draw parallels between David Hume’s philosophy and the moral aspects of Immanuel Kant. In contrast to Kant’s insistence that morality should be rooted in a priori principles, Hume’s approach to moral philosophy guiding political activities is experimental and empirical (Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace” 56). While Hume argues that reason should be the focus of the passions, Kant argues that morality should be grounded in a conception of reasoning that is applicable in and of itself.
Hume argues that altruism and generosity are the correct moral emotions to drive action. Although Hume typically considers the obligation a secondary or backup motive, Kant believes it is the most important since it uniquely expresses an agent’s dedication to morality and, by extension, imparts a particular moral significance to deeds.
Despite diverging on many vital aspects, there are significant overlaps between Kant’s and Hume’s ethical theories. Early in his career, Kant had been drawn to and inspired by the sentimental thinking of Hume and other British moralists. The two men shared certain critical beliefs about morality and motivation. In contrast to Hume, Kant thinks morality plays a role in politics and that the state requires a moral basis. The state needs an ethical justification and plays a moral role in people’s lives.
The Role of Morality in Shaping Political Practices
Kant’s Views
Ideas about morality inform political practices, and this may be discovered using the a priori approach rather than an empirical method. Since morality’s demands are unconditional, Kant argues that they should inform political activities (Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace” 76). In addition, there needs to be a distinct separation between moral philosophy’s theoretical and practical aspects. If the separation is not different, there is a risk of conflating universal moral needs with conditional facts, such as what benefits some people or animals under particular circumstances.
However, having the highest ethical principle is not enough; applying it to political activities requires knowledge of human nature. Little can be said regarding human agents’ duties to themselves and each other in light of the highest moral ideal. To accomplish this, one ought to be aware of factors like the nature of the goals people may be predisposed to pursue and the environments in which individual initiative is likely to flourish or wither.
As influenced by ideas about morality, a moral agent’s political will is independent in that it is self-legislating by providing the ethical law and self-constraining by motivating others to obey the rule. Kant asserts that “in morality, there is no imitation, and examples serve only for encouragement, i.e., they place beyond doubt the feasibility of what the law commands” (Kant, “Groundwork for the Metaphysics” 25).
The concept of autonomy stands out among Kant’s ethics, which have many distinctive and essential features. According to Kant, autonomy consists primarily of the will’s being a rule unto itself, apart from the properties of the targets of volition (Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace” 123). Consistent with Kant, the true self, or pure, rational will, is where the moral law originates, not the agent’s emotions, natural impulses, or preferences. On the contrary, heteronomous will submit to a higher power or authority than the reason dictates.
In their political practices, self-legislating agents make suitable choices because of their dedication to moral ideas. People’s moral beliefs may be the most complete manifestation of individual agency in political institutions and procedures. Unlike heteronomous legislation, which can only produce hypothetical imperatives, in Kant’s view, autonomous legislation can make a categorical imperative (Kant, “Groundwork for the Metaphysics” 124). Kant argued that laws based on the heteronomous notion of self-love, sympathy, fear of divine retribution, or desire for great reward were the source of moral responsibility, and the correct ethical motivation was flawed. Autonomous and moral ways of behaving are described as drawing political decisions, while heteronomous manners of acting are not portrayed as such.
Hume’s Views
Normative ethical theories cannot be established to inform political activities since moral ideas are preexisting natural occurrences. One could use terms like naturalistic, empirical, and experimental to describe Hume’s approach to ethics (Hume, “An Enquiry” par. 5). Hume’s ethics is a component of his broader philosophical effort to convey naturalistically every facet of human nature, including how people make moral judgments in addition to what they can know about the world.
Since the philosophy of mind is empirical, Hume’s morals affirm that people’s ethical views should not influence political behaviors. He applies the same experimental approach to morality as he does to understanding. Hume includes ethics in his moral science, psychology, history, art, and politics. With his view that everything can be investigated empirically and explained in naturalistic terms, Hume tries to displace a priori ideas of political practices and morality.
Innate qualities, such as beneficial action and prudence, and artificial virtues, such as justice and adherence to vows, should guide people’s political behaviors rather than ideas about morality. The list of excellent qualities included in Hume’s ethics is long and varied (Hume, “An Enquiry” par. 8). Character traits are the fundamental basis for moral judgment in Hume’s ethics. Deeds are evaluated in light of the characteristics thought to underlie them.
Whether or not they are part of a vast society, people will always appreciate and benefit from the practice of natural qualities. Natural virtues influence political practices and are significantly more likely to result in benefit or satisfaction than simulated qualities. Genuine, natural qualities are consistently admirable regardless of the context. The benefits of artificial virtues accrue not from individual instances but from the widespread adoption of such qualities throughout time.
Moral reasoning draws conclusions but does not determine goals or drive political action. In Hume’s view, reason plays a small but essential part in ethics. According to Hume, the primary function of logic in ethics is to assist actors in discerning which behaviors and attributes are excellent or effective (Hume, “An Enquiry” par. 9). Hume rejects the idea that reason determines what is moral or what goals should be pursued politically. A person’s goals are defined by their desires, influenced by their experience of pleasure and misery.
Morality ideas are not a driving force in politics; instead, they guide those whose actions are prompted by aspiration or inclination by pointing out how they can achieve pleasure. Hume states that “when several political societies are erected, and maintain a great intercourse together, a new set of rules are immediately discovered to be useful in that particular situation” (Hume, “An Enquiry” par. 2). Thus, virtue serves as an impetus for political action, providing the initial incentive for one’s free will (Hume, “Essays Part 1” par. 14).
The reason is necessary to discover whether character qualities or methods and conduct contribute to utility once sentiment has established effectiveness as one of the main objectives of morality. The role of reason in morality is multifaceted; for instance, Hume argues that to form an ethical decision, one must be aware of all the necessary facts and understand the relevant links between ideas. However, sentiment, which absorbs all the revelations of reason and develops with something beyond them—the sense of acceptance or disapproval—is necessary for political and ethical evaluation.
Every aspect of politics is driven by forces that should be present, just as the energy of its causation so precisely specifies every natural impact that no alternative effect, under the same set of conditions, could have emerged from it. The consistency in nature’s workings is the sole source of people’s beliefs of necessity and causality. A constant association exists between similar things, and the mind has become conditioned to infer one from the other (Hume, “Essays Part 2” par. 12). It is generally agreed upon that men are remarkably consistent across cultures and times and that the fundamentals of human nature have not changed. One draws assumptions about human activities based on their observed regularity, just as with natural phenomena based on consistency.
People give some thought to their social interactions and the historical and political contexts in which those interactions take place. Therefore, the theory of necessity and the deduction from motivations to voluntary behaviors, from characteristics to conduct, is seemingly essential to any endeavor in science or politics (Hume, “Essays Part 1” par. 13). People have no qualms about conceding that natural and ethical evidence are similar and drawn from the same values when they evaluate how well they link together and constitute a single connection of argument. Hume concludes that all causes have the same necessity.
Political decisions have little connection with intentions, morality, inclinations, and circumstances regarding the freedom of action in humans. Each political practice should be followed with the same consistency as the others. The functioning of their supporters is the only way to deduce the success of political actions.
Kant agrees with Hume that human activities are free and governed by causal necessity as they are part of the natural world (Kant, “Groundwork for the Metaphysics” 97). Nevertheless, Kant disagrees with Hume’s assumption that all moral and natural actions belong to the same causal chain. If they were, and if people regarded natural causal rules as universal and predetermined, then Kant’s ultimate goal for his moral theory, autonomy, would be impossible.
The State and Moral Justification
Hume’s Views
The government has the right to demand the devotion and allegiance of its subjects based on its foundation. Hume argues that the state can and should intervene in people’s lives without moral justification (Hume, “An Enquiry” par. 12). As a moral sentimentalist, Hume held that ethical norms cannot be explained away as rational approaches to social issues. According to Hume, moral justification is subservient and powerless against passion as the primary driver of action. Reason cannot be used to evaluate emotional responses; it follows, for example, that rationality cannot be the driving force behind ethical behavior. Reason cannot inspire moral behavior if it cannot instigate any behavior.
The ability of morality to inspire action means that fundamental moral concepts cannot be rationally justified. Since they stir up feelings and lead to or keep people from taking action, ethical principles, according to Hume, have no requirement for justification (Hume, “Essays Part 1” par. 8). Therefore, moral principles cannot be reduced to logical deductions; furthermore, the state has no business dictating morality to its citizens, as the reasonableness or unreasonableness of an action cannot determine its rightness or wrongness.
Demonstrative reasoning cannot provide light on morality, fundamental ethical principles, or classifications; virtue, wickedness, and other moral considerations are outside the scope of reason. This relates to the connections between likeness and dissimilarity, opposites and similarities, degrees of quality, and ratios of size and count. The moral value, for instance, of an act cannot be attributed to its cause or impact or to any other matter of fact that can be supplied by probabilistic or causal reasoning.
Kant’s Views
Morality, ethical drive, and a sense of obligation stem from reason rather than emotion. Kant believes the state must have a moral justification and an ethical function in people’s lives (Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace” 89). Kant affirms that “the maliciousness of human nature, although quite concealed by the coercion of government in the state of civil law, can be observed openly in the free relations between the peoples” (Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace”79). Only if morality derives from pure practical reason, in Kant’s opinion, can it universally, unequivocally, and unavoidably bind all rational creatures. If a law is to have any credibility as a basis for an obligation, it must be widely acknowledged that it is necessary. Kant invoked the concept of autonomy to defend the responsibility of citizens to obey the laws of the state, especially those of authoritarian regimes.
The right to publicly criticize unjust laws is essential but has limits. No matter how unfair a government is or how many people it oppresses, Kant insisted that people have no right to rebel or to start a revolution (Kant, “Groundwork for the Metaphysics” 45). When a law goes against the dictates of one’s conscience, Kant conceded only so-called passive disobedience. That is, disobedience to the law is permissible, but only if the noncompliant accepts the lawful sanction for actions without resistance. Freedom of expression and the press were two of Kant’s favored methods for changing an unjust government. Nevertheless, people should be discouraged from defying or rebelling against the state’s lawful authority.
The moral obligation of citizens to obey the administration of the states originates in the hypothetical social contract. Kant stated that the issue of political commitment to an established administration has nothing to do with any scientific research into the foundation of a state or government (Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace” 73). It makes no difference whether or not a social contract ever existed.
Instead, Kant argued for a rationally ideal hypothetical social contract. Contrary to what may or might not have been the case in the past, the hypothetical social contract lays out what reasonable individuals should consent to. Instead of taking the danger of living in a state of nature without the rule of law and unbiased judges to resolve disputes, rational people should agree to have their moral freedom secured by a government.
The people in a country accept their government’s authority and agree to abide by its rules. Therefore, Kant disagreed with Hume and held that citizens’ moral duty to uphold the law never compromised their right to moral agency (Kant, “Groundwork for the Metaphysics” 83). Morality requires that people be subject to the legal and moral authority of government, and the hypothetical social contract requires that people freely adhere to the hypothetical societal contract and subordinate their actions in the political sphere to that authority. According to Kant, this is not an impingement of people’s moral agency but rather an expression of it.
Conclusion
The ethical aspects of David Hume’s philosophy are often compared to those of Immanuel Kant. In contrast to Hume, Kant believes that ethics play a role in politics and that a moral foundation is necessary for a state. Kant argues that morality should guide political actions because its demands are absolute. Instead of moral principles, people should be guided in their political steps by their innate qualities, such as helpful action and prudence, and their artificial virtues, such as justice and fidelity to vows.
According to Hume, moral judgment should be based on character. Thus, integrity motivates political engagement by providing the springboard for individual agency. In line with Hume, there is no need for a moral justification for state intervention in citizens’ lives. On the contrary, Kant thinks it is essential for the state to serve a moral purpose and provide a moral justification for people’s lives. Kant defended citizens’ duty to follow the law, even under authoritarian regimes, by appealing to the concept of autonomy.
Works Cited
Hume, David. “An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (1751, 1777).” Hume Texts Online. Web.
—. “Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, Part 1 (1741, 1777).” Hume Texts Online. Web.
—. “Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, Part 2 (1752, 1777).” Hume Texts Online. Web.
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: Immanuel Kant. Edited by Allen Wood, et al., Yale University Press, 2002.
—. Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History. Yale University Press, 2008.