Introduction
The fire incident happened in the year 1940 on the evening of April 23rd at Rhythm Club in Natchez, an entertainment club for black people. Natchez is in Mississippi town with a population of 16,000 people. The incident left more than 207 dead and 200 injured. It was hard for people to escape because there was only one exit door. People died mainly from suffocation and as a result of being trampled. The club was well fenced to keep off gate crushers who may come along. The fencing left no chance of escape in case of any incident such as fire (Lyons, 1976). These are some of the reasons that necessitated an investigation into the incident.
Overview of Incident Investigation Report
The fire started in the front of the dance hall near the burger stand. The gray Spanish moss that was hanging on the ceiling began burning. The Spanish moss burnt at a faster rate and dropped to the floor; people who were in front managed to escape, leaving behind those seated at the back. People died because fire got their clothes burning, and some fell and stamped on. There was one exit door and the fencing properties of Rhythm club place also contributed to why people were unable to escape. It was even hard to break the building’s wall sides because it was made of corrugated iron. The response from the fire department was swift, and they managed to extinguish the fire (Cote et al., 2008). Despite the speedy response and breaking of the sided fenced sheet metals of the building, many people suffocated and died before the rescue team would rescue them.
The cause of the fire was not well established by the fire department. It is believed that it was a match or a lighted cigarette; this conclusion is derived from two people’s conversation about setting the building on fire. The fire growth curve started from the cigarette, then to the Spanish moss decoration, and finally to the floor where people tried using their clothes to put out the fire. The falling moss extended its flames from the front to the dance hall’s rear covering all the floor space (Lyons, 1976). The building that housed the club was not completely burned down.
A common substance involved in the process of burning and spreading the flame is Spanish moss. Moss was everywhere from six inches to a foot thick and was intended to hide the roof space (Lyons, 1976). Due to the fact that the building used to be a garage and a church, this moss hung on the ceiling for a long time and was severely dry. So, when it contributed to the rapid spread of fire on the premises. The lack of windows and metal walls created a furnace effect, which made the situation worse.
Findings from the Fire Incident
The findings from the construction of the building also proved otherwise. The building was not safe for clubbing purposes. It was not meant to host any kind of entertainment services as it posed danger to the users (Cote et al, 2008). It was established that the building was first used as a garage, then as a church, and finally converted into a dance hall, which was not the initial plan.
The building had 24 windows which is a good structure and of recommended standards. Out of the tall windows, two were iron-barred, one had an ordinary glass while shatters covered the rest, and this obstructed people to use the windows to escape. Those who tried were severely injured. The club did not consider safety precautions while designing the building. Similarly, only two entrances were located in the front, but only one was functioning as the other one was locked from the outside (Lyons, 1976). The problem with the design was that there was only one exit available, and it was also located in the front, making it difficult for people who were at the back to escape quickly. It was established that the fire department responded positively to the incident even if more than 200 people lost their lives and the other 200 people were injured (Mass, 1940). The report also established that the use of the mass of highly combustible Spanish moss is dangerous.
Recommendations
The type of building, layout, and size of the building had a significant impact on the spread of the fire. The only entrance to the dance floor, boarded-up windows and the “check valve” of the exit system from the lobby contributed to the deterioration of the situation and did not allow people to get rid of the fire and escape. In addition, the moss used as decoration contributed to the spread of fire throughout the hall. The fire itself started growing from the hamburger stand and accelerated when it hit the decorations on the ceiling.
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) should check if any construction complies with the fire protection regulations before issuing the trading certificate. Suppose the Rhythm club would have ensured that the building had many exit and entry points, and maybe making the windows passable would have saved the lives of many. NFPA should prohibit the use of combustible moss as decoration. Entertainment buildings should be well equipped with a fire alarm system at a central location for notification, leading to swift response without delay (Cote et al, 2008). The facilities should be equipped with automatic sprinklers and portable fire extinguishers that may help to put off the fire in case of any fire incident.
Conclusion
Decoration of theatres and assembly halls should be done using non-flammable or fire-resistance materials. All other decoration materials that can increase the kindling and spread of fire should not be used for decoration purposes. The Assembly point should always have more than two functional exit doors on the building’s front and rear sides. The rhythm club was overcrowded, and this should be discouraged as the results are well evident in Natchez Dance Hall in 1940.
References
Cote, A. E., Grant, C. C., Hall, J. R., Powell, P. A., National Fire Protection Association, & Solomon, R. E. (2008). Fire protection handbook (20th ed.). National Fire Protection Association.
Lyons, P. R. (1976). Natchez dance hall tragedy. Fire in America, 162-163.
Mass, Q. (1940) Natchez dance hall holocaust NFPA fire investigations report. NFPA Quarterly, 34(1), 70-75.