The human mind is a complex machine; which humankind has studied for hundreds of years. Thousands of scientists tried to de-code the sophisticated nature of emotions and the overall nature of humans. The concept of ‘natural goodness’ is not new to the philosophy, as it was discussed actively during the Ancient Greece period. While reading the work of Philippa Foot, one can experience a plethora of controversial emotions. According to her research, the ‘natural goodness’ of a person is in their virtues, which is analogous to plant and animal goodness (Foot, 70). Although this argument is correct according to some philosophical theories, I am still not persuaded by her parallels and statements.
First of all, Philippa Foot mentioned that humans derived their social norms from so-called natural patterns, which is not entirely true. Social norms come primarily from the standards of morality. What is more, morality is a part of a person’s psychological structure, which is formed based on “psychological reflexes” produced as a result of long-term fear of social judgment. Such concepts are non-existing and, therefore, cannot be derived from fundamental norms. In nature, there are only several norms, applicable only to animals. These norms are driven by the animals’ instincts or particular actions that animals use uncontrollably in a given situation. For example, if the food is absent for an extended period, polar bears are not averse to eating their offspring or just weaker representatives of their species. Such cannibalism is an automatic survival mechanism of some animals, which is not condemned among their kind. The situation is not the same among humans, because cannibalism is not only morally unacceptable; it is forbidden by the law, despite the level of famine in the country. The shown situation is a mere example of ‘natural goodness’ among animals, which is wrong in the human world under the same circumstances.
Moreover, Philippa Foot argues that judgments of ‘goodness’ and ‘badness’ vary from one species to another and differentiate whether one is talking about a plant, an animal, or a human being (Foot, 69). I think that assumption is correct because one cannot argue that something is wrong because it does not do something completely unnatural. When it is considered normal for black-tailed meadow dogs to consume newborns so the rest of the litter would survive, one cannot imagine the same norm for human beings. Moreover, it is considered horrible for a human mother to kill or abandon her child. People can say that a woman is a neglectful mother, however the same cannot be said about a cat mother because the norms of behavior vastly differentiate from humans to other species.
The author also argues that subjective standards can be established by studying different species, correct to a certain point. As written earlier, for some species cannibalism, murder, violence is natural norm based on an instinct to survive. However, for a human, that kind of behavior is abnormal and socially judged. In addition to mentioned above, if to speak about reproductivity, it is not necessary for humans, whether, in the animal world, it is life’s purpose. If a human chooses to live without children, it would not be socially judged, while in the animal world, it is impossible to live without at least several litters. ‘Naturally,’ there are same-sex couples in nature; however, this kind of behavior is heavily judged in some parts of the human world.
Furthermore, Philippa Foot discovers such a reflective element as secondary goodness. This concept means goodness declared to living things when they are compared to other species. For example, when someone equates a plant to animal or herbivore and carnivore, comparing their norms, their ‘goodness’ and ‘badness’. Secondary goodness is a weird concept because the standards of different species cannot be compared between themselves. Each species, although similar by its primary purposes, is radically differentiated by its natural goodness. For example, a tiger is ‘naturally good’ if it hunts prey, while a rabbit is right in the same category if it runs successfully from predators.
Philippa Foot also mentions such a concept as a defect in the species. To compare the organism and its background as well as the general characteristic of its species means to view it from the normative point. More specifically, to evaluate one creature against the typical indicators of the same creatures, one makes a normative evaluation. It is clear that there are many fluctuations possible for one kind of animal; however, if a particular characteristic is not found in each representative of an organism, it is considered defective. For example, if a human cannot have babies, they are deemed to be defected according to this philosophy; but if a person willingly chose not to reproduce it is not viewed as an abnormality.
The problem with this statement that is it has many variations: if human lacks one hand from birth, they are considered defected, but if they willingly choose to cut the hand-off it is typical? Normality and abnormality are highly subjective, and its definition can vary from one culture to another. In some countries, it is not abnormal to cut one’s handoff, kill an enemy of one’s family, or rape a woman if her skirt is too short and etcetera. My point is that humans cannot be judged in the field of normality inside their species, not to speak about animals.
If to speak about specific components essential for the organism’s vital operations, then Philippa Foot is partially correct. One must remember that to have such an understanding, one needs to fathom that the body can be considered functionally organized only if its functions are placed against the background of its kind. This statement further means that acknowledging the species implies the partial realization (even if erroneous) of its needs. This is, again, not applicable to human beings; even though people are capable of having numerous approaches of existence, it is highly debatable whether there is any ‘correct’ and ‘good’ form of human life, and whether there is such a concept as a ‘good human’ (Foot, 71). Philippa Foot supports the idea that humans are ‘animals with intellect’, she accepts this characterization, introducing a unique approach to describing humans.
One can respond to reasons because one acts on some partial recognition of goodness and badness. The evaluation that interests Philippa Foot is mostly ethical or applying logic to one’s actions to be precise. Philosopher argues that flaws in one’s body are directly proportional to the defects of the mind, which establishes a natural weakness in people. In particular, people with those flaws have inadequate desires in their minds. For the reason that humans have the opportunity to think and to evaluate their actions, they are subjected to different assessments. Contradictory to other natural flaws, which are mostly the consequence of misfortune, humans are culpable for their behavior and their right actions; therefore, humans are capable of responding to a logical critique of this concept (Foot, 73).
Presently, this concept seems to construct the basis of morality on the most common depiction of logic, abandoning other parts of social structure. In such a manner, the project of justifying virtues will not move forward because it seems that such a view leads to an empty level of behavior according to the “right reason.” However, as noted earlier, the attraction to the human mind’s structure works to help people determine whether their behavior is rational or not and whether they are acting reasonably.
If to mention Non-Aristotelian naturalism, Foot describes it as the thesis of logical response, corresponding to which rationality relates to the species. Her reasoning cannot ignore the lack of practicality of the things human beings tend to choose in their life. However, the beauty of living life as a human being is the ability to choose the life they want, whether natural or not, according to Foot. Thus, Philippa Foot can argue that as animals can reason, humans are free to choose whether they will be obedient to ‘fundamental roles’; in other words, nature is not the primary driver of one’s actions, but their intellect is. I agree with this point of view because humans can decide whether or not they should have children, whether they should move every day, whether they should eat more or less than needed or whether to have sexual relations with somebody. Foot says that humans can decide for themselves what they see as good or bad, not considering natural aspects. Again, I agree with that point, because as humans, we are capable of thinking and analyzing the situation, not like animals, who act based on their instincts and neurological responses of their bodies.
Despite the variety of lives one can choose, Foot disputes that humans are sensitive to the seizure of their natural senses found in plants and animals (touch, smell, sight, hearing, taste) called defects. Still, they are also vulnerable to the loss of mental capacities. Philippa Foot also argues that moral goodness is an integral part of human survival via reproduction. However, this concept can be disputed because there are many examples of serial killers, serial rapists, cannibals, abusers, and other horrible human beings who reproduced and had children later in their lives.
A person can morally defect but still fall in love with the same type of people or think that they can change morally defected. The crucial part of reproduction is the desire to have children and mutual sympathy. Sometimes even that can be omitted, and propagation happens because of several cases of abuse or rape. She also believes that humans necessarily know what makes a ‘good’ human. Again, that can be argued because different cultures possess vastly different concepts of good behavior. While something might be considered as ‘natural goodness’ in one country, it might sound like savagery in another one. Without a doubt, some regulations govern human’s understanding of their health, but some rules determine the occurrence of events when one thinks or acts.
Humans are not supposed to hold survival and reproduction as main goals and values in life, because humans can choose that fate for themselves like they can choose death and living as a child-free person with similar ease. Philippa Foot showcases morality as something in ‘human nature,’ which is a problematic statement. Some people are born without such virtues and any emotional response to horrid events such as murder. She believes that only with attributes and human connections can a human be judged as ‘good’; however, there are many people who are evil to the core and still have social relationships.
To conclude, the human mind is a complex machine that cannot be easily explained and put into categories. Although Philippa Foot is right in some of her theories, she still ignores the human factor and the fact that all people are different. While reading the ‘Natural Goodness’, I experienced a plethora of contradicting emotions. According to her research, the ‘natural goodness’ of a person is in their virtues, which is analogous to plant and animal goodness. Although this argument is not entirely wrong, people with no attributes can still survive and have families. In addition to this, different cultures can define ‘natural goodness’ vastly different, which is normal. Human beings can decide whether something is good or bad for themselves rather than do something based on their instinctual response similar to animals. Another problem with her arguments is that a human being must necessarily be ‘naturally good’ to reproduce. As written earlier, there are many cases of serial killers, rapists, abusers, and cannibals, which have families and loving relationships.
Works Cited
Foot, Philippa. Natural Goodness. Oxford University Press. 2015.