The argument that love is epistemically objectionable is based on the assumption that the standard epistemological norms are correct. The mainstream epistemological norms stress the importance of impartiality, truth, and rationality in beliefs and behavior. Therefore, the types of beliefs and behavior commonly associated with love and friendship are objectionable from the epistemic point of view. Indeed, we tend to treat our beloved ones and friends rather impartially, often viewing them and their actions more favorably. Therefore, I would agree with Stroud that this attitude “contravenes”, opposes the general standards of epistemological theories (514). Jollimore also acknowledged that love involves epistemic partiality and that partiality can go too far on occasion (52). However, I would argue that several premises of epistemic critique on love are questionable by themselves.
Most importantly, the assumption that epistemological norms are ultimately correct is very bold. The epistemic critique of love comes from pure belief, which seems to be borderline dogmatic. We might also assume the opposite — that love is a necessary feeling that makes us complete, fulfilled human beings. As Jollimore states, love is a way of seeing the world, and it is perspectival like any other way of seeing (4). Moreover, if epistemological norms treat a natural and almost essential feeling of a human being as something irrational, that shows the lack of rationality in those norms. According to Stroud, it might be better to rethink the assumption that epistemic rationality requires impartiality or objectivity from which friendship needs to depart (522). Therefore, the very basis of the epistemic criticism of love and friendship can be refuted in the same fashion.
Nevertheless, for the sake of impartiality, we can assume that the epistemological norms are universally correct. Furthermore, we can agree that love and friendship include epistemic impartiality since we never denied that in the first place. Jollimore provides examples of how the lover can become deluded about the beloved’s qualities and evaluate their properties in a positive manner (9). Therefore, the epistemic critics express concerns that love is dangerous because it distorts our perception of the world and replaces reality with constructed images and fantasies (Jollimore 10). From their point of view, love is irrational and, therefore, objectionable.
However, it is possible to question the premise that love is epistemically objectionable if we treat it as an epistemic standard of itself rather than a challenge for them. Jollimore states that love offers its own epistemic approach rather than standing in opposition to rationality (53). After all, love often demands actions, the epistemic practices, that bring us closer to truth, which is commendable from the epistemic standpoint. Being a good lover and friend does not necessarily come with a delusional perception of the world and people around you. Therefore, it would be wrong to consider love as an epistemically objectionable source of danger since it can be viewed as an epistemic phenomenon on its own.
Overall, the epistemic criticism of love in the form of hypothetical syllogism can be questioned from two sides. We can object to the assumed truth of epistemic theories or consider love a phenomenon, which demands an epistemic approach from the lover. While the premise about the epistemic partiality of love is valid, the conclusion drawn from it seems to be exaggerated. In the end, love can either be incorporated into the epistemic paradigm or freely exist outside of it.
Works Cited
Jollimore, Troy. Love’s Vision. Princeton University Press, 2011.
Stroud, Sarah. “Epistemic Partiality in Friendship.” Ethics, vol. 116, no. 3, 2006, pp. 498–524.