Nowadays, death is an integral part of the life cycle of any person, which will meet everyone in one day. However, there are different times, various circumstances and reasons for death, so most people are afraid of this day in their lives and their friend and families. This fear is generated by the unknown, as well as the love of life itself, the beautiful and terrible things that happen in it or can happen. This fact means that the fear of death does not exist because of the inevitability of meeting with it but because of the possibility to lose things given by life. However, in some situations, living can become painful, which forces a person to abandon it voluntarily. Therefore, although death most often becomes evil for the people who meet it, in some cases, it can also be salvation.
People have a different attitude to death; however, there is one inevitably bad aspect for the decedents, since they meet the end of their lives. While for friends and relatives the death of a loved one is a sad and often traumatic event, they still have a chance to return to normal life, continue to discover things, rejoice at little things, and achieve goals. A person whose life has ended does not have the ability to commit new acts or even finish their businesses. Moreover, as Nagel (1970) notes, no matter what good and bad things life were filled with, in any case, it was the experience that a person can no longer have after death. The author also notes that the very state of death is not evil, and it does not accumulate. The problem is that the person deprived of life can no longer experience its joys and troubles, he or she loses consciousness, and in fact, ceases to be a human. Therefore, death is terrible for a decedent because it takes away the ability to feel, think and experience life.
Moreover, death is equally bad at any age; however, dying is less fair at a young age. One may note that a longer life is better than a short one by considering the theory of asymmetry proposed by Nagel. Nagel (1970) said that the balance between the time before a person’s birth, the time of life and death is uneven, since people cannot be born earlier to have a longer life, but death takes away the time that they could live. Consequently, dying at a younger age is less fair and eviler, since the asymmetry in the balance becomes even more significant. One can also emphasize this peculiarity with general human morality, love, and sympathy because people of all nationalities and religions are more sorry for the deaths of children and youth. At the same time, older people who have lived long lives quite often are calmer about their death, especially if they have no regrets about things they have not complete. Consequently, although the deprivation of life is evil for any person, a younger age makes death even more unfair.
However, there are also conditions under which death is more good than life. Despite Nagel’s (1970) categorical statements that death is evil, he also notes that coma or unconsciousness is not life; therefore, in this state, the end of life is more acceptable. Kamm (2019) also supports this opportunity and the right of a person to choose death voluntarily when it is a better option than living in pain. According to Kamm (2019), a person who is experiencing chronic pain and suffering can turn to medicines that relieve agony but shorten life, and euthanasia that forever deprives a person of suffering and life. In this case, the doctor who helps in these procedures is not a murderer, since he or she only helps to fulfill a person’s will. Moreover, this state of a human demonstrates that immortality is not the best alternative to death if it also does not mean absolute health. If people do not die but cannot regenerate their body, they will only be doomed to eternal life in captivity of their flesh and will soon lose their love for life.
One can also draw an analogy between ridding animals and people of suffering. The ideas of Harman (2011) and Velleman (1999) are also similar to Kamm’s, and although they relate to non-human animals, both authors say that people have no right to take the life of others if there are no exceptional circumstances for this. Such conditions can be physical pain that cannot be overcome by medical means, and which makes the life of an animal unbearable. The practice when animals are euthanized, in cases when it is impossible to help them in other ways, is common, and such an act is considered a manifestation of humanity. For this reason, euthanasia for people is just as acceptable as euthanasia for animals, although at the moral and ethical level, these processes, undoubtedly, are different. Therefore, in some cases, death is a better decision than living in pain.
Nevertheless, not only physical pain can be the reason for euthanasia, since mental illness or other painless conditions can also cause misery. Velleman (1999) discusses human dignity as the primary cause of choosing between life and death under challenging circumstances. He emphasizes that euthanasia for a person who has a mental illness is a way to preserve human dignity if he or she considers it as the right choice (Velleman, 1999). In addition to such diseases, physiological conditions that cause little or no pain but cause moral misery can also be attributed. For example, a person who has a large part of the body paralyzed will depend on his or her relatives even in banal physiological needs, which can harm his or her dignity. In addition, this condition can cause guilt because a person cannot to take care of himself or herself and can feel like a burden for caregivers. A similar situation also applies to people with Parkinson’s disease, who have a clear mind, but cannot control their own body. These people can prefer death than life in which they have little or no control.
These explanations also demonstrate that death and the end of life can be different concepts. Nagel (1970), in his work, says that death under all circumstances is evil, but, at the same time, he does not tell that the unconscious state of a person is life. At the same time, Kamm (2019) says that a person who depends on injecting morphine as a means of combating pain also most of the time realize himself or herself as part of reality only partially. Velleman (1999) speaks of mental illnesses that prevent a person from perceiving the world around him. In the latter case, many diseases are successfully treated, but, for example, Alzheimer’s disease prevents people from recognizing the present and future, which is vital in Nagel’s understanding of life. Consequently, for some people, the end of life can occur earlier than physiological death. In another case, the end of the body’s life, or control over it, can also come with pure consciousness and, at the same time, cause significant suffering. Therefore, in such cases, illness or injury is evil, but death itself is good.
In conclusion, the end of human life is a tragic event; however, this end does not always mean the death of the physical body. Most philosophers agree that the fact of the inability to understand and experience life is the main evil that death brings. At the same time, physical or mental suffering can also deprive a person of this opportunity or significantly limit it. Therefore, not in all situations, death is the greatest evil, since a life full of misery can be a much more cruel destiny. In addition, in many countries, euthanasia for animals is considered an act of humanism, but, at the same time, the doom of a person to a painful life is also a manifestation of good. Although no one can speak of human and animal as equal beings, such a paradox seems unfair if animals have the right to be free from pain, but people have not this chance. Therefore, death is evil for a person who could feel and experience the joys of life; however, it is a salvation for those people who are deprived of such an opportunity.
References
- Harman, E. (2011). The moral significance of animal pain and animal death. In T.L. Beauchamp & R. G. Frey (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of animal ethics (pp. 726-737). Oxford University Press.
- Kamm, F. M. (2019). A right to choose death? Boston Review.
- Nagel, T. (1970). Death. Noûs, 4, (1), 73-80.
- Velleman, D. J. (1999). A right of self-termination? Ethics, 109 (3), 606-628.