Introduction
In this essay, I aim to counter Manuel Velasquez’s opinion that a worldwide authority is required to force global firms to contribute to the global common good as an improbable remedy for its preservation. I begin by summarizing Manuel Velasquez’s contention that multinational firms are not required to promote the common good since doing so would place them at a significant competitive disadvantage. I then explain why it is improbable to establish such a worldwide authority and why it would not force multinational firms to contribute to the common good even if it did exist. Finally, I provide insight on effectively approaching the problem of protecting the global common good.
The Exegesis
Velasquez concurs with the realism position that it would be unreasonable for a firm to conform to standards of morality when other companies do not. He begins by describing the global common good as ” the set of circumstances required for the citizens of all or the majority of countries to attain their satisfaction, as well as the products in which all of the world’s inhabitants have an interest” (Velasquez, 1992). Even if there are cultural barriers to articulating the global common good, he cites pure seas and the avoidance of nuclear weapons as prominent examples. Afterward, he describes the international business as a multinational organization. According to Velasquez, these firms’ principal objective is “to increase profits in a competitive environment” (Velasquez 1992). Furthermore, he notes that as these organizations cover many states, they may easily evade the jurisdiction of the laws of any country (Velasquez, 1992). This contributes to the inference that because these firms may escape the expenses of participating in the global common good by relocating manufacturing to another country, they have no ethical obligation to serve the global common good since doing so would put them at a competitive disadvantage. He does not suggest that they are absolved of their moral commitments; rather, he argues that it is illogical for individuals to assist the common good under these circumstances.
Velasquez continues by explaining that multinational corporations only have a moral responsibility to the global common good when “the encounters between international agents are recurrent in such a manner that agents may react against those who refuse to comply and agents can judge the credibility of other international agents” (Velasquez, 1992). Nonetheless, since multinational firms exist in a competitive market, these two prerequisites are, however, never satisfied. Moreover, he argues that “the only way to enforce this moral commitment is to create a worldwide authority that can consistently impose economic, political, and military influence on firms and smaller nations that do not commit to the global common good” (Velasquez, 1992). This organization would be distinct from existing global institutions such as the United Nations and impose moral obligations on multinational enterprises. Velasquez believes that a corporation compelled to adhere to its “home country standards” in its overseas activities may lose the motivation to do business abroad.
The Reasons
Velasquez’s stance makes sense until he concludes that society must build a worldwide authority to maintain global common goods. He does not go into depth about how he believes this should put up this worldwide authority, and he does not think about the various negatives of global authority. Establishing such power would need the governments of all or most countries to agree upon a set of laws and a single ruler, something the world has not seen before (Velasquez, 1992). The possibility of such occurring is relatively minimal, given each nation’s interests differ relatively from one another. For instance, such variables include how common products are weighed and those more desirable than others and how to ensure that this organization will eliminate free riders.
There will be countries that oppose the endeavor of others to conserve common goods since they assume that as long as others are providing, they will not need to bother themselves. Thus, the current issue of multinational firms going to countries where they do not have to adhere to the legislation to preserve their competitive edge will persist. Consequently, there would still be a deficiency of moral responsibility for global firms (Velasquez, 1992). Therefore, it is necessary to how one would build up international legislation to restrict these free riders or guarantee the preservation of common goods, a notion that Velasquez does not provide.
Presumably, to circumvent these concerns and establish a worldwide authority in which all countries consented to retain the global common goods and concurred on the order of significance of common goods. The problem of guaranteeing that this global authority will honor its commitments remains. In particular, the mechanism prevents multinational companies from petitioning this new authority to change the rules to their advantage (Velasquez, 1992). The best way to anticipate destiny is by studying the past, and history tells us repeatedly that robust corporations are adept at changing the polarity. However, suppose corporations were not lobbying for this power. In that case, there is still the matter of how it would implement “military pressures and political economy” to ensure the survival of common goods, an idea that Velasquez does not explain. Importantly, no global organization will be able to impose this; ideally, the only authority that can compel someone to behave ethically is their own.
I end by asserting that organizations should behave justly not because someone is ordering them to do so but because their managers intuitively understand that this is the correct course of action to take in any given circumstance. My argument does not suggest that Manuel Velasquez’s position is entirely wrong. However, I have suggested that it is flawed on various grounds. The principal reason is that Velasquez does not detail how he thinks it should be implemented. Thus, I have suggested that firms should work toward the objective of conserving the common good rather than wait to be coerced. That is, not since there is a law that requires them to do so; instead, they are aware that by doing so, they will enhance the amount of good provided to the group.
Conclusion
More importantly, I assert that multinational organizations need to realize that it is inconsiderable for them not to care about the environment. Velasquez does not emphasize this, yet cooperating with social responsibility is key to attaining the common good in an increasingly globalized economy. Since people will almost always find a way to circumvent the law, there is no practical method for instilling these perceptions in human beings. Thus, I conclude that this is an inspirational factor, which can only be achieved if people are trained to think about morality and ethics more frequently and evaluate their choices.
Reference
Velasquez, M. (1992). International business, morality, and the common good. Business Ethics Quarterly, 2(1), pp. 27-40.