Introduction
Both Russia and Israel have long maintained a bilateral relationship, with each government sending a delegate to the other. Israel has an embassy in Moscow and a consulate in Yekaterinburg, whereas Russia has an embassy in Tel Aviv and a consulate in Haifa (Igor Delanoë). Over the years, the two countries have had an on-and-off relationship. This was evident when Russia, as a member of the Middle East Quartet, was aided by Israel in providing a haven for Russian Jews and when Russia and Israel were on opposite sides during The Cold War of the 1970s and 1990s.
The election of presidents from the two nations who have been showing increased tolerance has promoted better relations and coexistence. Since the re-establishment of diplomatic ties in 1991, there has been a continuous improvement (Igor Delanoë). Since Vladimir Putin took office in 2000, Israel’s national security situation has improved significantly, and Russia’s global and regional strategy has benefited significantly. Bilateral ties are at their greatest level since 1991, if not ever. There has been steady progress since the re-establishment of diplomatic relations in 1991. Israel’s national security position has improved dramatically since Vladimir Putin assumed office in 2000, and Russia’s global and regional policy has benefitted tremendously (Igor Delanoë). Bilateral connections have never been stronger than they are now, perhaps ever.
History
When Nazi Germany invaded Russia in 1941, Joseph Stalin gathered Jewish support for the Russian military effort. As a result of this action, many Jews moved to Moscow to help the Jewish anti-fascist group. On May 17, 1948, three days after Israel’s independence, Stalin began to pay attention to the Middle East, and the Soviet Union formally recognized Israel. Israel’s ambassador to the Soviet Union, Golda Meir, was appointed on September 2, 1948, and served until March 1949. On the other hand, Stalin shifted his stance when Israel was established, preferring Arabs, arresting Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee leaders, and starting attacks on Soviet Jews.
Following the Soviet Union’s breakup with Israel following the Six-Day War, the Dutch embassy in Moscow established an Israel interest bureau to represent Israel in the Soviet Union until bilateral relations were restored in October 1991(Dmitrievna). When Israel Prime Minister Ariel Sharon applauded Putin’s reintervention in Chechnya, the two nations’ ties strengthened once more. Putin was more concerned with developing relations with anti-American regime governments, particularly when Russia and Israel were under attack from Muslim terrorists. So, in 2005, Vladimir Putin visited Israel for the first time and emphasized his support for Israel’s security.
Israel-Russia Relations From Past to Present
Russia’s footprint in the Middle East has risen as a result of developing relationships with each significant state and bridging the gaps between them. Russia sees itself as the Middle East’s “indispensable middleman,” with strong ties to nearly all its leaders (Barmin). Israel has a long history of pursuing excellent relations with any interested partner as a small, globally isolated country. Israel’s foreign policy aims to diversify its diplomatic alliances as much as possible, but it doesn’t mean the two nations’ relationship hasn’t had its ups and downs. In October 1991, the Soviet Union and Israel resumed diplomatic relations (Barmin). For 24 years, Alexander Bovin was Israel’s ambassador.
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union two months later, there was a massive migration of Jews from the former Soviet states. Historical, cultural, and social ties affect the Russia-Israel relationship, while the two nations disagree on certain fundamental strategic issues. The most significant are Iran, Syria, and Palestine (Igor Delanoë). The bilateral relationship occurs inside a defined context that both parties are aware of. The basic interests that characterize the bilateral partnership’s dynamics do not shift much. Russia and Israel’s ties will continue to be distinguished by a mix of goodwill and big disagreements on various regional problems (Igor Delanoë).
Russian Policies Toward Israel
This article will examine the impact of Russia’s manufactured identities and roles on its foreign policy toward the Middle East, notably Israel, in light of this context. The Russian and Israeli governments have developed a positive partnership that benefits both countries. The Russian military participation in Syria began in September 2015, following an official request for military assistance from the Syrian government against opposition factions.
Russian planes stationed at the Khmeimim base launched air assaults against Syrian opposition militant groups that were opposing the government. In addition, Russia has sent Special Forces and military advisers to Syria (Irkhin and Moskalenko). Before the incursion, Russia’s involvement in the Syrian Civil War mostly comprised of providing armament and equipment to the Syrian Army (Irkhin and Moskalenko). Both the Syrian and Russian governments had gained significant territory by the end of 2017, and additional soldiers had gotten specialized training as a result of the operation.
Soft Power vs. Hard Power
Soft power refers to a country’s capacity to attract and convince, whereas hard power refers to using it for force. Soft power uses a country’s culture, political principles, and laws to persuade an actor to adopt a specific attitude or take action by non-coercive methods, whereas hard power uses a country’s military or economic strength to force another country to do anything (Issaev and Shishkina). These appear to be two separate conceptions that impact the driving forces behind Russian policy toward Israel.
Soft power
Soft power methods stress the importance of shared political principles, peaceful dispute resolution, and economic collaboration in accomplishing common goals. Different concepts, relationships, and institutions utilized as foreign policy tools in the sectors of politics, security, and economy are also included.
Russia’s soft power operations in the Middle East are paying off, as Israel now sees Moscow as a more trustworthy partner than the United States. Russia wants to strengthen its connections with Jews. The threat of Muslim jihadists in Russian territory and the bitter history of the Afghan war moderate this goal slightly (Issaev and Shishkina). Moscow has never been able to reclaim the amount of power it had before the fall of the Soviet Union. Putin is working hard to change this, mostly via soft power (Issaev and Shishkina). The number of public diplomacy programs set to improve Russia’s international image in politics, economy, and cultural aspects has seen a considerable rise in Russia’s public image.
Russia has an opportunity in Israel to maintain its culture and exploit it as a potent force for advancement in foreign markets. As a result, practically everyone in Israel and other ex-Soviet nations in the Middle East speaks Russian (Krasna). It is not about imperialism but cultural advancement (Krasna). Exporting Russian commodities, services, and ideas to Israel and its environs will help boost Russian goods, services, and ideas; firearms and imposing harsh political systems will not. In Russia, the Jewish community is considered a minority community, and as a result, Putin’s intervention presents him as a protector of this Jewish minority in Russia and Europe on an overall scale (Krasna). One way through which he has done this is by visiting holocaust sites and opening the world’s largest Jewish museum in Moscow.
Russia is achieving its goal of becoming a regional “super soft-power broker.” It no longer simply hosts huge sporting events like the World Cup but also includes Kabul, Israel-controlled regions, Libya, and Gulf nations in bilateral trading activities(Krasna). The Russian desire to transform itself into a modernized soft-superpower is shown by its diplomatic attempts with the Taliban. In addition, Russia has developed the worldwide news channel RT, previously known as “Russia Today.” In Israel, RT is working hard to improve its service and has grown to become one of the region’s top television networks (along with Al Jazeera). RT, which the US has labeled “Putin propaganda,” is doing an excellent job pushing the Russian viewpoint throughout the region (Lund). Numbers don’t deceive, and Israel’s RT TV network and its surroundings have millions of monthly users (Lund).
Russia uses soft power to increase its educational and cultural influence in Israel and the rest of the globe, particularly in nations where a significant portion of the population segment is coherent in Russian to some extent. This strategy allows a wave of socialization in both countries, promoting calm negotiations. The founding of the Russian diaspora agency Rossotrudnichestvo Federal Agency was another great endeavor (the Russian department of the US Agency for International Development). It runs the Russian Centers for Science and Culture (RCSC) in Israel (Lund). The agency facilitates the immigration of Israeli people to and from Russia.
Growing ties between Russia and Israel reflect the two countries’ mutual interests. Based on cost-benefit analysis, the country with expanding regional power is typically ready to conduct business with Moscow (Lund). Finally, they do not want to be taken for granted by the United States; Russia is viewed as a viable option (Lund). Similarly, portraying Russia as a viable choice can be used to compel the US to follow a Middle Eastern country’s preferred path. Moscow advocates a secular, pragmatic, and non-ideological approach to the Middle East (Lund). When Middle Eastern officials distrust the United States’ commitments and promises, they turn to Russia for help (Lund).
There is a soft power fight between Russia and the United States in the Middle East, especially with Israel; most indicators indicate Moscow’s upper hand. According to two recent regional polls, Israelis (aged 18-24) increasingly see Russia as an ally while viewing the US as untrustworthy or worse (Mousavi and Naeni). The number of young Arabs who consider the United States an ally has decreased from 63 percent in 2016 to 35 percent last year (Mousavi and Naeni). Young people in the Middle East increasingly view Russia as the region’s best non-Arab ally, with 20% viewing it as its biggest associate outside of the Middle East and North Africa.
Moscow has offered to utilize national currencies as legal money in bilateral commerce instead of euros and US dollars on occasion and has asked its Middle Eastern trading partners, particularly Israel, to create a free common market with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Another key area of the ongoing collaboration between the two countries is an investment (Mousavi and Naeni). As can be observed, the soft power method delivers more good and variety to Israel in terms of language, culture, and education. This strategy brings the Russian government and the Israeli government together daily in unbreakable diplomacy and understanding (Mousavi and Naeni). If the United States still believes it is the world’s sheriff, it will have to oppose Putin’s soft power campaign. Otherwise, the US would lag behind Russia’s diplomatic achievements in the area.
Hard power
Military intervention, forceful diplomacy, and economic sanctions are utilized in hard power techniques to impose national objectives, resulting in aggressive policies. Hard diplomacy, economic incentives, military action, and other coercive means have all been used by Russia. Since the Soviet Union, arms agreements have long been a cornerstone of Moscow-Middle Eastern ties (Abbasov and Souleimanov). The majority of regional states prefer Western weapons to Russian weapons. However, there have always been two issues that hampered weaponry supply from the US and Europe: human rights concerns and sustaining Israel’s qualitative military edge. As a result, several Israelis regard Western countries as untrustworthy arms suppliers (Abbasov and Souleimanov). On the other hand, Russia has no restrictions on its weaponry sales (Abbasov and Souleimanov).
To destroy Islamic extremists and utilize Damascus as a springboard for expanding its influence in Israel, projecting force, and challenging US regional and global domination. Russia has launched the first major military engagement outside of Europe since the end of the Cold War in Syria. Russia has supplied major military and diplomatic support to the Syrian regime since October 2015 (Averbukh and Klein). Russian air attacks against its opponents have shifted the war’s tide in Syria’s favor, establishing Moscow as the country’s primary worldwide military force. Moscow currently controls much of the air space in Western Syria and parts of Israel after deploying the cutting-edge air-defense system (Averbukh and Klein).
From September 2015, when Moscow began assisting Syria’s military development, one of the oldest and most interesting anomalies in modern Middle Eastern affairs has emerged: an Israeli-Russian détente on the Syrian crisis (Blank). While Israel and Syria are still technically at war and have been since Israel’s independence in 1948, Syria shifted the Middle East’s power balance by signing an alliance with the former Soviet Union, cementing a Syrian-Russian tie that reflects both countries’ complete obedience to the notion of state sovereignty and disloyalty of Israel, who did not retaliate against Russia (Blank).
In 2015, Russia’s military intervention in Syria was crucial for Russian-Israeli ties as it was for Syria and the other countries, directly and indirectly, involved in the conflict. The Israeli military is acting in a radically different manner due to Russia’s engagement in both Syrian ground and airspaces (Averbukh and Klein). The Russian military participation in Syria in 2015 was as significant for Russian-Israeli relations as it was for Syria and the other nations participating in the conflict directly and indirectly. As a result of Russia’s involvement in internal Syrian territory, the Israeli force operates in a completely different environment. Israel had to de-conflict its operations with Russia because it was previously unopposed in the air over Syria and Lebanon, and it was able to strike targets on the ground with little, if any, worry about opposing forces (Averbukh and Klein).
Iranian forces in Syria and Israeli airstrikes against Iranian targets have been the most difficult subject in the DE conflict plan between Russia and Israel. Given Russia’s long-standing relationship with Iran and common goals in Syria, Israeli strikes on Iranian targets may have been a major cause of contention with Israel (Dannreuther). That does not appear to be the case. Even if the two countries’ bilateral commerce has increased, the economic pillar of the relationship has no strategic relevance. There is development potential in various areas, and if properly harnessed, Israel might become a modernization partner for Russia (Dannreuther). However, problems on the Russian side obstruct such a scenario: a lack of innovation, a lack of legal clarity, and a great reliance on the state. Israel, for one, is concerned about security, particularly in the energy and defense sectors (Dannreuther).
Policies used by Russia
This section examines Russian approaches to international relations with great powers and smaller neighbors, rooted in the Russian state’s attitude toward its citizens. Putin’s stance on Israel was influenced by a number of variables, particularly in his early years in office. One was the conflict with Chechnya, a breakaway republic in the North Caucasus that began in the early 1990s as a secular separatist movement but morphed into a radical Islamist movement in response to Moscow’s harsh policies and appalling human rights violations (Renee). Putin has drawn analogies between Russia’s and Israel’s anti-terrorism campaigns. He has made this exact parallel in discussions with several prominent Israeli leaders over the years. Israel was one of the few nations that did not condemn Putin’s conduct in Chechnya.
Putin’s intent on strengthening Middle Eastern business relations was another driving force behind his Israel policy. He has pushed trade with Israel in response, including weaponry, food, and even space technology (Renee). Overall, commerce between Russia and Israel increased in 2014, reaching $3.5 billion (Renee). Given Russia’s huge Muslim and small Jewish populations, as well as the rise of anti-Muslim sentiment and fears about terrorism, Putin had to strike a compromise in terms of local interests. Finally, Putin has pushed for a Russian role in the Middle East peace process, ostensibly to replace the West and simply to appear powerful (Renee).
Conclusion
Russia and Israel are still far from forming strategic cooperation based on common aims and mutual trust. The two nations’ relationship is still pragmatic, interest-driven, and distinguished by selective collaboration. The Syrian war and other Middle East issues are presently driving the relationship, whereas specific social and economic linkages are less important. Russia and Israel may not be able to avert a worsening of relations in the case of a security clash, such as over Syria or Iran. However, the two nations’ twenty-five years of peace are still in a state of fragility, with each fighting to keep the sanity of peace afloat.
The attack by Moscow will probably continue. Russia’s flaws are mostly neglected due to Washington’s lack of determination, nerve, and cognitive shortcomings (Babaoğlu). Russia’s invitation to China to send its navy into the Mediterranean for joint drills surrounding Syria underscores the country’s reliance on China (Babaoğlu). Russia is establishing strong connections with countries such as Israel. Putin is focused on the cost of becoming a superpower (Babaoğlu). However, Russian resources are present in reserve due to the war on the Ukraine border.
Israel appears to have conflicting sentiments about her friends’ actions since the country has neither officially criticized nor backed the conflict in Ukraine. However, in the absence of new US and European policies, Russia will continue to advance to calm turbulence to continue to play its usual role. In and of itself, the prolonged conflict in the Middle East validates Russia’s large-scale involvement by providing it with justification for acting decisively in the area.
Russia and Israel are expected to continue cooperating, particularly in the military and economic matters. According to news reports from Russia and Israel in February of this year, the two nations want to execute a free trade zone deal (Vasiliev). Russian overtures to Israel have well-defined boundaries. They are rooted in Syria’s unpredictable war dynamics and the competing interests of Iran and the United States in the area. Kurds from Hamas in Gaza to Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria to Iran, Russia will continue to take a cautious approach to everything involving Israeli interests.
In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Moscow will play the role of a neutral team player in the so-called Quartet (EU, UN, US, and Russia), enabling Washington to shoulder the unenviable leadership load. Today, we pray and wish for peace thought the world and its responsibility as a people, community, government, and country to make sure that the world is a safer place for us and our generation to come. We enjoy the peace we have today between Russia and Israel and their strive to coexist; however, we must be vigilant of Russia, comparing it to a volcano waiting to erupt or has already started.
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