The Sino-Indian border dispute is a political problem that complicates the relations between India and the People’s Republic of China. As a matter of bilateral relations between the two countries, it is technically a regional concern. Still, the importance of both India and China as great powers makes it a global one. The extensive common border between the two countries has two primary clusters of disputed territories. In the northern cluster, the main disputed territory is Aksai Chin – a mountainous and sparsely populated region in the eastern part of Kashmir, presently controlled by China. In the eastern cluster, the two countries dispute the authority over the state of Arunachal Pradesh, currently controlled by India. The ongoing feud regarding the control of the disputed territories refuses to abate due to several important reasons. The causes of the dispute are disagreements on the historical border delineation, economic potential of the disputed territories, and the implications of recognizing the McMahon Line for China.
As is often the case with border disputes, the first cause of the Sino-Indian conflict is that the sides do not recognize the same document as a basis for the demarcation of their border. India insists on the border demarcated in the 1914 Simla Conference and called McMahon Line after Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, a British colonial administrator (Ray 2019). The conference was initially supposed to accommodate three participants: British India, de-facto independent Tibet, and China. However, China was unhappy with the Tibet-China border proposed in the conference and, after some deliberation, refused to sign the agreement (Ray 2019). As a result, what was supposed to be a trilateral agreement turned into a bilateral arrangement between British Raj and Tibet. China never recognized the results of the Simla Conference and refused to acknowledge territorial claims based on the McMahon line. Thus, the disagreement regarding the results of the Simla Conference and the border between India and then-independent Tibet is one of the fundamental causes of the Sino-Indian border dispute.
Another important cause is economic, as some contested territories possess considerable resources that could yield significant benefits to anyone who controls them. Admittedly, Aksai Chin is not the most valuable piece of territory, as it is a snow desert ill-suited for human habitation with scarcely any natural resources (Ray 2019). However, this is not the case with Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern cluster of the disputed territory. India’s Northeast, despite its relatively small size, when compared to the rest of the country, has “an estimated 37 percent of India’s rover waters” (Banerjee & Bo, 2016, p. 85). Moreover, these water resources offer excellent prospects for producing energy, and the region’s potential capacity for hydroelectric power generation is nothing to scoff at (Banerjee & Bo, 2016). It is also worth noting that the territories along the eastern part of the present Sino-Indian border are among the less developed in both countries and would benefit significantly from cheaper and plentiful energy (Banerjee & Bo, 2016). The economic interests of India and China alike make the contested territories of Arunachal Pradesh too valuable to simply lay down the claim to them.
Finally, the third cause of the issue is the implications of the territorial dispute for the Chinese side, as even considering the recognition of the McMahon Line would put the People’s Republic in a precarious position. As mentioned above, the Simla Conference was supposed to accommodate the representatives of British India, China, and then-independent Tibet (Ray 2019). However, after the 1911 Chinese Revolution that overthrew the Manchu Qing dynasty, Yuan Shikai, the new ruler of China, proclaimed that Tibet was and remains a Chinese province (Ray 2019). This insistence on the fact that Tibet was never independent, to begin with and, as such, could not sign any agreements regarding borders, remained a staple of Chinese political rhetoric ever since. Hence, even theoretically recognizing McMahon Line as a potential basis for negotiations would also mean recognizing Tibet’s right to sign it as an independent nation. Such recognition would undermine Chinese positions in Tibet proper, which remains under Chinese control since 1951 – and, as a result, is out of the question for the People’s Republic.
As one can see, there are numerous causes behind the ongoing Sino-Indian border dispute. First of all, the two countries disagree on the validity of the decisions of the Simla Conference of 1914 and, mainly, the McMahon Line that delineated the border between the British Raj and then-independent Tibet. While India recognizes the decisions made in the conference and considers them a foundation for the current border, China refuses to do so. Secondly, the natural resources of Arunachal Pradesh and, in particular, the water resources with their potential for hydroelectric power generation are too valuable to lay down the claim to them. Finally, the conflict has political implications reaching further than the disputed territories. Recognizing the Simla Conference and McMahon Line would mean admitting Tibet’s independence at the time of signing the treaty and undermining China’s position in Tibet as a consequence, which is unacceptable for the People’s Republic.
References
Banerjee, P. & Bo, L. (2016). Dialogue across borders: Dam projects in Yunnan and Sikkim. In Ling, L. H. M., Abdenur, A. E., Banerjee, P., Kurian, N., Lama, N. P., & Bo., L. (Eds.), India China: Rethinking borders and security (pp. 80-101). University of Michigan Press.
Ray, J. K. (2019). India-China relations reconsidered: A realist perspective on India’s border dispute with its neighbour. Revista UNISCI, 49, 119-142.