Introduction
The Bosnian War and the Srebrenica massacre, in particular, are the most violent military conflicts that have occurred in Europe since the Second World War. Some experts attribute the high number of casualties to the incompetence of the United Nations (UN) and the Security Council (SC), which failed to protect the designated safe areas, enabling the genocide of Bosniak Muslims.
When the Srebrenica massacre occurred in July 1995, there were two prevailing perspectives: robust interference supported by Lt. Gen. Rupert Smith and non-interference advocated for by the UN force commander Bernard Janvier. The present essay critically analyzes the diverging views on aggression against safe areas, ultimately arguing that the reluctance to interfere in the conflict led to thousands of civilian casualties.
Historical Background
The central event in the context of the Bosnian War and the internal conflict within the UN is the Srebrenica massacre, which occurred partially due to the negligence of Bernard Janvier in providing the required military support to the city. However, to fully understand the reasoning behind non-interference, it is necessary to analyze what constitutes safe areas. In the UN resolutions no. 819, no. 824, and no. 836, the international organization declared some notable population centers as safe areas.
UNSCR 824 explicitly stated, “The towns of Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac, as well as Srebrenica, <…> should be free from armed attacks and from any other hostile act.” UNSCR 836 elaborated on some vague points of previous resolutions, namely, “Authorizes UNPROFOR (The United Nations Protection Force) <…>, acting in self-defense, to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas by any of the parties.” According to the statements, the UN could enforce protection of Srebrenica through a military presence and response, although the actual number of deployed troops was symbolic, numbering only 150 Dutchbat soldiers.
In this sense, the UN and UNPROFOR attempted to fulfill their peacekeeping obligations without committing significant troops to avoid escalating the conflict. Another critical issue was the presence of hostages from various nations held by the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA), and escalation from the UN could lead to their deaths and consequently increased political tension.
Nevertheless, this reluctance ultimately led to the BSA entering Srebrenica under the command of Ratko Mladić and systematically killing over 8,000 city residents in July 1995. During approximately one week of continued genocide, UNPROFOR was unable to mitigate the casualties to a meaningful extent. Having witnessed the horrors of the massacre, Bernard Janvier and NATO commander Leighton Smith agreed on NATO air support on August 10, 1995, to prevent any further tragedies.
Critical Analysis
Non-Interference: Bernard Janvier
As seen from the historical context, the UN was reluctant to fully commit to protecting safe areas due to the potential for escalation and risks to hostages’ safety, which were Bernard Janvier’s primary concerns. In his letter to Smith on June 2, 1995, he wrote, “The release of our personnel and I would like to point out that this, along with the security of all our forces, is my utmost priority.”
The UN force commander was also transparent regarding potential air support: “We must definitely avoid any action which may degenerate into confrontation, further escalation of tension, and the potential use of air power.” Despite these limitations, Janvier asked Smith for cooperation and the preparation of contingency plans to be used in case BSA violates safe areas.
The overall tone of Janvier’s first letter on June 2 was hopeful, describing the situation as “limited political movement” and “positive developments.” On the other hand, the general’s second letter on June 27, only two weeks before the genocide, was significantly more dreadful. In this document, Janvier explained the steadily escalating political tension and the UN’s vulnerable position in the region.
He estimated the window of opportunity for negotiation as “little as three to four weeks,” which was a generous evaluation in hindsight. Despite all these factors, he still demanded, “No matter how difficult, even frustrating, the situation in which we find ourselves, we must resist the temptation, no matter how inviting, to use force except in self defense.” The result of this hesitation and non-interference strategy was the Srebrenica massacre.
Decisive Action: Rupert Smith
Lt. Gen. Rupert Smith was the leading opponent of Janvier’s paradigm, consistently calling for decisive action while still complying with orders and collaborating. His intentions are clearly defined in the secret message from the US embassy in Sarajevo to Washington: “I’ve broken the machine, and it can’t be put together.” The machine in this context refers to the UN peacekeeping apparatus that was destined to fail, according to Smith.
Hence, the choice was either to fully commit to military confrontation to protect civilians and UN interests in the region or to maintain the existing methodology. Furthermore, in the case of intervention, Smith believed that air power exclusively could not solve the problem, implying that direct clashes on the ground would follow, with multiple casualties on both sides. Lt. Gen. argued that it was the optimal choice for reinforcing safe areas.
The strategic differences between Smith and Janvier are particularly noticeable in their conversation with SRSG in Split, Croatia, on June 9, 1995. Smith insisted that Mladic was never interested in ceasing military operations, “If we try to do our job our way, then we are his (Mladic’s) enemy and he will treat us that way.”
In other words, following the non-interference strategy would virtually render the UN’s presence near safe areas ineffective, thereby granting BSA unhindered access to cities. Furthermore, Gen. Lt. accurately predicted the upcoming crisis: “The situation with exclusion zones, safe areas, and WCPs is very disconcerting. I see them as the next series of major problems that we will face.”
Nevertheless, Janvier’s position was unchanged: “I insist that we will never have the possibility of combat, of imposing our will on the Serbs. The only possible way is to go through political negotiations.” In summary, Rupert Smith argued for military commitment in the area, while Janvier opposed it.
Discussion
While it is impossible to fully predict the consequences of a potential UN commitment to the conflict, it is clear that Janvier’s decisions of non-interference have led to thousands of deaths among innocent civilians. He underestimated BSA’s willingness to eliminate the UN presence in the region and the power of its ideological principles.
As a result, people in safe zones who believed the UN and NATO could protect them were left exposed, especially after the demilitarization of those public centers. Ultimately, the evidence suggests that Rupert Smith was correct in his assessment of BSA aggression in safe areas, while Bernard Janvier was wrong.
At the same time, it is critical to recognize that escalation of the conflict could lead to both the immediate cessation/protection of safe areas and broader military confrontation. Most experts continue to criticize Janvier, as Van Krieken notes, “General Janvier, his civilian counterpart Mr. Akashi, the UN Secretariat, the Security Council – are all to be blamed for the worst massacre in European history since World War II.” The strategies of non-interference and appeasement have rarely been successful in military history, and Janvier’s choice of de-escalation confirms these statistics. However, it is impossible to rewind time and accurately predict BSA’s movements in the case of complete air support and confrontation with the UN.
Conclusion
The present analysis has showcased two diverging views of Bernard Janvier and Rupert Smith on BSA aggression against safe areas, arguing that non-interference methodology ultimately led to the Srebrenica massacre. Janvier was wrong in his assessment of the situation because he underestimated the potential consequences of the warfare. Multiple primary sources, including UN resolutions, letters, and scripts of conversations, confirm these findings. They also highlight Rupert Smith’s argument that total military commitment was necessary if the UN was genuinely willing to protect safe areas.
Nevertheless, the ultimate choice was relative non-interference supported by Janvier, which allowed BSA forces to freely enter Srebrenica and murder more than 8,000 men and boys in the city. In conclusion, it is impossible to change the past, but it is imperative to learn from past mistakes and try to prevent such horrible tragedies in the future.
Bibliography
American Embassy Sarajevo. Secret File, May 27, 1995, Subject: “I’ve Broken the Machine.” Washington: U.S. Department of State, 2013.
Banbury, Tony. SRSG’s Meeting in Split, 9 June 1995. United Nations Peace Forces, 1995.
Janvier, Bernard. Personal Letter to Rupert Smith, June 2, 1995. United Nations Peace Forces, 1995.
Janvier, Bernard. Personal Letter to Rupert Smith, June 27, 1995. United Nations Peace Forces, 1995.
United Nations Security Council. Resolution 824 (1993): Adopted by the Security Council at its 3208th Meeting, on 6 May 1993. New York, NY: UN Headquarters, 1993.
United Nations Security Council. Resolution 836 (1993): Adopted by the Security Council at its 3228th Meeting, on 4 June 1993. New York, NY: UN Headquarters, 1993.
Van Krieken, Peter. “Srebrenica and the Safe Area Dilemma.” Refugee Survey Quarterly 23, no. 4 (2004), 125-146.