Introduction
The Kyrgyz Republic is a country located in Central Asia that gained its independence after the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991. Over its brief three decades of being an independent country, various political, social, and economic reforms have been adopted primarily due to protests and color revolutions that occur in the country regularly. In particular, the country has undertaken major steps aimed at reforming its political institutions to conform to the realities of the situation in the country. However, despite these reforms and attempts to accommodate the views of the majority when making them, a significant portion of the population has over the years felt left out leading to protests against proposed changes. For example, some of the reasons that have made people in the country protest include the concentration of power in the presidency, economic collapse, and the failure of the legislative organ of government to carry out its work, among many others. This research paper will analyze the 2005 Tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan and explain its causes by applying the theory of patronal politics and clan politics theory.
The Tulip Revolutions
Countries in the post-Soviet space have had to endure one or several color revolutions that aim to change the ruling government. In 2005, it was Kyrgyzstan’s turn with the color revolutions after countries such as Serbia and Georgia. The genesis of the protests in the country can be traced to the 2005 parliamentary election which the revolutionaries alleged was corrupt and the heavy-handedness of the Kyrgyz president, Askay Akayev, at the time, and a propensity towards authoritarianism by his government (Ivanov, 2022, p. 528). Initially, the protests had been called by various names but in a speech appealing for calm, the president called them the Tulip Revolution. Protestors had been calling it the pink, lemon, or silk revolution to indicate its non-violent nature similar to protests that had occurred earlier in Georgia and Ukraine. In the 2005 parliamentary elections, candidates close to the ruling president’s party did relatively well than the others. Despite the election being largely peaceful, it was criticized by foreign observers as lacking in some aspects and failing to meet the qualities of a free and fair election.
Following the criticism of the electoral process by the OSCE, protests began almost immediately in the country’s southern and western cities. At the start of March 2005, a bomb exploded in an opposition leader’s apartment. Following the explosion, many people pointed fingers at the government of President Akayev’s administration. However, the government was quick to deny any responsibility for the explosions. The explosion united opposition to the Akayev government as more politicians joined the protestors and held a symbolic “no confidence” vote against the president. By the twentieth of March 2005, protestors started occupying government buildings leading to the deployment of troops from the ministry of the interior (Ivanov, 2022, p. 528). However, protestors were successful in taking over all government buildings in the Southern parts of the country and demanding the resignation of the president. The president remained adamant that the protests were illegal and refused any talk of negotiation with them.
Despite their strong opposition to the government of Akayev, the opposition lacked a single leader that they could back to replace the president. The protest leaders suffered internal divisions and could not come to a consensus on who they wanted as the next president of the country. This did not slow the momentum of the protests. At the end of March 2005, the supreme court in the country ruled that the parliamentary elections were free and fair (Ivanov, 2022, p. 534). However, the supreme court also recognized an interim government formed just days later by the opposition after their ruling. The opposition coalition also scheduled another parliamentary vote later that year. Despite making some concessions to the protestors and attempting to violently quash the protests, President Akayev fled the country to Moscow at the end of March 2005 where Russian president Vladimir Putin allowed him to live in exile. His resignation led to the collapse of his government and the assumption of key government office by members of the opposition.
The coming into office of a new government is often met with enthusiasm from the electorate. In Kyrgyzstan, that enthusiasm did not last because the government that came into power began to take steps aimed at its survival rather than working for the interest of the public. In particular, the government of Kurmanbek Bakiyev was accused of backtracking in its promise to ensure transparency in the delivery of government services, maintaining law and order, and stopping discrimination against Russian and other minority groups in the country (Ivanov, 2022, p.534). Further, he made political alliances and appointed from the previous government for political expediency. In essence, the government by the opposition became almost exactly like the government they had helped topple. This cycle of politics in Kyrgyzstan and the Tulip protests can be explained by applying the theory of Patronal politics and clan politics theory.
Theory of Patronal Politics, Clan Politics Theory
The Post-Soviet states had to overcome many difficulties in their formative years as they sought to establish themselves as independent countries of the world. One of the main challenges was the internal political, social, and economic situation. In his study of politics in post-Soviet states, political scientist, Henry Hale studies these internal issues and others and formed a theory that he called the theory of patronal politics. The theory stands out among several others as a coherent framework that helps researchers understand the post-soviet political space. Hale describes patronal politics as “a political system in which politics is organized around a personalized exchange of substantial punishments and reward and not around any overarching principles or ideological beliefs” (Hale, 2015, p. 10)In essence, the theory of patronal politics describes a patron-client kind of political relationship.
Hale maintains that in patronal systems, power is distributed through a hierarchical network. Additionally, resources and coercion also follow a similar network (Hale, 2015, p.10). The theory of patronal politics invites a researcher to perceive power and politics in a given post-Soviet country such as Kyrgyzstan through the dynamics of patronage rather than through the perspectives, beliefs, and principles held by a political party or a coalition of political parties such as those found in western-style democracies. Additionally, decisions are not made by formal networks or government institutions. Rather, decisions are made informally by social networks that follow their unique structure that primarily exists to advance the interests of the patron system. Thus, in the many post-Soviet countries including Kyrgyzstan, power is acquired and maintained through granting favors in a pyramid structure that extends from the top down to the private citizens. This system extends to all aspects of life and ordinary citizens are expected to understand and know how and when to maneuver.
The clan politics theory maintains that clans, which are informal organizations based on kinship and fictive kin ties are a serious political player that has a profound impact on the natural political discourse of a country (Collins, 2004, p.232). In its bid to project a united national identity, the Soviet Union suppressed any notion of clans or kinship and their political activities. However, the fall of the Soviet Union led to the emergence of clans as major political players in the post-soviet states such as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. The clans were instrumental in ensuring a smooth transition to stable and independent states. However, in some states such as Tajikistan, the interclan conflict claimed many lives and was a source of instability and frequent tension. Consequently, any politician in this region must take care of the interests of the various clans to have a chance of survival in their position.
One of the defining features of Kyrgyz society is the role of clans in social, economic, and political life. Despite the appearance of a cohesive society from the outside, Kyrgyzstan is internally divided along regional, tribal, and clan lines (Berdikeeva, 2006, p. 25). These divisions not only cost the cohesiveness of the country but also lead to social, economic, and political problems. Of the divisions that exist in the country, clans wield the most power and shape the political discourse of the country. However, their informal but influential powers negatively impact meritocracy, rules of law, and the democratic process in the country. During his term as president, Akayev called for the limiting of clan influence in politics. He maintained that excessive power wielded by the clans was a source of instability and that civil violence almost always followed inter-clan tensions.
A Comparison of the Theory of Patronal Politics and Clan Politics Theory
The theory of patronal politics describes a relationship whereby patrons have selective access to government resources and are strategically placed to take advantage of opportunities that arise. In exchange, the patrons lend their support and votes to the individual or entity providing them privileged access to government resources. In this way, some groups have unfair access to government access goods and services, contracts, and other benefits compared to other groups within the same jurisdiction. The patrons do not need to be related or share any other characteristics. On the other hand, clan politics theory describes a political system in which familiar ties determine access to government goods and services, contracts, and other privileges. People who are not related to individuals in power have reduced access primarily because they are unrelated to people in power.
The comparison between the theory of patronal politics and clan politics theory indicates several similarities and differences between them. Firstly, proximity to power by the patrons and the clan members guarantees privileged access to government resources. Secondly, in exchange for this access, the clan members and the patrons are expected to extend favors to the individual in power in terms of voting for them. However, clan members have familial ties while patrons do not. Generally, because clans cannot raise enough numbers to keep an individual in power, interclan cooperation and coalition are common in countries with these systems such as Kyrgyzstan and other post-Soviet countries. These alliances help prop up governments in these countries but they are also a source of political instabilities because of infighting and a feeling that some factions may is benefiting more than others. Consequently, countries such as Kyrgyz will remain politically fluid in the foreseeable future despite political reforms because of patronage and clannism.
Theory of Patronal Politics, Clan Politics Theory, and the Tulip Revolution
The Kyrgyz society is divided along regional and clan lines which conform to the basic tenets of the theory of patronal politics and clan politics theory. The flawed parliamentary electoral process acted as a catalyst that sparked the Tulip revolution leading to the resignation of President Akayev. Other than the fact that the election was not free and fair, it failed to meet the local expectation. Coupled with widespread poverty, corruption, and a fear that the president would botch his succession, clans and various factions organized to force the president to resign (Lewis, & Sagnayeva, 2020, p. 84). However, it was a perception that the president was a captive of his family, his treacherous political maneuvering, and his poor management of crisis that ultimately aligned most of his allies and united opposition against him.
When a new constitution was drafted and agreed on by expert jurists and other professionals, functionaries in the office of the president drafted their own constitution and presented it for a vote by the public. Their version concentrated most of the powers on the office of the president raising alarm among allied clans. Further, his attempts to appease some factions against the satisfaction of other factions led to a deterioration of his relationship with his main political backers. While these and other events had taken place before March 2005, they were at the back of the mind of the protestors during the Tulip revolution that toppled him. Thus, a failure to satisfy the main factions that backed him and a lack of trust in him contributed to his downfall.
Naturally, a more democratic and transparent government of the people and by the people would have followed the Tulip revolution. However, just a few months into the new administration, the same issue that affected the previous administration arose. These issues were to be expected because some factions were bound to feel left out of the new administration. With nascent clan divisions and tension, a failure to play into the hands of these groups was bound to have political ramifications. Thus, the experience and consequences of the Tulip revolution illustrate the practicality of Henry Hale’s theory of patronal politics and clan politics theory.
Conclusion
The March 2005 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan toppled the administration of President Akayev. This revolution was sparked by a fraudulent legislative electoral process that the OSEC criticized and that failed to meet the expectation of local factions in the country. While one may attribute the protests to the electoral results, they were merely a catalyst in a web of dissatisfaction with the president that spread over several years. The president failed to meet the needs of the majority of his patrons and clan members and thus they failed to come to his rescue when a revolt against him arose. As a country whereby clans and special interests determine access to government resources, President Akayev’s alienation of this core constituent caused the revolt against him.
References
Berdikeeva, S. (2006). National identity in Kyrgyzstan: the case of clan politics. In The Association for the study of Nationalities 11th Annual World Convention. Nationalism in an Age of Globalization. New York: Columbia University. (pp. 23-25).
Collins, K. (2004). The logic of clan politics: Evidence from the Central Asian trajectories. World politics, 56(2), 224-261.
Hale, H. E. (2015). Patronal politics: Eurasian regime dynamics in comparative perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ivanov, Y. (2022). Revolutions in Kyrgyzstan. In Handbook of Revolutions in the 21st Century (pp. 517-547). Springer, Cham.
Lewis, D. G., & Sagnayeva, S. (2020). Corruption, patronage and illiberal peace: forging political settlement in post-conflict Kyrgyzstan. Third World Quarterly, 41(1), 77-95.