To assess philosophers’ arguments regarding which life takes precedence over which, acknowledging the structure of morality when it comes to human understanding is important. It is imperative to recognize that objective moral worth exists and must be included in the discourse. As per Nigel, when people detach from their particular viewpoints, ideals, and justifications that seem desirable, they might occasionally arrive at a new perception that may embrace some of the core reasons, which might dismiss some as subjective illusions (198). This is what Nagel refers to as an impartial, unbiased assessment of a practical issue. The current study disagrees with Nagel’s claims about morality or his intentions to change moral standards and remove conflict. It is assumed that this is because both claims have incorrect logic. The current study considers the claim offered by Williams, in the book The View from Nowhere by Nagel Thomas– the good life overrides the moral life.
The moral life is characterized as when actions and choices are consistent, and one can fulfill their life destiny, and serve others in the same manner. Nagel argues that no person is more important than another since people are valued, and this offers this study a reason to ameliorate everyone’s pain and misery, not just one’s own, which is agent-neutral but applies to everyone. Individuals must acknowledge and address other people’s sorrow, even if they do not have to neglect their own. This causes individuals to focus overly on other people’s needs rather than their own, which leads to a tiring existence. According to Nagel, moral life diverts attention away from one’s issues, such as “individual ambitions for achievement or romantic love” (201). Emotions are a natural aspect of human beings, hence the tendency to want to gratify as many desires as possible during an individual’s whole life.
Both reasons and morality may uncover and motivate people to behave in conformity with objective values. Nagel considers morality to be an objective virtue in and of itself (201). According to him, society does not appreciate reason in and of itself; rather, employs reason to find other objective qualities (201). In this case, the majority of people have an entirely subjective moral life because everyone has various values and morals based on their religious origins, race, upbringing, and so on. Conversely, some objective standards are immutable. For instance, murder is one example, which is always ethically wrong, regardless of the circumstances, since every human being is worthy. This study’s point of view, however, does not appear to be acceptable in this scenario. As such, individuals should not be considered fully immoral or moral. Although there are universal truths in morality, there exist degrees of immorality and morality. For example, theft may not be as serious as murder, yet both actions are wrong.
An analogy, through analysis has been employed to understand this dilemma. As an example, suppose a person had the option of saving four strangers rather than their child from an incoming train. In essence, the person did not set either of these people in danger but has the option of saving one of them. Therefore, the utilitarian seeks to maximize the greatest (good) effects while minimizing the worst (pain). The utilitarian would argue that saving the most people, in this case, the four individuals, though strangers, is the most appropriate action to take. Ironically, these four people might be the selected ones to discover a cure for cancer or the coronavirus.
As a result, in this situation, the utilitarian position would want the person to maximize the greatest outcomes, which would be to rescue the most lives. Each option, though, may be regarded as moral, despite not knowing the four strangers. However, as a parent, the individual owes it to their child to keep them safe from harm. Moreover, the individual understands their child since they delivered them into the world. In general, people give to their children’s lives by assisting them in being prosperous and prolonging their lives (Williams). Regardless of whatever option one chooses, someone will argue the opposite, until the person lets child and the four people to die, the individual become an unethical human being.
Acting with a utilitarian mindset in life or death is challenging. Furthermore, leading a moral life is extremely difficult in terms of the compromises that individuals must make in people to sustain a happy and fulfilled moral life. In a question like, how do you suggest utilitarianism is overly demanding while emphasizing that no one person is more essential than another is? Nagel’s response would be simple: “the moral life overrides the good life” (195). This indicates that when presented with a choice between moral behavior and activity that advances one’s self-preferences, the moral action should be chosen as the great majority of the time.
An exploration of Williams’ contention that the good life trumps the moral life contradicts Nagel’s perception of life and morality. The good life is the life that people aspire to possess. In good life, people do whatever they want to accomplish and achieve in their life objectively. As a result, Williams’ contention that living “the good life overrides the moral life” is more important (Nagel 198). He argues that morality can only be justified if one has a cause to exist (200). This is because; he feels that morality, in and of itself, does not provide a purpose to exist. The justification for prioritizing the lives of strangers over one’s own is illogical. An individual’s purpose for living stems from the ground tasks that one is interested in completing. However, in the event of suicide, his argument is the most powerful. In this case, he is implying that suicide is a viable option by stating, “In the sense that unless [individuals are] propelled forward by the conatus of desire, project, and interest, it is unclear why [they] should go on at all.” (12). A person who is considering suicide would not do it because they have a moral obligation to conduct a good moral act. That would not be enough to persuade an individual not to commit suicide.
William’s arguments present the concept of categorical wants in life. For example, suppose one had a long-held ambition to see Beyoncé in a live performance, but they also chose to commit suicide. Being able to see a concert by Beyoncé would serve as a way to live and prolong one’s existence. Having this great motive, the urge to complete this particular project to witness the Beyoncé live show is more likely to save the suicidal person’s life than do something for those who are moral. In a contagious question, what should you do if you have to pick between going to a Beyoncé concert and aiding a stranger? If watching Beyoncé’s performance is a fundamental goal, Williams would argue that the person should go see Beyoncé’s live concert.
Nagel would have a counterargument to the above assertion. Nagel would give this response if he were to apply the above reasoning. He would still argue that the moral life is preferable because morality necessitates self-sacrifice and agrees with the common sense viewpoint (Nagel). When there is a dilemma to contemplate, common sense dictates that a person should pick morality. In this case, one has reason to be moral, even if it is tough to live a good life. As an analogy, suppose there was a war and an individual’s nation requested them to go to battle and fight for their household. Even if there were a contradiction between the options of the good life and morality, Nagel would advise the person to follow their country’s call.
Furthermore, Nagel would that reasoning helps discern valuable truths. According to Nagel, humans have good cause to be moral, where “in human perspective, like reason, the moral standpoint should try to explain its own limits” (203). In this case, Nagel would advise one to use their reasoning to recognize that other people are morally as significant as they are, and hence they have cause to be worried about their pain and anguish. Moreover, humans want to be moral, yet due to the many aspects of nature, they are confronted with competing desires. Human beings have strong inclinations to serve their self-interests over the interests of others, which is a more hedonist viewpoint. As such, Nagel would next argue for a reduction in moral expectations.
By lowering the demands of morality, the tension between the good life and the moral life would be reduced. Nagel proposes that such people need to change moral expectations such that morality does not force them to perform absurd things. Individuals may act on their own beliefs by influencing morals. Even if we reduced morality and allowed for individual viewpoints, the tension between the good life and the moral life would remain (Nagel 204). Significantly reducing the demands will almost certainly not be an option in a dilemma between rescuing the child and sparing the four random people. The ethical or moral thing to do is to aid as many people as possible. Even if the demands are reduced, it does not appear that either party is morally incorrect in this case because it would be a sensible option to preserve the life of the child, therefore there is still a conflict.
Nagel proposes two approaches to resolving the tension between the good life and the moral life. The first step is to transform nature such that people desire to be moral. This assertion encourages people to drastically alter their lives and commit to becoming moral. This would lead them to reconsider their particular viewpoints. This necessitates a change in human nature to bring all aspects of nature into agreement. However, this is a challenging undertaking that appears to ease at face value. Therefore, individual conversion does not result in a good life; hence, morality is not responsible for the good life in this respect.
Another explanation is that expecting people to change their entire nature is unrealistic. In William’s words, “to live a good life, you must have non-moral qualities and greatness.” (198). It destroys their identity and prepares them for a life with no goals or ambitions. Consequently, it would result in a complete abandoning of the person’s actual self, which is extremely rare. The second approach suggested by Nagel is to modify the world’s environment by transforming power structures into morality-serving entities. Nagel argues that by structuring political structures around morality, individuals may reduce the weight of morality on people (199). This is a more plausible assertion, despite seeming improbable in the context of political and individual transformation, which must be a result of success for morality to exist.
Political and power structures are the least option for assisting others. They are the most morally reprehensible, and in terms of politics, a majority would concur with Nietzsche that morality renders individuals powerless (Nagel 196). Political structures are only concerned with their own gain in terms of money and their worth in businesses. They are all driven by a desire for success and place a high value on personal human advancement. As a result, none of Nagel’s assertions to eradicate antagonism between morality and the good life is appropriate.
Following the investigation of both claims, it is imperative to conclude that William’s claim on, “the good life overrides the moral life,” the argument seems superior. Although humans want to prevent abysmal immoral actions while maximizing good moral acts, to assist others, people must first help themselves. Individuals must have the courage, psychological mentality, and moral fortitude to aid a person morally, and not everyone possesses these qualities. Essentially, values are things that cannot be taught to other people. Otherwise, people will be unable to optimize their greatest outcomes. Therefore, because both a good life and a moral life are necessary components of a person’s nature, it makes sense to strike a balance. Nonetheless, it is more natural for the human tendency to prioritize personal endeavors above others for the greater good.
Work Cited
Nagel, Thomas. The View from Nowhere. Oxford University Press, 1989.