Introduction
In Chapter Three, “The Twenty-First Day”: Iraq during the Surge, 2007 of his book The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, David Kilcullen explores the Iraqi war of 2003. As the reader learns from the book, Kilcullen was present in Iraq during the war, serving as a special adviser to General David Petraeus. However, the author does not speak about the entire war, which only ended in 2011 – the chapter only covers the events that took place in 2007, explicitly The Surge – a new war strategy presented by George Bush. I decided to write about this chapter precisely because it recounts, in my opinion, some of the most questionable and contradictory decisions of the US government. The accidental guerilla syndrome that Kilcullen describes throughout the book heavily permeates the Iraqi war and the military’s policies towards the Iraqi people. In this chapter, the reader can see the consequences of the accidental guerilla syndrome – that is why I consider it the most relevant for my essay.
Main body
On March 20, 2003, the combined forces of the United States and the anti-Iraqi coalition launched a military operation against Iraq. Official Washington originally called the military operation in Iraq “Shock and Awe.” Later, the operation was renamed Iraqi Freedom (OIF). However, official Baghdad called the war “Harb al-Hawasim” – “the decisive war.” By official reports, the reason for the invasion was information from American intelligence services, which claimed to have found evidence of mass destruction weapons being developed in Iraq. Subsequently, no hard evidence of this was found. However, Iraq’s refusal to provide satisfactory proof of its innocence has later led to a new round of military confrontation. As the author begins his narration, the reader discovers the peak of this war – it is 2007, and the Surge is on the move. Kilcullen is at the center of the events – he is assigned to the counterinsurgency school at Taji.
The fact that Kilcullen is present in Iraq during the war and is immersed deeply into the conflict affects his view of events. As he consecutively explains the mistakes and failures the US forces made in previous years, he also firmly states that the invasion was, in the end, good for Iraq. “The success we and the Iraqis achieved in the Surge during 2007 was substantive and significant: […] it is correct to say that we […] pulled their society back from the brink of total collapse”, he says. Nevertheless, after this bold statement, he delivers heavy critique to the US military counterinsurgency work, pointing every flaw in their approach that led to developing the accidental guerilla syndrome towards the Iraqi people. He emphasized that “rather than working with the population so as to protect them from the insurgents, some units […] tended to treat all Iraqis as a potential threat and thus […] alienated the population”. This did not help alleviate the conflict.
The chapter is, essentially, a retelling of the events, so the author chooses a more descriptive approach. He adds many details about his own experiences, like encountering a bomb while flying on a helicopter or attending a brief meeting with Iraqi national security advisors. This enriches the narration and creates a feeling of the reader’s involvement in the events. His most significant points match the most impactful decisions and operations of 2007. Kilcullen presents every bit of information through the lens of his personal judgment, forcing the reader to adopt his views. He does not present an alternative point of the story. For his every argument against the US actions, he also gives a prominent explanation as to why those actions were, in the end, justified or, at least, did not bring unsolvable problems. The validity of his assertions is questionable, as the amount of personal feelings and impressions in the narrative is enormous.
However, there is no denying that this chapter presents an accurate and detailed description of everything that happened in Iraqi in 2007. For example, Kilcullen speaks about a brief meeting the US military and Coalition held for the national security advisor. He calls the briefing Dialogue of the Deaf. As he recalls, “the Iraqis had great difficulty in following the brief in military English with highly detailed, and colorfully busy PowerPoint slides”. Then, when it was Iraqi’s turn to speak, the roles were reversed. “The key Iraqi bureaucrats now raised a series of questions, complaints, and points, admittedly often in Arabic and sometimes devolving into somewhat grandstanding speeches”, tells Kilcullen. This, of course, did not help at all the reconciliation of the US and Iraq and only brought dire consequences in the form of disinformation, deaths of innocent citizens, and overall misunderstandings.
Conclusion
Concluding this essay, I cannot say I can provide an example of a good counter-argumentative review of the Iraqi war, as I would like. Every book or article written on the topic is affected heavily by the authors’ affiliations and political preferences. For example, the attitude of Europe and the United States to the situation that developed after the occupation of Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam Hussain had significant differences. However, the most indicative was Saudi Arabia’s aversion to the US military-power policy in the region. The country rather sharply opposed the new war, which only made worse the relationship between the two states, and this also created differences of views. Overall, I think that the book is an interesting narrative of the Iraqi war’s peak, promptly and competently enriched with details and personal experiences. Nevertheless, it does not provide an objective and argumentative analysis of the war – rather more politically affiliated and exculpatory.
Bibliography
Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.