The issue of the deployment of the National Guard personnel is ambiguous and multilayered. Legally, local jurisdictions can resort to the state National Guard for assistance when community resources are depleted, but the actual societal benefit of such employment is questionable. The most revealing illustration of the National Guard’s unreliability happened in Kent State in 1970, which resulted in several deaths of student protesters. When the National Guard was called in to solve difficulties, the results were unworthy of the ramifications. While certain deployments of National Guard personnel are valuable to society, particularly in the case of natural catastrophes, “law enforcement” and “riot control” should be avoided.
Recognizing the threat that a standing army could pose to individual civil liberties and the need to protect the country from external and internal threats, the Constitution’s drafters devised a system of checks and balances. It was done to divide military control between the President and Congress and share control of the militia with the states (Walker, 2018). Although the Constitution does not expressly ban the military from being used in civilian or law enforcement circumstances, the US has typically avoided employing the military to police the law unless it is absolutely essential. During an insurrection or civil disorder, Congress has given the president the authority to call in the military. The so-called Insurance Act allows the president to employ the military to put down an insurrection at the request of a state government, fulfilling the federal government’s role to defend states against “domestic violence” (Walker, 2018). Throughout US history, the Insurrection Act has been used to dispatch military personnel to calm public unrest, for instance, during the 1992 Los Angeles riots and Hurricane Hugo in 1989, when widespread looting was reported in St. Croix, Virgin Islands (Elkins, 2018). However, the legal ambiguity and improperness of the National Guard’s containment of the “internal instabilities” most often resulting in civilians’ deaths shed light on the lack of necessity of this practice. I believe the National Guard should not be deployed for law enforcement or crowd control in instances like these. There was no indication that local law enforcement was unable to deal with the crisis, and there was no evidence that local governments attempted to address the matter amicably other than by imposing a curfew.
State and municipal militias were commonly utilized to respond to public upheaval from the end of the nineteenth century. The National Guard can be activated at the expense of the state, according to the restrictions set by state laws. After exhausting local resources to handle a situation, cities and counties may seek National Guard help from the state. While National Guard personnel have been useful in the aftermath of storms and wildfires, as well as during the coronavirus epidemic, their riot-control past suggests otherwise.
The most indicative example of the National Guard’s troops’ unreliability happened in 1970 in Kent State. On May 4, 1970, National Guardsmen at Kent State University in Ohio responded to anti-war student protests (Reddebrek, 2019). When tear gas ran out, the military opened fire, killing four students and injuring nine more. Most crucially, a federal judge dismissed all charges against eight Ohio National Guardsmen for their participation in the killings of Kent State students at the conclusion of the criminal inquiry (Elkins, 2018). When it comes to ‘domestic instability,’ the National Guard’s position as an unaccountable force has been established. The US law and security system is undermined by the ambiguous classification of such disruptions, as well as unclear assertions about what constitutes a danger to internal security. Protests over civilian fatalities in Detroit, Newark, and Kent following the deployment of the National Guard resulted in small system reshuffles, but the system as a whole was unaffected (Elkins, 2018). Numerous films and other testimony reveal that the National Guard’s deployment continues to be improperly executed and results in even more internal problems and civilians’ deaths.
Members of the National Guard have no arrest authority during protests, but they collaborate with the police to keep the crowds orderly. Their primary objective is to safeguard “life and property,” which can be construed in a variety of ways (Elkins, 2018). When it comes to the proper employment of military forces in domestic issues, the president and governors must examine how a military presence might either help or aggravate an already sensitive situation (Erenrich, 2020). The mobilization of the National Guard almost always leads to greater escalation. As in past situations involving National Guard involvement, the shooting in Kent sparked nationwide protests.
My argument against the practice of National Guard deployment is based on an assertion that not all the peaceful means to handle the situation were exhausted. This is the most evidenced in the Kent shootings and also applicable to other situations that occurred in the history of such interventions. There was no indication that local police enforcement was unable to handle the crisis, and there was no evidence that the university administration attempted to resolve the matter amicably other than placing curfews on students. Even with a well-established presence of student activists, Kent State seemed an improbable site for student extremism. On the university campus, several student groups thrived, such as Black United Students (BUS) and Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), but student participation should not be exaggerated for the need for military involvement (Erenrich, 2020). As we have seen throughout history, the misuse and abuse of authority inevitably backfire. The Kent State shooting generated an extraordinary wave of anti-war agitation across the United States, outnumbering even the widespread student engagement that led Johnson to resign (Reddebrek, 2019). Conscription and the Vietnam War were both shortened as a result of the rise of this movement (Erenrich, 2020). Other comparable instances eventually spawned white supremacists, far-right movements, student radicalism, and other tendencies that may have been averted if the situation had been handled differently.
The National Guard’s use and abuse of authority in so-called riot control should be avoided, and the repercussions should be prosecuted by the federal government. This position is supported by several pieces of evidence, both empirical and documented. This issue is hugely important and sensitive to me as a former law enforcement officer and military. The use of the military is restricted by law in the United States for a reason, and the National Guard’s handling of the issue has proven undeserving of the repercussions. While some deployments of National Guard personnel, particularly in natural catastrophes, are more helpful to society, law ‘enforcement’ and ‘riot control’ should be avoided. The broad scope for law interpretation and the potential for lack of communication across instances (as in the case of the shooting in Alabama in 2009) create the foundation for a legal framework reform.
References
Elkins, A. (2018). Urban Riots and Rioting in the United States, 1800–2000. In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of American History.
Erenrich, S. (2020). The Cost of Freedom: Voicing a Movement After Kent State 1970. The Kent State University Press.
Reddebrek. (2019). Kent State: May 1970 [Video]. YouTube.
Walker, J. S. (2018). Most of 14th Street is gone: the Washington, DC riots of 1968. Oxford University Press.