Introduction
Among the several arguments for theism presented by atheists, the issue of evil and suffering stands out as the most renowned and often discussed. Despite ongoing debates around evolution and related topics, it is plausible that the majority of meditative theists would concur that the presence of evil and suffering poses a more substantial challenge to believing in God compared to arguments stemming from scientific perspectives.
Numerous individuals, whether they have faith or not, find themselves troubled by the existence of evil. When confronted with personal suffering or the suffering of others, they often grapple with anguished questions: “Why?” Nonetheless, it is necessary to distinguish between the issue of evil as a philosophical challenge to religious faith and the problem as an inquiry-driven by genuine concern.
Several philosophers have presented arguments based on the existence of evil, aiming to demonstrate that the existence of God is either untenable or irrational to believe in. First, it is essential to provide a preliminary understanding of the term “evil” and elucidate the rationale for deeming its use as a “problem.” If it is assumed that God is benevolent and that God’s intention as the Creator is for beings to exist in their specific forms, it might be inferred that the presence of animals is inherently good. From this standpoint, it may be inferred that evil can also be characterized as anything that poses a danger or hinders the development of creatures according to God’s intended nature for them. This verse expresses God’s delight in His creation and implies that goodness was the desired attribute of all He created.
The evil aspects present in the world are often categorized into two distinct sorts. Moral evil encompasses all wickedness arising from the volitional behaviors undertaken by individuals with moral authority. Instances of homicide, sexual assault, and the deprivation of basic sustenance resulting from societal inequities might be seen as manifestations of moral evil. Nonetheless, the presence of everlasting retribution in the form of Hell, particularly for limited wrongdoing, poses a moral quandary to the notion of a kind and just Creator. Natural evil encompasses all forms of evil that are not attributable to the conduct of morally accountable individuals. This includes pain and suffering resulting from natural catastrophes and various illnesses.
Certain philosophers argue that the presence of evil serves as evidence for the nonexistence of God. The presence of sin and the existence of God are logically inconsistent. It is incompatible to concurrently proclaim the existence of a benevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent deity while acknowledging the reality of evil. The term used to refer to this concept is known as the “logical form” of the problem of evil.
Their willingness to acknowledge that the existence of God may be rationally reconciled with the presence of sin. They recognize the possibility that a being possessing qualities of perfect goodness, omniscience, and omnipotence may have justifiable reasons for permitting the existence of evil. Therefore, the presence of evil, although not providing conclusive evidence against the existence of God, diminishes the likelihood or probability of his existence. This line of reasoning is called the “evidential form” of the problem of evil.
The assumption asserting the existence of evil represents one of the most frequently contested premises in the framework of the logical problem of evil, which aims to demonstrate a logical discrepancy between the presence of God and the prevalence of sin. They can argue that something considered evil may not be wrong from God’s perspective. The argument that God’s existence depends on the presence of misery may face obstacles concerning the evidential problem of evil. The notion of God’s kindness should be reinterpreted, according to critics.
The Logical Form of the Problem
J. L. Mackie composed a highly recognized assertion regarding the logical form of the problem of evil. According to him, it is “positively irrational” to simultaneously affirm the existence of a benevolent and omnipotent God and acknowledge the existence of evil. Although the discrepancy may not be readily apparent, Mackie acknowledges that it can be demonstrated by including additional principles that define terms such as “good,” “evil,” and “omnipotent.”
An omnipotent entity has limitless capabilities, and good is opposed to evil to the extent that it inevitably eradicates evil. These premises indicate that the existence of evil is incompatible with the presence of a good omnipotent being since the complete eradication of evil is a consequence of such an entity. Mackie proposes that the existence of evil is logically implied from the assertion that God exists and his additional antecedents.
The prevailing theistic reply to Mackie’s contention is that a good being undoubtedly eradicates evil to the greatest extent possible. Nearly all contemporary theodicies build their arguments on this kind of “greater-good” principle. The justification for the evil that God allows exists from the fact that it facilitates the attainment of a more substantial good or the aversion of a more severe evil.
However, it is crucial to exercise caution when applying the “greater good” principle to the problem of evil. The criticism probably objects that a powerful being, compared to a soldier, should be able to do anything, necessitating its capacity to eradicate evil while preventing any net loss of sound or escalation of evil. God, if genuinely all-powerful, would never allow evil to exist, transpire, or place any good “out of reach” of Him.
The justification for permitting particular atrocities is logically essential to attain specific benefits. However, this seems conceivable. For instance, specific moral virtues appear to necessitate particular atrocities from a logical standpoint. It is inconceivable to muster courage in the absence of potential damage. According to its critics, the natural law defense fails to sufficiently account for the anguish induced by natural calamities and diseases. Even if guided by natural laws, they argue that a kind God would not have created a universe that permits such pervasive suffering.
Evidential Form of the Problem
Most philosophers generally concur that the logical framework of the problem of evil is flawed, given the inability of atheists to generate such a proposition. As a result, in recent years, the primary focus of discussion and debate has centered around the “evidential form” of the issue. Advocates of the “evidential” argument concede that theism makes sense and that the presence of evil does not indicate God does not exist. They claim that the presence of evil, especially the types and amounts of evil that people encounter in the world, provides compelling evidence that God does not exist. To put it another way, the evil humans witness makes it implausible that God exists, giving humanity solid grounds to reject God.
The atheist acknowledges that a perfect, omniscient, omnipotent being might permit evil if doing so results in a more significant benefit that could not be attained in any other manner. Thus, God’s presence is not incompatible with the existence of evil alone. Still, atheists would argue that much of the real evil people witness is meaningless since it either fails to contribute to the greater good or is not logically required to attain any higher good. For the fundamental notion of “good” to exist, evil would not exist for no reason. This is a concise summary of the argument:
The following is a summary of the argument:
- If God is real, he forbids all needless evil.
- It is likely that the world contains some senseless evil.
- Hence, God most likely does not exist.
It is crucial to distinguish between them and evidential logical problems of evil as they represent two distinct categories of arguments that explain the basis of the threat that evil poses to the presence of an all-knowing, all-mighty, and all-good God. Though it is a powerful argument, the logical problem of evil can be refuted by claiming that God has a valid purpose for permitting evil to exist. God might, for instance, permit evil to thrive to give humans free will or to put them to the test. Although it is a weaker contention, the evidential problem of evil is more challenging to refute.
The Free Will Defense
Given that it is almost unavoidable that free beings will commit evil, the free will defense holds that the presence of free beings represents a larger ethical good that even an almighty God cannot attain without permitting some evil. The “Noseeum” argument, made popular by philosopher Alvin Plantinga, represents one of the most well-known forms of free will defense. According to the Noseeum contention, people cannot understand what a world free of evil might look like, nor can anyone determine if giving up free will would be worth the price. Thus, an all-perfect God may be able to tolerate evil because of the moral value that free beings contribute to the universe. Free will has historically been used to address the logical problem of evil.
According to the Soul-making Theodicy, God permits evil and suffering in the universe to fortify and enhance moral growth and human character. There are many issues with soul-making theodicies. Among other issues is that certain natural evils, like the suffering of other animals, do not appear to be contributing to a more significant benefit. Envision a situation where a lightning strike far from any human witnesses creates a forest fire, severely burning a fawn and causing it to die slowly and agonizingly.
Such things undoubtedly happen, but why would a loving God permit them? This evil appears not to be required for any second-order good. The soul-making theodicy contends that evil is essential to nurturing the human soul, in contrast to the free will defense. This theory holds that positive and negative events help people learn and develop. Thus, viewing negative situations as chances for personal development is possible.
Considering the discussions, I concur with the evidential problem of evil’s assertions. It does not attempt to show how the existence of God and evil are incompatible with reason. On the contrary, it contends that compelling empirical evidence contradicts the presence of a loving, all-powerful God due to the magnitude and prevalence of suffering and wickedness in the world. The argument implies that the likelihood of God’s existence is significantly reduced by the evidence of evil rather than saying that the existence of God is illogical. In other words, we have good reason to reject God because the evil we witness makes it seem implausible that God exists.
Conclusion
The central issue surrounding evil is the apparent contradiction between God’s qualities and the reality of evil. The presence of both natural and moral evil seriously challenges the idea of an omniscient, omnipotent, and all-good God. Although other doctrines, like Soul-making theodicies, concentrate on other parts of the issue, the free will defense provides one means of resolving these aspects by emphasizing the part that human free will plays in the presence of moral evil. Understanding the differences between the evidential and logical problems of evil is crucial to comprehending the many approaches and arguments for the issue.
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