This article has written about the origins and development of European competition policy. Many claim that German ordoliberal ideas were the guiding force, but a careful examination of the problem reveals that France and the United States played a crucial role in implementing the most supranational of all European policies. It can be concluded that the European competition policy arose due to fierce bargaining between French bureaucrats who were in favor of competition and German politicians who were opposed. This fact poses a severe challenge to ideological theories, the liberal intergovernmental approach, and ideas of delegation of authority for the sake of trust.
The originalists argue that the judiciary should be concerned only with the observance of laws and not their creation to perform their functions properly. To understand the current state in the formation of self-reinforcing sequences, scholars seek to understand what happened at the beginning of the historical series. Students studying the rational choice of educational institutions argue that it is impossible to define institutions as externally conditioned forms; it is necessary to strive to endogenize this form as a more primitive product. Political scientists conduct a constant stream of research about the moments of the creation of all types of policy, monetary unification, and transport policy. Their findings are helpful in the political process, at a time when various human rights organizations are trying to rewrite history for personal gain.
The history of the ECP is still poorly understood, in contrast to the history of antitrust policy in the United States. The origins of the EPC are focused on US politics, but scholars have ignored US contributions in recent years. They claim that Europeans created the laws on European Coal and Steel Community and Economic Europeans; this point of view belongs to David Gerber. However attractive Gerber’s words may be, recent research into the history of law has shown that the ideological interpretation of the history of the ECP is questionable. Analyzing the German experience of the last century, Gerber concludes that it was a failure, but this failure influenced the development and dissemination of the ideas of competition law.
Since past works on this topic included errors, theoretical and empirical methodologies of analytic narratives were used in this work. The economic theory of trade and competition in the 40s-50s was not as unified and straightforward as it is today. It makes determining preferences based on such approaches more problematic, and there is also a large amount of unique literature that will help in the study. This methodology eliminates superficial claims about national interests, especially in trade matters. Systems analysis of ideological explanation is a process that emphasizes the decision-making of well-defined actors. A particular event is distinguished from a non-specific occurrence because it corresponds to action during the actual and final situations. The responses that one actor’s acts will elicit are analyzed to the point that and actor’s plans are compatible with one another.
Empirical methodology derives from the theoretical methods of historically-minded analytic narratives. Sources that included a strict triangulation of mutually independent sources of various quality, eras, and countries. In addition to Gerber, who reports based on German materials, various French and German archives were used. Gerber and others have recorded the presence of a solid ordoliberal tradition among German intellectuals, claiming that this implies that the ECP rules are linked to it. These customs, however, are insufficient to justify concrete policy statements. Another potential contender for the paternity of the ECP rules in France had a similar competition practice. The German tradition did not have as much political influence as they claim. The ECP comes from other, perhaps non-intellectual, circles and interests since neither the French nor the Germans were significant participants in the Paris negotiations of 1950-51.
There are two explanations for the actual events that led to the emergence of the ECP rules: In the 1950s, the Paris Accords were negotiated. The ordoliberal ideas of the ECP provided an emphasis on the game of pure teamwork, according to an ordoliberal ideational basis established by Gerber and adopted by many writers. An explanation of redistribution that institutionalizing the ECP rules was off ensuring that ECSC would be a collaborative, efficient venture for the participating states and collectively organize them would organize their political economies.
The philosophical viability of hypotheses that view the European executive branch as a tool for raising trust is seriously questioned in light of this narrative. If Europe’s founders wanted to establish political legitimacy, the European antitrust regulator should have been modeled after the US Federal Trade Commission. The fact that the ECP rules were passed on to the general public speaks to the security rather than the credibility sought in creating such institutions. Germany would not join the European integration process if it wanted to create a competition policy. Like many other politicians, the ECP has a distinctive redistributive character.