Introduction
On September 11, 2001, a number of militants associated with the Islamic multinational extremist organization al-Qaeda committed airline hijackings and suicide attacks against the U.S., making it the deadliest terrorist act in American history. Approximately a month later, the U.S. military forces invaded Afghanistan to avenge the attacks, starting a long war with several key combats. One of them is Operation Anaconda – a combination of failure and success and an example of the necessity of effective adaptation in a battle, a concept studied by many researchers, including Kugler (2007). Despite some significant frustrations due to the drawbacks of the initial plan, Operation Anaconda was inevitable and has brought an extraordinary success because the forces managed to adapt to the new circumstances, switch tactics, gain control over the Shahi-Kot Valley, and prove the power of American military.
Causes of the Operation and Its Inevitability
For some time, Operation Anaconda was considered to be the largest combat operation in Afghanistan during the fierce War on Terror. Even nowadays, military researchers study the causes, stages, and outcomes of the operation, trying to understand what lessons it should have taught the nations. Overall, this combat was inevitable, and various severe reasons had led to the operation being launched in early March 2002. As noticed by Kugler (2007), it “was an outgrowth of earlier events during the war in Afghanistan,” and “in important ways, the battlefield at Tora Bora set the stage for Operation Anaconda” (pp. 3, 5). In order to understand some valuable aspects of the latter, it is necessary to discuss the frustrating failure of Tora Bora’s combat.
Essentially, the purpose of the Tora Bora operation, which was not prepared properly, was to attack the remnants of al Qaeda and Taliban forces gathering in that region. Due to the ineffectiveness of the Afghan troops from a local Pushtun militia, Osama bin Laden and his aides were able to escape (Kugler, 2007). Consequently, the U.S. and allied forces had to learn their lessons and launch further attempts, including Operation Anaconda, which would not probably be needed in case the Tora Bora was successful.
The Initial Plan: Doomed to Fail?
According to the information received by America and its allies, the enemy forces assembled in the Shahi-Kot Valley. Unfortunately, there were many obstacles for the operation to be entirely successful, and the U.S. military groups were limited in their abilities when planning to launch Operation Anaconda (Kugler et al., 2009). First, the location of the Shahi-Kot Valley and the weather conditions were very convenient for defense but not for attack (Kugler, 2007). Second, notwithstanding the fact that “the U.S. military possessed capabilities, especially modern information networks and precision strike weapons,” they faced a significant problem, namely, “lack of good intelligence on the number of enemy fighters and their weaponry” (Kugler, 2007, p. 6). Despite this drawback, America tried to estimate the number and power of enemies and based their plan on these suggestions.
However, some factors indicated that the plan initially was supposed to fail, either partly or completely. For example, as stated by Hastert (2005), the U.S. military decided to rely on the ground forces, and the air support was not significant. Additionally, a large role in the battle was given to the Afghan troops, who could not fulfill their obligations. Therefore, it is a wonder that the plan finally resulted in a success, considering the fact that many of its elements were weak and ineffective.
Early Frustrations of the Operation
In order to understand the drawbacks of the operation, it is required to analyze its elements closer. To begin with, one issue was with the friendly Afghan forces because they were not under the command authority of General Hagenbeck (Hastert, 2005). As noticed by researchers, “they operated according to their own command structure, principles, and designs,” which did not prevent these Afghan forces from withdrawing from the battle on the first day (Kugler, 2007, pp. 9, 14). Therefore, it was a crucial mistake made by the American command forces – they split the attacking force into several parts, trusting the Afghans and expecting them to cooperate effectively. What is more, this mistake provided the enemy with a serious advantage of having their forces gathered in one place.
Further, even before the main part of the operation began, there was a major problem that did not allow the actions to be launched as planned. According to Kugler (2007), the aircraft that had to bomb the thirteen enemy targets before the ground phase started had to cease their attacks due to receiving a message about friendly troops being endangered. Therefore, this first part of the plan failed, and less than half of the targets were eliminated. Finally, the “initial intelligence estimates underestimated the size, armaments, capabilities, and determination of enemy fighters,” which also had a severe negative impact on the plan (Kugler, 2007, p. 23). Nevertheless, despite the numerous failures, drawbacks, and weaknesses of Operation Anaconda, this significant combat was quite effective and successful, which is examined further.
Extraordinary Success of Operation Anaconda
It is possible to say that the battle was efficient and resulted in the victory of the U.S. military and its allied forces due to a number of factors. To be more precise, thanks to their ability to adapt to the new unfavorable circumstances, switch tactics, kill many members of al Qaeda, and gain control over the Shahi-Kot Valley, the American military managed to finish the operation successfully. It took American command several weeks to develop, adapt, change, and approve all stages of the plan, considering the fact that they did not know the exact size and capabilities of the enemies.
A special tactic known as hammer and anvil attacks was selected for this operation, meaning that the allied troops had to be divided into several parts. Consequently, this situation was especially difficult for adapting any changes and switching the tactic after the beginning of Operation Anaconda. According to Kugler (2007), “success was achieved because the U.S. military showed a capacity to adapt by employing joint operations and modern information networks to surmount a surprising and difficult challenge” (p. 1). Indeed, the development of the circumstances was not in favor of Americans and friendly forces. After facing numerous issues one after another, the U.S. troops could remain prudence and composure in order to correctly analyze the new situation and make sure that further solutions are effective. Finally, since the enemy troops were either eliminated or made to escape, and the allied forces gained control over the valley, this operation proved to be successful and extremely significant.
Conclusion
To draw a conclusion, one may say that Operation Anaconda has taught many valuable lessons, and its success and effectiveness proved the power and skillfulness of America and allied forces. Despite the fact that not all operations are launched as planned, and many mistakes and obstacles may appear during the phases, the determination and ability to adapt to any circumstances lead to success. Consequently, Operation Anaconda is valuable combat that played a key role at the beginning of the War in Afghanistan.
References
Hastert, P. L. (2005). Operation Anaconda: Perception meets reality in the hills of Afghanistan. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 28(1), 11-20. Web.
Kugler, R. L. (2007). Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan. A case study of adaptation in battle [PDF document]. Web.
Kugler, R. L., Baranick, M., & Binnendijk, H. (2009). Operation Anaconda: Lessons for joint operations [PDF document]. Web.