Events during wars are unpredictable, and the success depends on a joint effort from commanders and their subordinates. An example of an operation with notable changes in plan is Anaconda, which pursued the defeat of Taliban and Al Qaeda troops in Afghanistan by the US army (Kugler, 2007). The US forces have faced certain difficulties that can be analyzed based on the principles of mission command. First, when considering the tenet of risk acceptance, Anaconda can be characterized by a substantial danger due to an incorrect intelligence assessment by the American reconnaissance (ADP 6-0, 2019; Kugler, 2007). As a result of insufficient information about the enemy, the US forces encountered problems in the management structure. Because those in power lacked collaboration, the principle of shared understanding was not completely followed (ADP 6-0, 2019; Kugler, 2007). Nonetheless, the US army had two significant advantages in terms of mission command. American troops complied with the tenets of competence and mutual trust (ADP 6-0, 2019). Consequently, the US military has learned important lessons that facilitated the triumph of following operations. Anaconda presented considerable challenges but was successful and informative for the US forces.
The first tribulation encountered by the US army was a lack of knowledge about the enemy. Insufficient information and resultant strategy caused the anticipated three-day action with light combat to become a seven-day battle with intense fighting (Kugler, 2007). The US troops had a plan, but war plans cannot account for every possibility and often change in response to a particular situation (ADP 6-0, 2019). However, one can evaluate the American forces’ approach as deficient because it neglected certain matters. In particular, the US military did not abide by the mission command principle of risk acceptance on the basis of forecasting hazards (ADP 6-0, 2019). The US attack relied on faulty intelligence estimates that resulted in notable casualties that could have been avoided if more dangers had been taken into consideration (Kugler, 2007). The program developed for the execution of operation Anaconda failed to meet the realities of the mission.
The American troops made decisions that were not based on reliable information. The tenet of risk acceptance suggests that perils cannot be avoided, and commanders and subordinates need to face threats to achieve primary goals (ADP 6-0, 2019). At the same time, leaders must not gamble and should analyze as many hazards as possible (ADP 6-0, 2019). Nevertheless, the US forces made a faulty conclusion about the Taliban and Al Qaeda and dismissed several dangers. The case study indicates that although the US army attempted to obtain good intelligence, their plans were based on common beliefs rather than precise information about the enemy (Kugler, 2007). The American military assumed that the opponents would not try to combat or use the mountains to their advantage, and the rival forces were expected to either flee or seek a peaceful surrender (Kugler, 2007). One can argue that such a positive initial forecast prohibited the US troops from assessing other hazards. Accordingly, the US strategy did not comply with the principle of risk acceptance because considerable perils, such as the enemy’s willingness to fight, were overlooked.
Wrongful prediction of potential dangers fostered additional challenges for the US army. Kugler (2007) proposes that operation Anaconda did not have a unity of command, which suggests that a single senior officer should have the authority and assets to join all campaigns and battles into one cohesive plan. Consequently, insufficient unity signifies a lack of collaboration, which is a significant aspect of the tenet of shared understanding (ADP 6-0, 2019). Although higher and lower levels of Anaconda apprehended their main goal, eliminating the Taliban and Al Qaeda, the operation had many leaders with different powers. General Hagenbeck had the seniority to command the attack in the Shashikot Valley (Kugler, 2007). However, the General was not granted the control over the US air forces and Task Force 11, with the latter being slated to play an important role in the operation (Kugler, 2007). As a result, the US military approached Anaconda with discrepancies in its troops.
The US powers were not connected because the American forces did not have one chief over all components. The principle of shared understanding states that commanders and staff must have knowledge of an operational environment and participate in decision-making (ADP 6-0, 2019). Nonetheless, before D-Day, the elements of the US military did not engage in careful cooperation and joint planning (Kugler, 2007). As discussed above, the US army’s strategy relied on common beliefs over good intelligence about the enemy, which caused uncertainty. Consequently, the ambiguity of a situation can decrease collaboration and hinder decision-making (Shortland et al., 2018). Moreover, the multiheaded management structure became a problem during the execution of Anaconda as the commanders could not efficiently collaborate during the battle. In particular, getting permission for strikes was complicated because ground teams, air commanders, and SOF (Special Operation Forces) units had varying perspectives on certain occasions (Kugler, 2007). Therefore, the US troops did not comply with the shared understanding tenet due to a lack of collaboration and involvement in making decisions.
Despite facing issues in anticipating risks and concentrating on partnership, operation Anaconda was successful because of the potency of the American soldiers. The US military followed the mission command’s principle of competence, which is necessary for the effective accomplishment of tasks (ADP 6-0, 2019). The tenet suggests that leaders and subordinates become qualified through training, professional development, and assignment experience (ADP 6-0, 2019). Accordingly, the US troops overcame emerging challenges because the soldiers finished special preparation programs. The case study states that the US forces were “superbly trained” and performed bravely and efficiently, exhibiting useful skills throughout the battle (Kugler, 2007, p. 11). Moreover, the unexpected change of plans resulted in the American army adapting to new situations. For instance, air forces had to execute their normal functions but also provide a replacement for mortars and artillery (Kugler, 2007). The US soldiers had to prepare for fighting and surviving in the mountains. Combat locations in Anaconda presented such environmental factors as hypoxia and rugged terrain and required substantial practice (Lechner et al., 2018). The American troops met the competence principle, as they were trained to adjust to challenging settings.
Operation Anaconda ended successfully due to the components of the US military having faith in each other. Although the command structure was not unified and resulted in a lack of collaboration, the American soldiers managed to comply with the tenet of mutual trust. Notably, the principle emerges from the canon of competence because confiding interactions depend on realistic and repetitive training (ADP 6-0, 2019). For example, unlike friendly Afghan fighters who were undertrained and eventually retreated, the US forces remained on the battlefield despite having many losses (Kugler, 2007). Furthermore, the US troops must have felt more assured as they began better understanding the fight circumstances. The mutual trust tenet is represented through confidence and takes time to be fully established (ADP 6-0, 2019). The US participants of operation Anaconda supported one another and steadily enhanced their ability to work together (Kugler, 2007). The American forces abided by the principle of mutual trust as, even in a situation of uncertainty, the soldiers were triumphant in pursuing the primary goal.
Finally, the challenges encountered during Anaconda were informative for the US military. The army learned the importance of planning for joint networked operations and cooperation between ground and air forces (Kugler, 2007). For instance, the American troops realized that battles present many risks. As a result, the leaders acknowledged that the air component must always be ready even if the initial strategy relies on ground battalions (Kugler, 2007). The case study proposes that the US forces had learned Anaconda lessons because the military elements collaborated better in the later operation of Iraqi Freedom (Kugler, 2007). Although the US army did not completely follow some mission command tenets, the leaders and subordinates have discovered practical knowledge.
To summarize, the US troops faced challenges, such as unexpected resistance from the enemy, in Anaconda but were successful in finishing the operation. The principles of mission command explain the causes of difficulties and triumphs during Anaconda. In particular, the US forces did not comply with the tenets of risk acceptance and shared understanding as the commanders overlooked potential dangers and were not united. Accordingly, evaluation based on such mistakes indicates a deficiency in the US army’s approach to the operation. Nonetheless, considering that war times require soldiers to quickly adapt to changes in plans, the American troops were quite efficient. The US military managed to adjust to new dangers because the leaders and subordinates were well trained and had faith in each other, which prevented them from retreating. Therefore, the US forces followed the principles of competence and mutual trust. Although mission command was not fully enabled in Anaconda, the operation’s outcomes demonstrated that the US troops had identified areas for improvement.
References
ADP 6-0: Mission command: Command and control of army forces. (2019). Department of the Army.
Kugler, R. (2007). Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A case study of adaptation in battle. Center for Technology and National Security Policy.
Lechner, R., Küpper, T., & Tannheimer, M. (2018). Challenges of military health service support in mountain warfare. Wilderness & Environmental Medicine, 29(2), 266-274. Web.
Shortland, N., Alison, L., & Barrett-Pink, C. (2018). Military (in) decision-making process: A psychological framework to examine decision inertia in military operations. Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science, 19(6), 752-772. Web.