Terrorism and Violent Extremist Organizations in Somali and Their Elimination

Assessment

Utilizing proper analytic techniques is essential to conduct a risk assessment and prevent catastrophic failures in various military and non-military operations. Indeed, according to Artner et al. (2016), “the use of structured analytic techniques (SATs)” can “promote rigorous analysis, lessen the risk of intelligence failure, and make analysts’ reasoning more transparent to consumers” (p. 1). However, analysts should not be giving an answer without research or pre-existing knowledge about a topic. Providing legitimate evidence ensures the target audience confidence in the response. For example, reviewing and presenting information about extremists’ actions in Somalia requires accurate facts to maintain a healthy awareness of the potential threat and avoid unnecessary panic among citizens. This project aimed to understand how the current Federal Government of Somalia plans for current and future threats against terrorism and violent extremist organizations. Another objective was to identify current leaders and active militants of al-Shabaab, a terrorist organization formed in Somalia with the purpose of overthrowing the government. The three analytic methods, including quality of information check, outside-in thinking, and red team analysis, will be used to assess data and facts about the current situation in Somalia.

Presentation of Critical Data from the Sources

Al-Shabaab became synonymous with jihad and terror throughout the region of Eastern Africa. This extremists group emerged in 2007 when it separated from the United Islamic Courts (The Organization for World Peace [OWP], 2021). Al-Shabaab was placed on the United States State Department’s list of foreign terrorist organizations in 2008 (Council on Foreign Relations [CFR], 2020). However, they were already recognized as a threat to the country’s peace when they successfully expelled Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government in 2006 (OWP, 2021). The central goal of this organization is to build Islamic Caliphate on this territory (OWP, 2021). Although the U.S. military forces intervened to help the officials liberate major cities, this group remains active. Moreover, they did not stop their attacks on civilians, military units, police forces, and politicians during the COVID-19 pandemic (CFR, 2020). They have completed 10,811 strikes totaling approximately 29,500 deaths since the origin of the al-Shabaab insurgency in East Africa (OWP, 2021). It appears that the weak Somalian government and the growing power of al-Shabaab enabled the latter to expand its influence inside and outside the country.

Quality of Information Check

The first assessment method to evaluate the information related to al-Shabaab’s actions in Somalia is the quality of information check. This method is an essential element of any process that requires critical thinking, allowing to assess the “completeness and soundness of available information sources” (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2009, p. 10). The quality check process should start from compiling data and creating a library of resources that can be later evaluated and reviewed periodically for validity and relevance to the current issue (CIA, 2009). Indeed, quality of information check implies updating information used and reviewing the understanding of problem representation in the sources used. Furthermore, it can assist analysts in better understanding the context of conditions and critical information (CIA, 2009). Overall, it can benefit customers and policymakers by helping to identify information gaps.

This method can help detect possible deception and denial strategies conducted by al-Shabaab to throw off the government of Somalia and U.S. forces. Most information about the plight in Somalia is obtained from reports of federal agencies. Therefore, these sources can be considered reliable for creating the library for assessment of this issue. Still, the political situation in this region changes frequently; hence, updated resources should be added to the library often.

Outside-In Thinking

The second analytic method, outside-in thinking, helps to identify various external factors that influence an issue. According to the CIA (2009), this method identifies all possible outcomes of a situation. Furthermore, it prevents analysis groups from omitting critical information necessary for predicting potential scenarios (CIA, 2009). This imaginative method involves such steps as a generic description of the question, listing fundamental forces and factors, assessing their impact on the problem, and determining the actual influence of these forces (CIA, 2009). Overall, outside-in thinking allows reviewing an issue in a broader perspective, considering external power that may alter the circumstances.

In the case of al-Shabaab aggression in Somalia, this method can help highlight the outside players that may affect the result. Based on the assessment of the current state in this country, terrorism will remain the primary threat to peace in East Africa (Office of the Director of National Intelligence [ODNI], 2021). In fact, the power of this extremist group is obtained from internal conflicts and governmental instability. The central forces are the al-Shabaab militant group, Somalia’s federal government, the United States, and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (OWP, 2021). The most vital participants seem to be the terrorist group, the U.S. forces, and AMISOM. On the other hand, the Somalian government appears to be not robust enough to withstand al-Shabaab attacks alone (OWP, 2021). Therefore, it requires support from the United States to eradicate the activity of the militant extremist organization on the territory of Somalia.

Red Team Analysis

The third assessment method is red team analysis, which evaluates a problem by modeling an opponent’s behavior. Indeed, it is an effective technique for understanding one’s thinking and decision-making process because it places analysts in the social and cultural environment identical to a group under investigation (CIA, 2009). It is used when trying to foreshadow enemy movements and behaviors. Indeed, one of the advantages of this technique is the possibility to free the evaluators from fixed worldviews and biases by immersing them into a new mindset (CIA, 2009). Thus, every team member involved in role-playing should be able to acquire the role of their leaders, viewing the Western world as an external threat (CIA, 2009). Moreover, they should understand their enemies’ perception of the world by studying their religion, culture, objectives, and strategies. In fact, red team analysis is considered one of the most complex methods because it requires specific knowledge and expertise about the analyzed problem and maximum abstraction from analysts’ values, thoughts, ideas, and beliefs.

Each team member of the red team for the Somalian issue should have an excellent understanding of terrorists’ goals. Since al-Shabaab successfully expelled the Somali government in 2006, historical data can be used to imitate the enemy’s thinking (OWP, 2021). Moreover, the data from the tracking system can also be implemented to create a more realistic and accurate scenario for assessment. The first step in identifying their actions is to ask how al-Shabaab would respond to the current situation of the unstable Somali government and inadequately trained military and police forces (Headquarters Department of the Army [HQDA], 2020). The second step would be to emphasize the need to avoid mirror imaging and define cultural and personal norms that could influence al-Shabaab’s behavior (HQDA, 2020). The third step is developing first-person questions that leaders of al-Shabaab would ask about the situation (HQDA, 2020). The last step presents and describes courses of action that al-Shabaab may pursue customers and leaders (HQDA, 2020). The team must acquire the roles of the leaders of this militant organization to understand what actions they plan to take soon.

Reflection

These three structured analytic techniques would significantly improve the outcome of the intelligence assessment. Firstly, utilizing quality of information checks helps to evaluate and present to the customer correct and reliable sources about al-Shabaab’s attacks in Eastern Africa. Secondly, outside-in thinking helps develop the potential outcomes of the current situation in Somalia based on past events. Thirdly, developing offensive and defensive courses of action by thinking like the enemy through the red team analysis will predict the possible behavior of the militant group. Moreover, allowing the team to share ideas and thought processes ensures the richness of available hypotheses and knowledge about the assessed problem. The appearance of an al-Shabaab terrorist organization in Somalia resulted in the destabilization of the political situation in this country, ruining the lives of civilians for more than a decade. Although the support from the U.S. military forces liberated major cities of the country, this group re-emerged last year and continued its armed attacks throughout the pandemic. The possible outcome, based on the three abovementioned analytic methods, is that the intervention of the United States is crucial for eradicating their activity from this region.

The analysis methods are helpful tools for assessing various issues, and they possess specific advantages and disadvantages that make them more useful in some situations than others. Structured analytic techniques (SATs) can improve intelligence analysis by eliminating random noise and systematic bias (Chang & Berdini, 2019). Therefore, SATs are the essential components of U.S. intelligence training programs that teach professionals to build mental models and apply imaginative thinking to find plausible explanations and develop potential scenarios (Chang & Berdini, 2019). Currently, a broad range of SAT techniques is available for intelligence analysis. However, most SATs often treat these two problems as one, resulting in inaccurate evaluation and prediction. For instance, the quality of information check’s limitations are selective exposure and confirmation bias (Chang & Berdini, 2019). Similarly, red team analysis may be impacted by confirmation bias. Outside-in thinking, a technique that identifies different external forces, can be subjected to a status-quo attitude and illogical thinking (Chang & Berdini, 2019). These three methods were necessary for understanding the present situation in Somalia and gaining a future perspective; however, the quality of information check may not be practical due to its limitations.

Utility and Value of Quality of Information Check

Quality of information check is often used in analysis before other methods to generate a library of reliable information. This method helps to reveal potential deception tactics of the enemy and identify intelligence gaps (CIA, 2009). Furthermore, it assesses if the available resources are valid and objective. Still, human error also limits this technique since one’s mind can have a distorted perception of data because of how information is presented (Heuer, 1999). The first issue that can negatively influence quality checking results is status quo bias that increases the preference for selecting data related only to the current situation (Chang & Berdini, 2019). Hence, articles that describe alternative scenarios may be omitted and not included in a library. Secondly, confirmation bias can distort the perception of the problem and make imprecise prognosis due to people’s tendency to search for information that confirms their beliefs (Chang & Berdini, 2019). Lastly, analysts may conduct an inadequate investigation so that some essential information will remain uncovered (Chang & Berdini, 2019). It appears that this methodology is helpful but may become ineffective if the research group does not control the abovementioned biases.

Quality of information check helped to find credible sources from governmental agencies that discuss the current state of affairs in Somalia and predict the development of the situation in the near future. However, most of these reports are affected by status quo bias, preventing the analyst team from considering alternate scenarios. Although al-Shabaab may seem unlikely to stop fighting and overthrowing the official government, different outcomes are possible. For example, this organization’s leaders may be murdered by the U.S. air forces or die from COVID-19, resulting in temporary or permanent termination of al-Shabaab’s activity. However, such articles were not explored due to preference for evaluating this issue based on real-time data. Although exploring some questions may seem unnecessary, provided the pattern observed over the past fifteen years in Somalia, different outcomes still should be considered because this insurgence may have an unexpected finale. Overall, this SAT approach helped to investigate the past and current events in Somalia, but it did not allow to find analytic articles that predict alternative scenarios.

Utility and Value of Outside-In Thinking

Considering external factors is essential to have a relatively objective view of a problem. Outside-in thinking is one of such methodologies that allow for analyzing the issue from different angles. This technique is crucial at the early stages of the assessment process because it prevents analysts from missing essential details (CIA, 2009). To exemplify, the first part of this paper discusses such robust players in the conflict as al-Shabaab, U.S. military forces, and AMISOM troops that can significantly influence the outcome. Indeed, the analysis of the previous events when the United States liberated the country’s capital indicates that help from the American government is crucial. Furthermore, the study reviews a weak participant, the Somalian federal government, who will unlikely have a tremendous impact on this situation. Consequently, Somalia needs external support to stop the terrorist activity of this organization, which is determined to change the ruling system of this country.

Nevertheless, this SAT method is a subject of various biases. These prejudices are status quo, syllogistic fallacy, and illogical arguments (Chang & Berdini, 2019). Although the first bias may be inevitably present in this analysis, the two others are less likely to occur because the assumptions were made based on historical events and the current political situation. An illogical conclusion can be that al-Shabaab terminates its actions and decides to disband or that it will start bombing big American cities. The former is hardly possible because of the organization’s ideology and beliefs. At the same time, the latter is improbable because their goal is to establish power in Somalia, not in the United States. Moreover, syllogistic fallacy was avoided by making hypotheses based on the available knowledge. Although it may restrict the range of assumptions, it prevents making illogical conclusions. Still, it is challenging to claim that the syllogism is incorrect unless disproved or confirmed by the facts.

Utility and Value of Red Team Analysis

Thinking like an enemy can be an effective strategy to understand what steps they want to take and how to stop them. Red team analysis strives to place analysts into the same environment and mindset as adversaries have. This method helped to understand the intentions of al-Shabaab’s leaders, who wanted to overthrow the government of Somalia and believed in the righteousness of their actions. In fact, red team analysis demonstrated that this militant organization knew how to influence people and recruit more followers. However, these people did not seem to have any emotional pain over murdering thousands of civilians for attaining the larger purpose. Al-Shabaab understands its limits; thus, this terrorist group never attempted to attack the U.S., but it possesses sufficient finances to buy weaponry to control Eastern Africa (CFR, 2020). Overall, acquiring a mindset of extremists, aiming to do the right thing for the country, and temporarily removing the Western perception of the issue can help successfully conduct red team analysis.

Various prejudices can also affect the red team analysis technique, including mirror-imaging, confirmation bias, and attribution error. Interestingly, this methodology is resistant to status quo bias that adheres to preserving the current scenario (Chang & Berdini, 2019). Indeed, the analysts of the red team understand that the militant group is constantly planning, and the situation may alter to positive or negative direction. However, it is challenging to avoid thinking that the enemy perceives problems differently or fail to believe that the latter may have a better strategy, corresponding to mirror-imaging and attribution error (Chang & Berdini, 2019). Hence, it is essential to consider all possible plans of this organization and vulnerable targets for terrorist attacks to increase the efficiency of this methodology. Nonetheless, red team analysis appears to be the most effective for evaluating al-Shabaab’s insurgency in Somalia because it enables the team of analysts to become enemies and evaluate the situation from terrorists’ position.

Conclusion

In summary, the three structured analytic techniques, quality of information check, outside-in method, and red team analysis, helped assess the insurgency of the al-Shabaab terrorist organization in Somalia. These methodologies allow the collection of reliable data, classify forces depending on their influence on the current issue, and model future scenarios by resembling extremist leaders’ thinking and behavior. However, all of these SATs appear to have specific prejudices that may reduce their effectiveness. For example, the quality of information check can be subjected to status quo and confirmation bias, generating a library of resources that only describe the current situation and confirm analysts’ viewpoints. Although the outside-in method may also be affected by status quo bias, the analysis was controlled to avoid illogical conclusions. Lastly, red team analysis appears to be the most effective strategy to evaluate this problem. Indeed, it enables the team of analysts to adopt al-Shabaab’s leaders’ mindset to predict the possible course of actions. Overall, the Somalian government will need external support from American forces and African military troops to stop the activity of this extremist group on the territory of East Africa.

References

Artner, S., Girven, R. S., & Bruce, J. B. (2016). Assessing the value of structured analytic techniques in the U.S. intelligence community. RAND Corporation, 1-16.

Central Intelligence Agency. (2009). Structured analytic techniques for improving intelligence analysis.

Chang, W., & Berdini, E. (2019). Restructuring structured analytic techniques in intelligence.

Council on Foreign Relations. (2020). Al-Shabab.

Headquarters Department of the Army. (2020). Intelligence analysis.

Heuer, R. J. (1999). Psychology of intelligence analysis. Center for the Study of Intelligence.

Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2021). Annual threat assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community. 

The Organization for World Peace. (2021). Al-Shabaab insurgency in the east and the Horn of Africa. Web.

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StudyCorgi. "Terrorism and Violent Extremist Organizations in Somali and Their Elimination." February 28, 2023. https://studycorgi.com/terrorism-and-violent-extremist-organizations-in-somali-and-their-elimination/.

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StudyCorgi. 2023. "Terrorism and Violent Extremist Organizations in Somali and Their Elimination." February 28, 2023. https://studycorgi.com/terrorism-and-violent-extremist-organizations-in-somali-and-their-elimination/.

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