Facts of the Case
Gary Small, the petitioner in this case, had been imprisoned in Japan for three years for illegally importing firearms into that country and violating Japan’s weapons-control and customs laws and regulations. After serving the three-year sentence in Japan, the petitioner returned to the United States in 1998 where he bought a 9-millimeter SWD Cobray pistol. The pistol was discovered by the federal law enforcement authorities during a search of his house, business office and motor vehicle. Gary Small was arrested and charged of violating statute 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1), which prohibits “any person… convicted in any court … of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to possess any firearm,” (Wrightsman, 2006, p.20). Small had a right to challenge the conviction based on the argument that the statute does not apply to foreign convictions. This argument was initially rejected by both the Federal District Court and the Third Circuit.
Issues of the Case
One important issue arose from the conviction of Small. The issue is whether the phrase “convicted in any court” refers only to domestic convictions or it includes foreign convictions as well (Wrightsman, 2006).
Arguments Made
The first argument that was made by the United States court of appeals for the third circuit was based on the assumption that legislations are normally made by the Congress with domestic concerns in mind. Therefore, the court argued that such legislatures apply only to domestic convictions unless where foreign issues are clearly stated. In making this argument, a reference was made to Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, where the court argued that although the terms ‘any person or persons’ can refer to any human being on the planet, they can only apply to cases involving persons within the state’s jurisdiction (Lauterpacht, p.132). The second argument made was that the phrase explains only one essential part of the “gun possession” act, which is banned by the domestic laws. Convictions made domestically differ significantly from convictions made abroad.
The court argued that some convictions for crimes punished by foreign laws for imprisonment of more than one year may involve actions that are permitted or even encouraged within the United States, for instance, economic crimes. Most important, some crimes committed may be punished severely by foreign countries but the same crimes committed in the US may only receive a lenient punishment. The inconsistency of foreign laws with the American standards of fairness and human rights makes the statute inapplicable to foreign convictions. The court argued that many people who are convicted abroad for a sentence of more than one year are individuals who commit serious crimes. Therefore if the statute was to include foreign convictions, the seriousness of crimes committed in the US would increase.
The third argument made by the court involved the language used in the statute. The court argued that the language used does not suggest any intent of foreign convictions. This is so especially because of the inclusion of the words ‘Federal or State’ in the statute which imply that the law is applicable only to persons convicted within the United States jurisdiction (Vizzard, 2000).
Holding
The court argued that it had no cause to believe that the Congress took into consideration the additional enforcement benefits that could arise from including foreign convictions in the statute. It was therefore held that the phrase “convicted in any court” is only applicable to domestic convictions and does not include any convictions made abroad (Wrightsman, 2006, p.21). Based on this holding, the initial judgment of the Third Circuit was revered.
Dissent
The opinion of the Third Circuit was dissented by Justices Thomas, Scalia and Kennedy. Their dissent was made based on a number of arguments. The Justices argued that the word ‘any’ in unambiguous and includes all courts that have jurisdictions to try and convict persons for an imprisonment sentence of more than one year. They argued that because the Japanese court of crimes had the power to try and convict Small to a one-year sentence in prison, the petitioner was prohibited by the statute from owning a gun within the United States (Vizzard, 2000, p.215). Secondly, the dissenting Justices argued that the Third Circuit erred in assuming that the Congress did not have foreign convictions in mind when making the statute. They argued that no judgment should be made based only on assumptions rather than on facts.
The Court also erred in comparing convictions of crimes made abroad with those made in the United States. Justice Thomas and his colleagues argued that the Court was discriminatory in comparing only those serious cases convicted abroad with cases convicted at home yet there are so many crimes committed abroad whose sentencing is similar to those made at home and which do not violate American standards of fairness and human rights. The Justices therefore dissented on the grounds of the inability on the part of the Third Court to explain its departure of the statute’s meaning from its natural meaning (Wrightsman, 2006).
Reference List
Lauterpacht, E. (1963). International law reports. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vizzard, W.J. (2000). Shots in the dark: the policy, politics, and symbolism of gun control. Boston, MA: Rowman & Littlefield.
Wrightsman, L.S. (2006). The psychology of the Supreme Court. Oxford: Oxford University Press.