Introduction
The discussion about the essence of humanity and the concept of free will is a common topic in philosophy, with many differing views. In his essay “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Harry Frankfurt presents his view on how a person is defined in terms of desires and actions. The philosopher explains that the main characteristic of a person is a unique structure of free will based on the capability of aligning second-order volitions with effective actions. Thus, actions based on first-order desires define a non-person, which can be either a human being or another creature. Thus, it is impossible to distinguish a person’s behavior from their essence since the actions and motives behind it determine it.
Second-Order Desires, Volition, and Freedom of Will
The concept of will is central to Frankfurt’s discussion of the essence of a person. He argues that different species-specific morphological features may not be able to distinguish a person from a non-person with absolute certainty. The philosopher claims that “one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person’s will” (Frankfurt 6). The will for Frankfurt is the main distinguishing feature, which serves as the basis for the unique essence of a person.
The philosopher argues that a person is the only being with second-order desires, in contrast to other creatures with only first-order desires. According to Frankfurt, second-order desires define persons’ capability of “wanting to be different, in their presence and purposes, from what they are” (7). Other beings, in turn, are only capable of first-order desires, which involve performing specific actions. Due to second-order desires, a person can decide what motives and aspirations to possess or not, independently forming his first-order desires based on reflective self-evaluation.
Frankfurt notes that a person’s will is a motive that moves them to a particular action. The philosopher emphasizes that a person’s will can be identical to one or more of his first-order desires (Frankfurt 8). However, second-order desires define what inclines a person to desire a specific action, which is the difference between the two types. Thus, Frankfurt explains that motives, rather than specific actions, determine a person’s character. Second-order desires describe what makes a person perform a certain action and have first-order desires. Thus, the object of second-order desire is always desire, while the object of first-order desire is anything but desire.
Frankfurt clarifies that having second-order desires is not the only condition for being a person; it is also necessary to have volitions of second order. The philosopher also highlights effective desires that ultimately lead to action and are associated with a person (Frankfurt 8). Second-order volition, in turn, describes a situation where a person wants the first-order desire to be effective (Frankfurt 11). This aspect forms the will of a person about which the philosopher speaks. For example, a person may want to give all their money to charity. Thus, the second-order desire to enhance one’s reputation motivates the first-order desire to donate money.
However, at the same time, a person may not want this first-order desire to be compelling, as it is associated with a loss of money. Frankfurt explains that the will consists precisely in being critically aware of one’s second-order desires formed based on rationality and making associated with them first-order desires effective (Frankfurt 11). Non-persons, whom the philosopher’s advice wants, have no desire to want; they have only first-order desires, which can also be true for humans.
Further, Frankfurt defines freedom as something that, for him, also consists of different aspects and has a different nature. Thus, a person is free when he acts according to his desires, but this only constitutes freedom of action (Frankfurt 15). However, since people can control their desires, they also have freedom of will (Frankfurt 17). According to the philosopher, freedom of will lies in possession of second-order volitions and the ability of a person to align his or her effective desires with them.
For example, a kleptomaniac is aware of the need not to steal objects in order not to be caught and punished. This aspect is the second-order desire, which consists of wanting to have a first-order desire not to steal. However, the kleptomaniac has a conflicting first-order desire to steal, which he translates into actions and effective desire. Thus, second-order and effective desires do not coincide, which indicates a lack of second-order volition. Consequently, a kleptomaniac does not have the freedom of will, only the freedom of action.
Frankfurt’s View on Personal Identity
According to the philosopher, it is not the case that every first-order desire that a human being acts on is part of what constitutes a person. Frankfurt explains that if an action is motivated solely by first-order desire, it is attributed to a non-person. According to the philosopher, a person has freedom of will, while acting on the basis of first-order desires identifies only the presence of freedom of action. The freedom of will, in this case, is determined by a person’s ability to have effective desires based on second-order volitions. In other words, the reasoning behind a person’s actions is based not only on the desire to act but on the presence of a specific motive behind it.
For example, a person has two conflicting first-order desires: to smoke and not to smoke. The second-order desire is to refrain from smoking for the sake of quitting it entirely in the future. That is, a person wants not to want to smoke so that in the future, they will not be able to do it at all. Suppose a person performs the action of not smoking and manifests a second-order volition, which determines the freedom of will based on rational choice. If a person acted differently, then this would be a manifestation of freedom of action based on first-order desire and therefore defines a non-person.
Conclusion
Harry Frankfurt does not distinguish who someone is and how they actually behave. The philosopher explains that a person behaves based on freedom of will, while a non-person acts based on freedom of action. Thus, it is not plausible to make such a distinction because performed actions and the motives behind them generally define a person. In turn, a non-person is also determined by the actions performed, which have other motives of a lower order. Thus, there can be no separation between a person’s behavior and essence because the nature of effective actions determines the characteristic of freedom.
Work Cited
Frankfurt, Harry G. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 68, no. 1, 1971, pp. 5-20.