Introduction
It is important to point out that today; aviation is the safest mode of transport. One of the key challenges facing the aviation industry and regulatory authorities is to improve the safety of the air transport system. The solution to this issue is associated with some difficulties. Considering flight operations only from the point of view of safety, it is impossible to solve this problem, since flights must be both safe, regular, and cost-effective.
At the same time, safety is an essential factor in flight operations. There is no safe human activity, that is, risk-free activity. It is impossible to completely avoid the risk in aviation, while in this area of human activity, errors are the most critical, as they can often lead to human losses.
The problem of ensuring flight safety has always been and will be a task daily solved by the personnel involved in the flight. The safety management system was created to ensure the safe operation of aircraft operations. This task is accomplished by managing existing risk factors for the safe operation of aircraft.
The main purpose of the system is a continuous improvement in flight safety. The most well-known example is the disaster of March 27, 1977, where two Boeing 747 passenger jets, KLM Flight 4805 and Pan Am Flight 1736, collided on the runway at Los Rodeos Airport is considered to be the deadliest aviation accident in history. This was a turning point when Human Factor measures were integrated into a number of safety management systems.
Human Factor as an Influence
The Tenerife airport disaster is an example of the socio-technical system not operating correctly. Aviation is a system of systems, which means that a multitude of intertwined components creates a larger unit, which cooperates with other complex units (Maurino et al., 2016). The case was the result of human error of mutual misunderstanding and poor weather conditions.
This is an illustration of the socio-technical system, where such complex actions are highly reliant not only on technology but also on human interaction. However, the perception of the influence of the human factor in the form of an already adopted decision does not help to improve the safety and success of human actions. The decision made or the already completed action is a finished process, and it is no longer possible to influence it.
One of the basic principles of optimizing safety and success is the principle of preventive action. The report suggests that the overall health conditions of both KLM captain and first officer were normal with no sign of abnormalities (‘Aircraft accident report’, 1977). The similar case can be observed in Pan Am crew members (‘Aircraft accident report’, 1977).
Thus, one thing is clear that human influence on the safety and effectiveness of the activities carried out by a pilot is not the only influencing factor because there are still technological and natural factors. However, it is a person who is that element in the chain that, by its decision, combines all previous actions, together with the uncertainties that have arisen. As such, a person is a determining factor and the last resort in the process of increasing or decreasing the safety and quality of work. In this sense, the influence of the human factor is best perceived as an essential circumstance.
For aviation, the problem of the human factor is perhaps more acute than in most sectors hazardous to life, due to the most stringent requirements for people. High speed of processes taking place in the aviation transport system and their potential danger to human life and health are primary reasons. The share of accidents caused by direct violations by the flight personnel of the established flight operations rules is especially high.
For example, it is stated that the accent of ground controller heavily influenced the overall comprehension of Pan Am (‘Aircraft accident report’, 1977). Thus, the problem of reducing the influence of the human factor due to the knowledge of a person’s resource on accident rate is more important than ever. The training process in this area allows a person to see holistically the individuality of the pilot, to trace how the multilevel characteristics of his personality determine the features of his own professional activity.
A systematic approach to training in the field of the human factor is the most effective means of knowing oneself and increasing the level of one’s own reliability.
Currently, the theoretical and practical training of flight crews in the field of the human factor is used. Safety training is carried out in classrooms, and functional training is carried out on simulators, where the pilot’s personality is in the center of attention and acts as the core of professional practice. In the process of training, it can be seen that different levels of individuality in different ways determine the characteristics of professional activity in group work in the audience and on the simulator.
It is difficult to develop an automatic system designed to recognize a large number of possible types of dangerous situations. However, using the analysis of accident statistics, among the entire population, one can single out a set of the most common typical circumstances characterized by certain common signs by which they can be identified. Thus, the task associated with the development of diagnostic algorithms for critical flight modes, including those related to the danger of aircraft collisions in the air and collisions with ground obstacles, is highly relevant (Wise, Hopkin and Garland, 2016).
According to the report, the accident was the result of a multitude of factors, which included the airport specifics, unique weather conditions, recent political unrest, and technical issues (‘Aircraft accident report’, 1977). Facts increasingly show that the safe and effective reactions of pilots depend not only on their knowledge, experience, and skills brought to automatism (Wiegmann and Shappell, 2016). The cause of critical situations is becoming less and less frequent due to inadequate training and the lack of sufficient practical experience.
Safety Management
The basic principle of the safety management system (SMS) is the constant identification of risk factors, careful analysis, assessment of the admissibility of risk, as well as the reduction and control of hazard factors. The concept of the human factor is now widely used in all professional spheres of human activity, and everywhere it is used in accordance with its own specifics (Stolzer and Goglia, 2015).
An analysis of the influence of the human factor so far indicates only that this concept is too general to conduct a correct assessment of a person’s professional activity. It is evident in the case of Tenerife airport disaster, where both human and environmental factors contributed to the incident.
Therefore, clarification of the meaning of the idea of the human factor must begin with a description of the meaning of the concept of factor. For example, the idea of a factor in the scientific sense is perceived mainly as a source of influence, a driving, acting force, or an essential circumstance. Under the human factor, as a source of error, one can understand all the various manifestations of human personality. Personal and cultural qualities of a person, various manifestations associated with the characteristics of temperament, thinking, intelligence, and physical attributes can affect the environment.
Crew resource management (CRM) is a methodology for training personnel in areas where human error can lead to disaster. CRM does not focus on technical knowledge but the relationship of team or crew members in the same cockpit, including leadership and decision making (MacLeod, 2017). Initially, this technique was used in aviation and was subsequently implemented in other services. For example, a person can influence other people or the environment, realizing his abilities or motivations, satisfying various needs, ambitions, and instincts, reacting differently to everything around him or her.
These reactions cannot be foreseen because they can depend on the momentary state of a person. For instance, the perception of the human factor as a source of environmental impact can lead to certain results on the disclosure of the general logic of its influence. In case of the KLM captain, there is a possibility of him having a training syndrome, which is the result of the background centered on air carrier training (‘Aircraft accident report’, 1977).
Therefore, this type of individuals can have difficulty of distinguishing the training environment from the line of operation (‘Aircraft accident report’, 1977). This is an example of socio-technical system malfunction, where human factors alongside technical issues create hazardous environment. The human factor, as a driving, acting force, is usually understood as individual actions and decision-making of people directly or indirectly affecting the environment or people.
Threat and error management (TEM) is another safety method, where pilots are trained to be ready for any dangerous situations. The given approach focuses on the fact that errors are unavoidable, and thus, pilots need to be aware and prepared to handle threats (Helmreich, Klinect and Wilhelm, 2017). The primary goal is to make the crew knowledgeable on sources of errors and threats, which can lead to accidents. The report states that the “filter effect” was the primary cause of the accident, which is a faulty aspect of human information processing (‘Aircraft accident report’, 1977).
The latter resulted in pilot error, where he or she considers that certain amount of information is sufficient to operate. This term is denoted as the concept of “fineness” and the report suggests that these human factors led to chain of events (‘Aircraft accident report’, 1977). TEM and CRM have overlaps regarding pilot training, but the former also focuses on the technical aspect of the flight, whereas the latter only considers decision making and leadership.
Line Operation Safety Audit (LOSA) is a highly important element of analyzing flights and gathering essential data of safety measures. The audit also incorporates various strategies of factoring-in human factors, which can be a source of error (Salas, Edens and Wilson, 2017). The main advantage of LOSA is the fact that the entire industry is involved in data analysis and collection processes, which benefits all aviation professionals. For instance, various training approaches can be derived from LOSA data, such as observer training.
It is important to understand that in aviation, incidents are considered to be the result of just culture and not a fault of a single entity. Just culture is a term used to describe the root-cause of various mistakes within a system. Organizational cultures in both medicine and aviation are essential in establishing safety measures, because these industries constantly operate with life and death situations (Helmreich and Merritt, 2019).
This approach is essential to systems thinking because it helps to shape and evolve the industry, rather than eliminating individual pilots. The framework views human factors, such as errors, as a learning opportunity for an organization.
Socio-technical aspect of the accident can be observed through the accident report. It is stated that KLM crew had unhealthy cockpit environment, hydraulic leak, and stressful Dutch regulations. Technical issue was manifested in the hydraulic leak, which needed to be refilled at every point of destination (‘Aircraft accident report’, 1977).
Although this was not a major issue, it contributed to the stress accumulation regarding the pilots. Social aspect can be seen in the fact that KLM captain was trained to remove any form of unrest and distress in the crew by appearing confident and unworried (‘Aircraft accident report’, 1977).
This can be considered as a form of toxic social aspect of the crew management. In addition, the social aspect was further influenced by Dutch regulations that encouraged pilots to arrive at Amsterdam earlier, and thus, the pilots were in a hurry (‘Aircraft accident report’, 1977). Both technical issues and social disturbances constituted to socio-technical malfunctioning of the crew members.
Human Factor as a Psychological Phenomenon
In civil, military, sports, and private aviation, the human factor determines the efficiency and reliability of man-machine systems and all parts of the infrastructure of professional labor. The human factor includes the psychophysiological, psychological characteristics of the individual and the body, which determine the abilities, reserves, and reliability characteristics of a person in the process of flight work. The human factor is the personality of a professional in all the variety of its manifestations.
KLM crew experienced additional accumulation of stress due to newly integrated employee regulations, which forced them to arrive at Amsterdam early (‘Aircraft accident report’, 1977). KLM expressed a highly unique form of crew management, where a captain was trained to make sure that all factors had been considered (‘Aircraft accident report’, 1977). However, this type overreliance on the captain can increase the overall amount of their psychological stress.
The success of ensuring the professional, psychological, social reliability of the human factor is determined by the focus on the functioning of the system. Irrespective of the desires, flight operation, has a number of fundamental rules, the negligence of which will affect the lives of aviators and the population, both on the ground and in the air.
The following structural properties of the human factor in the flight profession determine the program-targeted long-term planning of scientific and organizational support of various social elements (Martinussen and Hunter, 2017). The latter includes technical, personnel, financial, educational, economic policies in aviation enterprises with any form of ownership, including in any type of military aviation.
Considering the process of psychological support of human reliability in professional activities, it is important to profess the humanistic ideology of the human factor. The essence of which is that the labor process is not considered as an end in itself, but as a condition for the development, formation, and upbringing of a person in the profession. The professional aspect of human factors can be observed in KLM first officer, who was relatively young and inexperienced (‘Aircraft accident report’, 1977).
Since psychological support is considered in relation to the flight profession, it will be appropriate to give one explanation. The psychology of dangerous occupations is engaged in flight labor, one of the central tasks of which is the formation of human and professional reliability. Reliability is higher for a socially active person, who has a deeper moral foundation for actions, such as taking responsibility and showing personal courage for the benefit of others.
A person is useful, interesting, necessary, dear not only as a carrier of the result of labor but also as a source of spiritual enrichment for other people and society as a whole. From here come the cultural guidelines and methodology of training professionals in a dangerous profession.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the scope of the human factor is not limited to the safety aspects. The effectiveness of the system largely depends on the application of knowledge in the field of the human factor or on ignoring it. During flight operations, for example, ignoring the influence of the human factor can lead to a drop in the efficiency of performing tasks below the optimal level. Such types of training as CRM, business, and role-playing games form a safe corporate culture in the organization. They are considered to be the most effective because they are focused on the needs of developing the skills required in aviation.
Reference List
Aircraft accident report (1977). Web.
Helmreich, R. L., and Merritt, A. C. (2019) Culture at work in aviation and medicine. London: Routledge.
Helmreich, R. L., Klinect, J. R., and Wilhelm, J. A. (2017) ‘System safety and threat and error management: the line operational safety audit (Losa)’, in Salas, E., Edens, E., and Wilson, K. A. (eds.) Crew resource management: critical essays. London: Routledge, pp. 179-186.
MacLeod, N. (2017) Building safe systems in aviation: a CRM developer’s handbook. London: Routledge.
Martinussen, M., and Hunter, D. R. (2017) Aviation psychology and human factors. Florida: CRC Press.
Maurino, D. E., et al. (2016) Beyond aviation human factors: safety in high technology systems. London: Routledge.
Salas, E., Edens, E., and Wilson, K. A. (2017) Crew resource management: critical essays. London: Routledge.
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