Introduction
Science has a history characterized by an incommensurate succession of paradigms. Kuhn asserts that a sole paradigm’s empirical work is of little significance to that of another (Kuhn, 1974). Comparing paradigms on identical grounds, for instance, empirical adequacy, proves inconclusive. Diverse paradigms differ on the meaning of truth or what makes up knowledge. The works of recent philosophers of science, such as Lakatos and Kuhn, nonetheless offer expectations regarding a scientific discipline’s history. Comparing both Lakatos’s and Kuhn’s notions offers veridical analysis. Two notable features separate Kuhn’s scientific accounts from that of Lakatos. First is the fact that Kuhn detached experimental evidence from its central place in earlier accounts, denying the decisive role of empirical evidence in the science of change: in the replacement of one paradigm by another. Second, he argued that claiming a paradigm’s objective superiority over another is impossible. Lakatos dismissed Kuhn’s views as an appeal to mob psychology. This paper presents the two philosophers’ views and shows that science is progressive.
Kuhn’s Notions
A look at the history of any science will show two unique activity types: revolutionary science and normal science. Normal science entails long periods of calm, during which the scientific community is working to increase and expand a theoretical account’s explanatory scope based on a sole set of fundamental beliefs (Kuhn, 1974). For the vast part, there is no questioning of an idea. Conversely, revolutionary science transpired in transitory, brief, chaotic periods when normal sciences previously supported fundamental beliefs were ditched and replaced. These set of fundamental beliefs were referred to as Paradigms by Kuhn. They entailed exceptional groupings of epistemology, methodology, and ontology.
Kuhn asserts that the beliefs that make up a paradigm are so fundamental that they are immune from empirical testing. The progressive nature of science can be seen in Kuhn’s notion as he further contends that experimental failure can cause the rejection of particular theories, but the paradigm will persist, directing new theories’ construction. The paradigm is central to the rational appraisable nature of scientific changes: it determines how scientists logically view the world. Without it, there is nothing based on which they can constrict theories. It is thus a cataclysmic happening when one paradigm is occasionally replaced by another. The old paradigm’s world is destroyed with it, and with its successor, there is the birth of a new one. This process signifies the most distinctive form of scientific change and is referred to as a scientific revolution. Some examples are the Copernican revolution, which substituted the Aristotelian world with that of Einstein and Newton, and later Newton’s world was replaced.
Lakatos Notions
Lakatos replaced the Kuhnian paradigm with an entity referred to as a research program. The research program recognizes the progressive nature of science and its change over time with rational, discernible improvements. It entails a succession of theories connected by a mutual hard core of shared commitments. Sequentially each theory involves a more detailed new articulation of the commitments. The hardcore is protected from instant empirical refutation by a protective belt of dispensable suppositions. Features that are dispensable such as assumption simplification, are altered by the program’s successive theories, with core conventions remaining intact. Another research program’s imperative characteristic is its capability to stimulate the development of adequate and intricate theories. Lakatos referred to this development capacity as the heuristic and is construed as the program’s objective feature.
In the process of maturity of a research program, the most common reason that a theory undergoes replacements is due to experimental failure. According to Lakatos, for a new theory to be acceptable, it must accommodate its predecessor’s success and bring into question the data that had brought the former theory(Imre, n.d). A good theory should do even more: it should lead to new experimentally verifiable predictions. When a research program comprises successor theories that meet these goals, they are called progressive.
A non-progressive program is referred to as degenerating. This denotes that a program has ceased temporarily to show new epifocal successes or predictions. However, if it is only possible to meet empirical anomalies through ad hoc maneuvers instead of the introduction of new effective theories, or if there are more problems raised by the new theories than they solve, then there may be an exhaustion of the heuristic and the need of a new research program. However, appraising a program as degenerating or progressive is not absolute. A program’s recent performance is used to make a judgment. With adequate time an appraisal can become positive or vice versa.
Comparison of Kuhn’s a Lakatos’s Notions
Comparison of the two notions offers a chance to see their variances and similarities. Lakatos characterizes Kuhn’s scientific revolution notions as the defeat of a research program by another (Imre, n.d). A few historical cases where a key scientific system was abandoned universally in favor of an incompatible rival fit the Kuhns model. However, the model fails to offer a veridical account of most cases of program replacement, and its application can be problematic. A judgment’s revisability regarding whether a program is degenerating or progressing makes it problematic to offer a final appraisal of any modern science. Comparing Kuhn’s incommensurability problem to Lakatos, the Lakatos model demonstrates a clear method of research strategies of rivals.
The two philosophers differ on how they view history. Lakatos assumed that the existence of various research programs simultaneously is the norm (Imre, n.d).There might be an exchange of elements among rival programs, and at times degenerative programs can be revived. Though Kuhn did not specify that science can only have a single paradigm at a time, his account resulted in this conclusion among many. From the incommensurability thesis, the implication that it is impossible to have real content continuity from one paradigm to another seems to be drawn. More so, after a paradigm is superseded, it should not recur. Most importantly, and lastly, Kuhn denied the fact that the replacement of one paradigm by another is what makes progress. However, Lakatos believed that empirical, theoretical progress allowed a preference that is reasoned from a research program over rivals in the historical cases that are most significant (Imre, n.d). It is evident that the two philosophers view history divergently.
Conclusion
From the paper it is clear that that science is progressive and the changes is rationally appraisable. From Kuhn’s view this is evident from his assertions that in the process of maturity of a research program, a theory undergoes replacements. The rationality is evident as he explains the reason that causes the replacement which he says is due to experimental failure. Lakatos, asserts that for a new theory to be acceptable, it must accommodate its predecessor’s success and bring into question the data that had brought the former theory (Imre, n.d). This shows its progressive nature and the fact that it must question its predecessor exemplifies the rationality in his notion. This assertions by the two philosophers also show the process of the advancement of new scientific beliefs which is logical: this shows a general method for the production of satisfactory results and methodological characteristics shift which is characterized by an irrevocable metamorphosis over time. The irrevocable metamorphosis being the logical process.
References
Imre, l. (n.d.). Science and Pseudoscience.
Kuhn, T. S. (1974). Objectivity, value judgment, and theory choice. University of Chicago Press, 1-7.