Operation Anaconda, conducted in 2002 by a joint military team of the US Army, Northern Alliance, and friendly Afghan troops, is an example of a complex operation that requires consolidation and joint command. The military forces involved in the operation were commanded to destroy the military Taliban formations based in the Shahikot Valley. According to Milkovich (2018), the initial planning of the operation had a significantly high risk of failure due to “complex authorities and authorizations, the lack of coordination and planning, and lack of joint training” (p. 35). Hence, after analyzing the specifics of the Operation Anaconda battle, it has been established that despite possible miscalculations at the beginning, the ability to join forces and improve the air-ground coordination through joint commanding can change the course of an event drastically. This operation has presented a military blueprint for various other operations, namely, Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Mission Command Principles
Competence
In the military discourse, the notion of the US Army has been long associated with innovation, competence, and high-rank intelligence. Competence, according to Matzenbacher (2018), is education, training, and self-development presented by the commanding officer and the troops. In the context of Operation Anaconda, the training and education were indeed conducted among the potential actors of the battle. However, instead of securing sufficient force training at the beginning, the military divisions were educated nearly three weeks prior to the battle. Thus, according to Kugler (2007), the Afghani battalion had not been considered a full-scale combat force when the operation was planned. Hence:
In the weeks before Operation Anaconda was launched, U.S. SOF advisers set about to organize these forces and provide them training in combat operations. … But normally, a period of two or three months is required to train such units to the point where they can perform complex combat operations. (Kugler, 2007, p. 11)
However, the real competence of the military force was noted during the operation itself, as the joint commanding office was able to restructure the whole process of the operation directly while conducting it, surrounded by the enemy on the unknown and complex battlefield.
Mutual Trust
The success of Operation Anaconda was built primarily on the firm belief in the commanders and their trust put in the forces. Indeed, the initial failure of the operation could have led to an unprecedently high level of army demoralization and insecurity. However, instead of accumulating disbelief in the commander, every task force, including intelligence, CAS, and CFACC/CAOC, developed mutual trust and blindly obeyed the orders. In this case, it was confidence in each other that led the forces to a joint victory.
Shared Understanding
The issue of understanding became a serious challenge for the operation’s forces due to the fact that various task forces worked under the command of different officers, and there was no mutual understanding of how to act at the beginning (Kugler, 2007). As a result, the forces that were not initially trained in the US, such as friendly Afghani troops, have a different image of the battle and the commanding patterns. While the US army was responsible for the intelligence, the Afghani forces were expected to move forward on the ground due to a better familiarization with the area. Eventually, the forces had no understanding of what the other divisions were doing. The shared understanding was achieved only during the operation itself when the primary focus was placed on the CAS.
Commander’s Intent
For the military forces to secure a successful operation, commanders need to clearly articulate the goals of the operation. As far as Operation Anaconda is concerned, this mission was accomplished at all levels, as due to a multi-level commanding, every infantry was able to learn about the purpose of the battle. Everyone involved in the operation was aware of the “hammer anvil” plan, a strategy to divide the forces into two parts in order to strike the opponent unexpectedly (Pape, 2022). Even when the plan did not work, the forces were also aware of the new immediate tactic outlined by the commanders, helping the forces to conduct a successful operation.
Mission Orders
While there was a clearly stated intent, the mission orders for the military forces became a challenge due to multi-level commanding that could secure cooperation and unity across all the infantries (Kugler, 2007). As a result, there were cases of withdrawing forces from the battlefield because the military maneuvers were performed differently than expected. Lack of joint order was one of the many reasons for the initial operation’s failure. However, once the orders articulated by the joint commander were equally accessible to Air Forces, CAS, and ground troops, the operation had an unexpected beneficial turn.
Disciplined Initiative
The disciplinary aspect of the operation was challenging for the most part, mainly due to the absence of a joint commander and command staff. Since some of the major commanders, like General Hagenbeck, had no control over some Afghani and Air Force divisions, the unity of the discipline could not be accomplished (Kugler, 2007). A lack of discipline is demonstrated in the example of the sudden demoralization and withdrawal of the Afghani troops at the beginning of the operation. On the contrary, during further alterations to the process, every infantry was given clear and joint instruction, presenting an opportunity to discipline.
Risk Acceptance
In order for the infantry to accept risks, the risks should be presented and discussed by the top commanding offices. In the case of Operation Anaconda, some major risks were overlooked because the intelligence lacked data on the number and location of the Taliban troops (Milkovich, 2018). As a result, the military forces commenced the operation without realizing that such a limited number of troops and ammunition could lead to drastic events. Hence, from the second day, the operation was driven by risks, as none of the maneuvers were planned beforehand. In that situation, the commanders’ willingness to accept risk dictated the course and mood of the whole operation.
References
Kugler, R. L. (2007). Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A case study of adaptation in battle. National Defense University of Washington, D.C.: Center for Technology and National Security Policy.
Matzenbacher, M. B. (2018). The US Army and mission command. Military Review, 61-71.
Milkovich, N. D. (2018). AirLand Battle Redux: Evolutions of air-ground integration from the Gulf War to Operation Iraqi Freedom. US Army School for Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, United States.
Pape, R. A. (2022). Hammer and anvil. Æther: A Journal of Strategic Airpower & Spacepower, 1(1), 106-117.