Abstract
Operation Anaconda was an example of ambiguity in the interpretation of success and effectiveness. This paper examines previous evaluations of the operation. It provides the analysis to understand the situation better and assess incorrect command actions to avoid them in the future. Information from official sources is used in extrapolation to the seven fundamental principles of military command. The analysis reveals inaccuracies and shortcomings in the combined commands that may have contributed to the mixed reviews of the operation’s performance.
Introduction
Operation Anaconda was a military operation conducted by Allied forces in Afghanistan in March 2002 in the context of countering the Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorist groups. The location of the operation was the Shahi Kot Valley in the Arma Mountains, and the time it was conducted was from March 2 to 18. According to the command’s official statement, the initial goals of the operation were achieved. However, negative feedback from various allied forces cast doubt not only on the effectiveness of the command’s actions but also on the necessity of the operation itself.
Basic Principles of Mission Command
Mutual Trust
When forming such a massive battle group, it is impossible to achieve complete trust and cooperation between units in a short period. The battle involved representatives from all Allied nations, many of whom had not conducted joint operations before and could not entirely rely on each other (Ploumis, 2020). A sufficient example of this was the scandalous conflict between the German KSK Special Forces and the American troops over the implementation of a planned tactic, the details of which became known after the end of combat operations (Caruso, 2019). In addition, the Afghan task forces Hammer and Anvil, formed from the allied local military forces, had shortcomings in coordination and cooperation with the rest of the teams.
Shared Understanding
A shared understanding of the operation’s objectives was communicated to all participants at the strategic level. On the tactical side, however, many mistakes were made due to human and technological factors on the ground (Caruso, 2019). Local objectives had to change throughout the operation, and a complete understanding of all of their immediate objectives was not achieved, which is unacceptable at this level of warfare.
Commander’s Intent
The intentions of commanders at every level were fully communicated to the troops. The problems encountered were the cause and effect of unanticipated changes in the enemy’s situation and behavior, which contributed to the disarray of the various units for the same technical reasons (Luning et al., 2022). For example, a miscommunication between the command’s promise of an almost hour-long bombardment before the assault at 06:15 on March 2 and the actual dropping of only six bombs prevented the Texas 14 Special Forces team from fully accomplishing its mission (Caruso, 2019). Due to incomplete communications between ground forces and air support, the Hammer group came under mortar fire from undestroyed enemy points, suffered casualties, and was demoralized.
Exercise Disciplined Initiative
With the adverse effects of communications technology, the initiative of the rank and file in some of the units was a significant factor in the operation’s success. Many soldiers were willing to sacrifice their lives to shield their comrades in action (Roberts, 2021). Examples of posthumously decorated heroes include Tech Sgt. John Chapman, Sgt. Philip Switak, and Senior Airman Jason Cunningham (McDaniel, 2020). Despite the extreme conditions, not all of the initiatives can be described as disciplined, but the fighters’ bravery in accomplishing their missions cannot be underestimated.
Mission Orders
Initial orders were mistakenly violated from the outset, resulting in a change of plans and subsequent mistakes. Groups of U.S. troops landed with CH-17s in the middle of a valley instead of a set point on its edge and were immediately suppressed by terrorists’ fire (Caruso, 2019). Plans focused on suppressing and then fleeing the insurgents did not materialize, and the fighting was much harder than planned.
Competence
The competence of virtually all field commanders cannot be challenged. Most lower-level commanders displayed efficiency and a quick response to changing circumstances, such as Staff Sgt. Andrzej Ropel of 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment, TF Rakkasan (McDaniel, 2020). However, the many flaws in the planning and coordination of the operation raise doubts about the competence of the high-ranking staff officers and the intelligence service that provided the inaccurate information.
Risk Acceptance
Risk Acceptance in Operation Anaconda was at an appropriate level, except for incorrect assumptions about enemy actions. From the information reviewed, the units were aware of the complexity of the combat operations (Roberts, 2021). However, this does not negate the abundance of criticism from military experts and outside observers (Caruso, 2019). With proper planning and consideration of all the risks, casualties among the Allied troops could have been completely avoided.
Conclusion
Operation Anaconda, while achieving the stated objectives, was an excellent example of the failure of the plans and shortcomings of detached command. The failure to provide quality communications technical support and the introduction of large numbers of poorly matched units from different nations into combat demonstrated the ineffectiveness of such an approach. Undoubtedly, if all of the above errors had been accounted for, the loss of eight American soldiers killed and 72 seriously wounded could have been avoided, as could the escape of high-value targets among the terrorists.
References
Caruso, D. (2019). Operation Anaconda: America’s first major battle in Afghanistan. The Oral History Review, 39(2), 334–336. Web.
Luning, C. R., Attoh, P. A., Gong, T., & Fox, J. T. (2022). A culture of organizational grit from the perspective of U.S. military officers: A qualitative inquiry. Armed Forces and Society, 48(3), 542–570. Web.
McDaniel, D. (2020). Australia’s intervention in Afghanistan, 2001–02. In J. Blaxland, M. Fielding, & T. Gellerfy (Eds.), Niche Wars (1st ed., pp. 65–80). ANU Press.
Ploumis, M. (2020). Mission command and philosophy for the 21st century. Comparative Strategy, 39(2), 209–218. Web.
Roberts, P. (2021). Command and control: By task or purpose? In Decision Points (1st Edition, pp. 9–21). Routledge.