Reconstruction in the United States failed due to the internal disagreements between white Southerners and the white supremacist attitudes of some of them. The antagonists used violence to weaken the Black political authority and persuade uncommitted neutral citizens to join their cause. Even though structural constraints made it more difficult to control the violence, a sequence of policy errors proved to be the most significant. The US administration, led by the radical Republican party, did not send enough troops or employ them strongly enough. It also did not seek other options that may have increased the chances of success, such as arming the Black community.
The victorious white supremacists incorporated structural racism into the post-Reconstruction political and social structure in the South. This claim can be supported by many of the presented facts, particularly the foundation of the Ku Klux Klan and the reports about its racist violence. The failure of Reconstruction demonstrates the perils of using half-measures. The US wanted to alter the American South at a low cost, both in terms of army numbers and time (Byman, 2021). Furthermore, the failure emphasizes the significance of ensuring that democratization encompasses more than just elections. Most importantly, Reconstruction indicates that a popular policy recommendation, namely the compromise with the defeated enemies after a civil war, can be risky, with generations of injustice as the price of peace (Byman, 2021). The irrevocable differences in worldviews and values did not dissolve after the outcome of the war. If anything, they became even more pronounced, with the defeated Southerners quietly angered by the logical consequences of their loss. Overall, the failure of the Reconstruction was mostly unavoidable, and structural racism continued to plague the territory of the South with a considerably higher intensity in the years to come.
Reference
Byman, D. (2021). White Supremacy, Terrorism, and the Failure of Reconstruction in the United States. International Security, 46(1), 53-103. doi: 10.1162/isec_a_00410