Introduction
In the modern world, disputes persist over the freedom of the human role, whether it is complete or whether the will is caused by external influence. Philosophers hold different opinions in this discourse: some adhere to deterministic positions, others libertarian. Determinists declare that there is no free will based on the fact that any actions are events that have a cause. In their opinion, any activity does not have the opportunity to be chosen, which leads to a lack of will to choose. If the reasons motivating people to act were different, they would do things differently, which corresponds to free will. Libertarians, in turn, believe that there is free will, they do not give up causes, they distinguish several types of causality. In one case, when one event triggers another, this type is based on the relationship between them. In the second case, the agent itself causes an event or circumstances. Roderick Chisholm adheres to a libertarian position that borders on the incompatibility of free will and determinism doctrine.
On Addicts and Dams
Chisholm rejects in his work the concepts of determinism and indeterminism when an action or event is not caused by anything. He justifies his refusal by saying that they are not conditioned by the opinion that people are agents. His work attempts to resolve the dilemma that if one adheres to determinism and indeterminism, then the action is either caused by a previous event or not caused at all (Chisholm 8). If people follow determinism and assume that the previous event is the cause of their actions, they commit an act and are not responsible for it. If the show were not caused by anything, the person similarly would not be liable for it. Here one can observe the conflict of determinism and indeterminism with free will. If both concepts were actual, then there would be no other alternative possible actions, and people would have no moral responsibility. Chisholm declares that people can be worthy of praise and blame only if they have free will.
The classic objection to Chisholm’s views demonstrates that determinism is associated with human responsibility. Opponents of Chisholm’s theory argue that the expression (A) can be synonymous with (B); if a person decides to act differently, he will act differently. Chisholm refutes this opinion and states that they may not always be related to each other (Chisholm 10). The very attribution of responsibility contradicts the determinists’ view of the action. Chisholm’s position is difficult to assert that each event is related to another event.
Chisholm’s Response to the Compatibilist Strategy
Chisholm discusses the metaphysical difference between a brain event and an event that a person immanently caused. If a person’s spiritual considerations drive a brain event, this already excludes that another event caused it (Chisholm 13). Until the action passes through the brain, it is difficult to say that it was caused by desire or internal motivation because it is impossible without the fate of the brain. The desire to do something will arise when the action itself reaches the brain and, through a chain of causal connections, will lead to the final result. The scientist clarifies this statement, concluding that this is an error in the public understanding of causality and not immanent causality. Chisholm does not use the combination “free will” because, according to him, “will” is a driving ability (Chisholm 16). The will moves human actions; at one moment, it can limit it, at another moment to give complete freedom of movement without moral responsibility.
Conclusion
The problem of free will was raised not only by Chisholm but also by several outstanding philosophers. The human will always remain the subject of research by both determinists and libertarians. Spirituality or reason encourages a person to act, specific events, but this does not remove moral responsibility in any way. The question of a person’s freedom to do what he wants to do, as well as his freedom not to want to do what he wants to do, remains open.
Work Cited
Chisholm, Roderick M. Human Freedom and the Self, Department of Philosophy University of Kansas Routledge, 1964.