Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1844-1900) works had a tremendous impact on the development of the entire philosophical current of the XX century. Nietzsche was a harsh critic of religion; in particular, he viewed Christianity as a disease of the entire Western civilization. In his opinion, Christian moral in its exaltation of eternal obedience, forgiveness and asceticism led to the fact that a religious man became fearful, vindictive and lost the remnants of his strong nature. This moral does not represent any true agape love or compassion, or sense of nobleness, claims Nietzsche, instead it hides fear and cowardice in its essence. A religious man lives in fear of a punishment, and this fear shapes his actions and thoughts, forcing him to do not as he pleases or sees right but as his religion dictates. This is what Nietzsche called a “slave morality”. In this essay, I will elaborate on Nietzsche’s claim that slave morality disrupts the growth of humanity and support it with evidence, as well as provide an insight into the counterarguments to the statement.
Nietzsche first formulated the idea of a “beyond-man” in his book Thus Spoke Zarathustra. His concept of an ideal human orientated towards the radical liberation of man through self-creation and presupposed a rejection of the morality of modern society in order to overthrow all assessments of moral values. It is this “questioning of values”, old and new, that the philosopher undertakes, deciphering, comparing and reassessing them, which then leads to Nietzsche proposing his own understanding of the moral phenomenon of “good”. He then proceeds to divide the humanity into two main clusters according to his concept of the “will for power”: The Masters and The Slaves. According to Nietzsche, the masters have this will to power, and therefore, their actions are dictated by this innate pursuit for excellence through the expansion of their domination and power. Slave morality is, instead, unconditional, and the aura of the Almighty God gives a sense of absoluteness to it. However, the God is only a creation of a human mind, therefore, by presenting Him as an unreachable ideal, a human only revels in his own unworthiness. This confidence of sinfulness justifies poverty, powerlessness and fear, adding to the “herd instinct” of the slave morality.
Nietzsche calls out the slave morality not only because of its “herd” orientation, but also because of the certain socio-economic makeup that precedes it. Indeed, if the people, whose freedom is suppressed and who suffer, begin to moralize, what kind of moral assessments would they make? The answer is obvious: morality, which can somehow alleviate their fate, and such a morality happened to be Christian. The concept of “suffering for the greater good” teaches a man obedience, humility and, even worse, self-flagellation that his conscience dictates him to employ regularly. Not only does slave morality ascribe a person an incredible in its power belief in his own sinfulness, it also elevates his insignificant existence into a virtue. Who, if not oppressed, will fight with all his strength against power and might? “The slave’s eye is not favorable to the virtues of the powerful: he is skeptical and suspicious, subtly suspicious of all the “good” that is honored there – he would like to persuade himself that even their happiness is not genuine” (Solomon 78). This signifies the beginning of the opposition between “good” and “evil” in Nietzsche’s concept of controversial moralities of slaves and masters.
In the dichotomy of “good and evil”, the philosopher tries to actualize his new symbol of faith – the doctrine of the “will to power” and “the eternal returning of the same”. Being the substantive basis of both the person himself and all their stimuli and motives of behavior, the “will to power” carries their main features: striving for growth and improvement, an aspiration to rule their environment. The slave sees this will as “evil” – dangerous, selfish, and projects those feelings into the concept of power itself, proclaiming it sinful and unbecoming of a true believer. For the master, this pursuit of might is the main drive for development and domination, as it shapes his personality, sharpens it into a man above petty limitations of religious morals. The desire and ability to create, the will to step up and defend his views and opinions, are inherent to the nature of the master. “According to slave morality, those who are “evil” thus inspire fear: according to master morality it is precisely those who are “good” that inspire, and wish to inspire, fear, while the “bad” are felt to be contemptible” (Solomon 78). These traits constitute the philosopher’s ideal of triumphant self-assertion of the master morality.
In fact, master morality is the morality of a creative person, whose will is strong. Both the will and desire liberate a man: for to want is to create, as teaches Nietzsche. In The Gay Science, he proclaims that the God is dead, whilst desperately asking where the Earth is going now. It seems at first that the death of the God has upset Nietzsche, as if the humanity has lost something of incredible value, and is standing now at the edge of despair. However, for Nietzsche, the God’s death is an opening for a new way of existence: only by enduring it can a man create something greater, more powerful – a “beyond-man”. Moreover, the “murder” of the God cannot happen without dire consequences: centuries of culture and morality are to be sacrificed. The death of religion leads to the elimination of all previous unconditional moral values and, as a result, opens the world to man’s freedom and unlimited creativity. Therefore, Nietzsche offers his own interpretation of subjectivity – the eternal becoming of man, but here and now, without appeal to some abstract image that the God presents.
Nietzsche’s ideas are the impetus for the liberation of the human mind from pessimism and despair, from the narrow understanding and the prescribed principle of the “duty to society”. However, in his claims, Nietzsche resorts to very dubious argumentation from the standpoint of the etymology of words and meanings, making far-reaching philosophical and socio-political conclusions from them. Not utility, suitability for society or other mechanisms of explanation lie at the basis of his moral investigations, of the assessment of an object as “good”, but purely the will of the master. He himself calls it good; he evaluates it as good in etymological terms. To confirm his hypothesis, Nietzsche resorts to the help of etymology, which, according to the philosopher’s design, bears in itself unchanged ancient meanings of words, despite all the controversy of the conclusions and consequences themselves:
I was given a pointer in the right direction by the question as to what the terms for ‘good’, as used in different languages, mean from the etymological point of view: then I found that they all led me back to the same conceptual transformation, – that everywhere, ‘noble’, ‘aristocratic’ in social terms is the basic concept from which, necessarily, ‘good’ in the sense of ‘spiritually noble’, ‘aristocratic’, of ‘spiritually high-minded’, ‘spiritually privileged’ developed: a development that always runs parallel with that other one which ultimately transfers ‘common’, ‘plebeian’, ‘low’ into the concept ‘bad’. (Nietzsche et.al 54)
Here, it would seem, etymology confirms the interpretation of the philosopher’s research. However, does this mean that it should be so? Moreover, these linguistic exercises were implemented not in the age of ancient philosophers, when they arose, but at the end of the 19th century – in the age of domination of the very masses against whom the philosopher would stand.
This exploration of etymology might be confusing, but if we simplify it to the equation of “schlecht” – “schlicht” (German, meaning “bad” – “simple”), the intention behind Nietzsche’s claim becomes clear. Those terms then lead Nietzsche into even more racist views, where he considers plebs as darker-skinned and haired people, pre-Arians, while the prevailing nobility is white with golden hair. It is with enslavement that Nietzsche connects the elevation of the human type; the highest part of humanity has always been the meaning and justification of any existing system. Gemes et al. note that “the very terms Nietzsche uses to describe the sovereign individual – ‘proud’ […] ‘aware of his superiority’, ‘like only to himself ’, […] – clearly hark back to the descriptions of the masters of the first essay” (326). Recognizing the cruel nature of his claims, the philosopher simultaneously calls for refraining from any sentimental weakness and remembering that life itself is in essence is oppression. Therefore, any healthy aristocracy must be the embodiment of the will to power – only by the right of birth, it seems.
Another question is whether the Nietzschean society of the future would be more morally advanced than it is now? For Nietzsche, a society without God, created by free and powerful people not burdened with false values, presupposes the content of high morality by itself. In his ideal world, a person acts nobly not out of fear for punishment by a higher power, but out of a feeling based on instinct and power. An ironical example lies in the philosopher’s book Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Higgins implies that “as a human being with fluctuating spiritual states, Zarathustra can lose his sense of the attitudinal aspect of his insights and retain only their propositional formulations” (76). In addition, what is the result of this created myth of Nietzsche’s own wisdom? What personality emerges from this story of the “unconscious birth of a hero” as opposed to the mythical image of the first Christian crucified on the cross? In my opinion, it presents an image that is far from perfect and depicts a typical epileptoid psychopath who combines “a smile on his lips, a prayer book in his hands and a stone in his bosom”.
In conclusion, we can assume that Nietzsche’s concepts of “good” and “evil” are a truly complicated formation which would be discussed repeatedly. They cannot be simplified into the negation of Christian moral; instead, they represent an everlasting fight with human obedience and weakness. Nietzsche’s definition of morality is full of vital force and controversial meanings; it flows within his philosophy and seethes with life. He defends his opinions fiercely and inflicts understanding with every statement. However, one should not ignore the fact that Nietzsche proclaims relativism in morality, and therefore his own moral convictions are neither true nor false. They only invite the reader to look at morality through the prism of his insights. To me, Nietzsche’s philosophy is akin to a revelation – something very new, alien, amazing, and sinister; and at the same time – very honest and truthful. As for Nietzsche himself, the person who wonders about “the value of the value itself” is already on the other side of religion and morality.
Works Cited
Gemes, Ken, et al. Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy. Oxford University Press, 2011.
Higgins, Kathleen Marie. Nietzsche’s Zarathustra. Lexington Books, 2010.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Nietzsche: on the Genealogy of Morality and Other Writings. Edited by Keith Ansell-Pearson. Translated by Carol Diethe, Cambridge University Press, 2017.
Solomon, Robert C. Existentialism: The 2nd Edition. Oxford University Press, 1994.