Introduction
War has persisted throughout the whole history of human civilization, emerging from inevitably conflicting opinions held by different groups of people. The immediate causes of warfare might vary significantly, ranging from ethnic concerns to competition over resources. An example of a modern military conflict is the Somali Civil War in 1991 and consequent US intervention in 1992-1993, with the latter being the focus of the present paper.
Ultimately, contemporary warfare is more complex than ever, with an intricate intertwining of innovative technologies, advanced tactics, and a wide variety of causes, which should be meticulously examined and discussed. However, the present paper argues that politics remains the central and most significant element of modern war and proves this thesis through a critical analysis of the US intervention in Somalia from late 1992 until late 1993.
Historical Background
Before analyzing the connection between the US intervention in Somalia and principles of contemporary warfare, it is essential to provide a brief overview of the event. From a historical perspective, it started with a civil war between the Somali National Movement (SNM) and the Somali government (President Siad Barre’s regime) in the 1980s, with severe escalation at the end of the decade. [1] Due to increasing casualties and the risk of famine for approximately 95% of the population in the country, the United Nations (UN) was the first to intervene in April 1992 – this mission is presently known as UNOSOM I. [1]
Finally, the United States decided to support the humanitarian operation in late 1992 (Operation Restore Hope) under the pretense of peacekeeping. However, the true motives were significantly more complicated. [2] The US intervention effectively ended in late 1993, shortly after the battle at Mogadishu.
Motives and US Policy
A comprehensive analysis of motives is one of the most effective tools for understanding the causes of the conflict and its implications for contemporary warfare in general. This approach also enables a clear overview of whether the military operation can be legitimized and justified. According to popular belief, American President George H. W. Bush initiated Operation Restore Hope for one of three reasons: a purely humanitarian mission, empathy, or to reduce political pressure on the US to intervene in Bosnia. [2] Furthermore, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) – a responsible US unit for the intervention in Somalia – insisted on the “politics-free” aspect of the mission. [3] In other words, the United States justified Operation Restore Hope as a primarily humanitarian intervention aimed exclusively at saving the Somali people from famine and restoring order in the country.
Declassified Documents and Pragmatism
Nevertheless, the claims regarding humanitarianism and a politics-free agenda are specifically refuted by the recently declassified documents. Unlike the official statement, the main advocate for the intervention was not the President but General Colin Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) at the time. [2] Moreover, the motives were not humanitarian but exclusively pragmatic. Namely, if the UN peacekeeping force failed in 1992, the responsibility to extract them and address the famine fell on the US, which would be problematic for US foreign policy. [2]
Besides, the high-standing US officials were concerned about the scope of the civil war and a lack of an exit strategy. [2] In other words, the US would be forced to engage in a prolonged conflict due to its political agenda of peacekeeping and connections to the UN. Hence, Powell recommended initiating the operation on the United States’ own terms and conveying the message to the world that the United States cares about the people in Somalia.
In addition, declassified documents confirm that Operation Restore Hope was initially planned as a short-term mission lasting a few weeks, contradicting the humanitarian statement. [2] It is impossible to manage the civil war and famine in such a period of time, further strengthening the argument that the US intervention was an inherently pragmatic and political operation. Ultimately, the mission aimed to stabilize the UN presence in Somalia, which could allow the United States to avoid further involvement in the conflict and enable a convenient exit strategy.
World Order, Proxies, and Interventions in Africa
Another critical aspect of the US intervention in Somalia and contemporary warfare, in general, is the globalized reach of major political powers. This phenomenon was most noticeable during the Cold War, when extensive rivalry between the United States and the USSR arguably had a significant adverse impact on people’s lives in third-world countries. Consequently, after the fall of the USSR, the term “global police” has been a core characterization of US foreign policy. [3] Kapteijns labels the operation in Somalia as the typical example of “First World interventions into Third World lives,” which is a unique characteristic of modern warfare by itself. [3] Due to the advancement of technology and information networks, the United States can conduct multiple simultaneous missions globally, which was impossible (or highly challenging) in the past.
Sub-Saharan Africa specifically became one of the most prominent spaces for major powers to showcase their values (humanitarianism/democracy), political influence (American and Chinese dominance over the region), and military prowess. [4] Unfortunately, civil wars and conflicts are frequent occurrences in this area, creating a favorable environment for foreign powers to intervene. There is no doubt that some soldiers on the ground act in the best interest of their countries and the regular people in Africa; however, these proxy operations, including the 1992-1993 Somalia, are inherently instruments of geopolitics.
Finally, while politics-driven conflicts are not new by any means, the accessibility of global deployment and proxy operations is a relatively new phenomenon. As mentioned briefly earlier, innovative technologies enable major powers to deploy task forces virtually anywhere in the world without significant restrictions. For the US specifically, this global reach characterizes virtually all operations in the 20th and 21st centuries.
Strategic Aspects and Washington Approval
The next part of the analysis concerns strategic goals, alignment, and implementation. According to the documents, the core strategic mission in the conflict was to support the UN presence in Somalia and avoid a long-term stabilization burden on the United States. It was critical to shift this responsibility to the UN to (I) assess the UN’s effectiveness in post-Cold War operations and (II) minimize America’s role in the conflict. [2]
Naturally, military intervention on the ground was not the preferred option to achieve these goals, and the US Department of State (DOS) sought other methods first, including air support, food airlift, and safe area proposals, all of which restricted direct involvement (early 1992). [2] Washington was reluctant to send troops to Somalia at first. Still, the increasing pressure on UN forces strongly implied the worst-case scenario in which the United States would have to take on the stabilizing role in Somalia. For this reason, Powell and other high-ranking officials recognized that the optimal solution, aligned with strategic goals, was to commence Operation Restore Hope.
When the first US troops landed in Somalia in December 1992, the initial intervention was successful and effectively intimidated Somali militias, preventing further damage to civilians. [2] Nevertheless, the overarching strategy of the mission did not always align with what happened on the ground or the tactical implementation. Washington still strongly emphasized the need for a brief intervention, focusing on supporting the UN peacekeeping forces rather than fully mitigating the conflict. For this reason, in January 1993, formal authorities insisted on an early transition to the second part of the mission, with the UN task force, UNOSOM II, taking the leading role. [2]
It was a critical point in the intervention because both the US Central Command (CENTCOM) and on-the-ground officers opposed the decision due to tactical challenges. As a result, the transition was, relatively speaking, a failure, and UNOSOM II’s force comprised only about half of the authorized strength (16,000 instead of 28,000). [2] Due to the misalignment of strategy and tactics in the US methodology, the Somali militias continued the resistance. They made significant advancements from March 1993 to October 1993, culminating in the Black Hawk incident with the death of 18 US soldiers. [2] It caused a notable backlash in Congress, which put pressure on the new Presidential office, and Bill Clinton announced the retreat of US troops from Somalia, concluding the US intervention.
This case study is an excellent example highlighting the utmost significance of coordination between strategic and tactical goals. It also emphasizes a relatively unique characteristic of contemporary warfare. Namely, while dissociation between the strategic apparatus and soldiers on the ground is not new, conducting proxy wars makes communication more challenging. In this case, the Washington authorities and those at the UN Headquarters in New York insisted on adherence to the initial strategic goals, while failing to understand the nuances of tactical warfare in Somalia. [2]
They also did not recognize the hardships that regular people experienced in the country. This excessive focus on politics-driven strategic goals resulted in faulty decisions, arguably causing (I) more violence in Somalia, (II) the death of the US soldiers, (III) the failure of Operation Restore Hope, and (IV) the resentment of regular citizens in Somalia toward the UN and the US. [3][4] Finally, the case study shows that despite more effective communication and tactical methods in contemporary warfare, the underlying nature of war remains the same, with politics, pragmatism, and strategic alignment guiding most decisions.
Contemporary Warfare and Media Presence
Another critical characteristic of modern warfare is a more pronounced focus on information and media presence. Unlike the wars of the past, governments have a larger array of propaganda instruments, and even though the world is more globalized than ever, people still lack foolproof ways to obtain credible information. This issue is particularly acute in authoritarian regimes, but even in democratic societies, public perception is artificially controlled.
For example, regarding the United States, the term “CNN effect” emerged shortly after the Gulf War and implied 24/7 coverage of foreign policy-making and interventions outside the US. [5] This instrument can also be used to establish prominent agendas, such as “who the enemy is” and “where the problems lie.” Finally, it is critical to recognize that independent media might not act in the government’s best interests. However, they still cover the most discussed events due to the nature of business organizations.
In the context of the present case study, the CNN effect played a pivotal role. Although most people today are used to Europe- and America-centric media coverage, news outlets in the early 90s ran extensive coverage of events in Somalia. [5] The New York Times, in particular, provided 24/7 coverage of the humanitarian crisis, with pictures and articles showing Somali people suffering from famine and the civil war. [5] This approach shaped the public perception of Americans and put pressure on the government to intervene. As the US ambassador to the UN noted, “Television’s ability to bring graphic images of pain and outrage into our living rooms has heightened the pressure both for immediate engagement in areas of international crisis and immediate disengagement when events do not go according to plan.” [5]
The quote excellently describes the role of media presence in contemporary warfare and the timeline of the intervention in Somalia. Namely, during the initial success in December 1992 – January 1993, most Americans supported humanitarian aid (62%). Military intervention (72%), with only 13% opposing the operation. [5] Such high numbers are shaped mainly by media messages and political agendas since few Americans had a direct connection to the war.
Unsurprisingly, when the situation worsened and the outlets reported military failures in Somalia, the approval rate dropped rapidly from 81% to 49%. [5] Moreover, most people (67%) believed that the government should withdraw troops, which was the opposite perspective from the beginning of the conflict. [5] As a result, it put pressure on Washington to cease the intervention and reconsider strategic goals.
Since the mass media were the only information source for the vast majority of Americans, they were the critical factor in changing public perception. In the context of contemporary warfare, it shows how media outlets can guide foreign policy-making by manipulating what most people think. In democratic countries, it would put pressure on the government as well (although federal propaganda is still possible). At the same time, authoritarian regimes can effectively exploit mass media to pursue their political agenda. Ultimately, while propaganda is not a new military concept, the 24/7 availability of information is the unique element of contemporary warfare.
Military-Civil Relation in Contemporary Warfare
Continuing on the topic of mass media, it is crucial to recognize that the general public plays a more significant role in warfare than ever before, at least in democracy-oriented societies. The military-civil relationship is reciprocal, meaning that regular people can influence federal decision-making, but government/military officials can also shape public perception. For example, Colin Powell – the critical figure in the intervention in Somalia – wrote an opinion editorial in the New York Times in October 1992, where he criticized potential intervention in Bosnia (and the upcoming president, Bill Clinton) and praised George H. W. Bush. [6]
It is an example of indirect coercion since direct forms of persuasion/intimidation are not effective in democratic societies. Nevertheless, public approval is essential in US foreign policy, as Brooks and Erickson explain, “An absence of public support for limited wars is devastating to the military’s social standing and reputation.” [6]
As with some of the previous points, public involvement is not a novel concept in warfare, since it is the regular people who fight on the ground. However, the soft power of citizens in democratic societies is higher than ever due to the 20th- and 21st-century focus on equality for all groups. Today, the US government (and other democracies) must either take public perception into account or manipulate it to achieve favorable outcomes, such as high approval ratings for military intervention, as the Somali case study confirms. It is a unique characteristic of contemporary warfare because it significantly differs from the past, when regular people had limited rights, limited access to information, and other forms of soft power. Therefore, it is safe to assume that the utmost significance of military-civil relations is an inherent part of modern warfare.
Conclusion
The present paper critically analyzes the US intervention in Somalia from 1992 to 1993 and connects its unique characteristics to contemporary warfare. According to the analysis, innovative technologies, global interventionist policies, 24/7 media coverage, and the enhanced significance of military-civil relations were among the most relevant changes in military interventions in the late 20th century. These are all critical notions that will most likely be relevant to warfare for the rest of the 21st century as well.
However, the present paper also confirms that, despite these changes, the nature and underlying causes of warfare remain the same. Similar to the past, war is an instrument of geopolitics and the specific strategic goals of elites. Even the Somali intervention (justified as an exclusively humanitarian mission) was, in fact, a military operation pursuing Washington’s pragmatic goals. In summary, while the methodology of contemporary combat might seem novel with unique technologies and communication capabilities, warfare still revolves around politics and its strategic goals.
References
[1] Isabelle Duyvesteyn. “Contemporary War: Ethnic Conflict, Resource Conflict or Something Else?” Civil Wars 3, no. 1 (2000), 96.
[2] Stefano Recchia. “Pragmatism over Principle: US Intervention and Burden Shifting in Somalia, 1992-1993.” Journal of Strategic Studies 43, no. 3 (2020), 342.
[3] Lidwien Kapteijns. “Test-Firing the ‘New World Order’ in Somalia: The US/UN Military Humanitarian Intervention of 1992-1995.” Journal of Genocide Research 15, no. 4, 422.
[4] Felix Oyosoro and Edith Herbert. “The United States Military Presence in Africa: Challenges and Constraints for African Nations (1993-2017).” Federal University Otuoke Journal of Political Science 4, no. 1 (2021), 2.
[5] Alida Tomja. “The CNN Effect and Its Influence on US Foreign Policy Decision-Making.” Interdisciplinary Journal of Research and Development 10, no. 1 (2023), 19.
[6] Risa Brooks and Peter Erickson. “The Sources of Military Dissent: Why and How the US Military Contests Civilian Decisions about the Use of Force.” European Journal of International Security 7, (2022), 38.