Introduction
This assignment is a comprehensive and extensive analysis of the largest international corporation Citigroup in terms of the impact of the Credit Crunch on the company, the cost of funds, and assistance to the firm from the government. Thus, the purpose of this work is to acquire, accumulate, systematize and expand knowledge and ideas about the structure, essence, and activities of Citigroup within the framework of financial aspects and shocks in the monetary sphere. Such objectives as a description of the organization and its capital, an assessment of costs and financial assistance, as well as a critical discussion of problems, strategic mistakes, and the consequences of the crisis are subordinated to the implementation of the purpose of this task.
It is known that Citigroup is one of the largest and most well-known companies providing a wide range of financial services in markets around the world. As a rule, such type of “assistance” includes consumer, corporate, and investment services, loans, asset management, as well as operations, trading, and securities services. (Citigroup inc, no date, para. 1). Citigroup positions itself as a reliable and responsible partner providing services that contribute to the growth and economic progress, solving complex issues for more than 200 years while using great opportunities (About citi, no date, para. 1). Citigroup, Inc. was formed due to the eradication in 1998 of the banking company Citicorp and the insurance company Travelers Group (The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, no date, para. 1). Additionally, Citigroup uses a model of diversification of its activities to achieve the maximum level of profitability and reliability of its business.
The case of the history of Citigroup at the time of the financial collapse in 2007-2009 is of great interest. This topic identifies itself as one of the most essential and exciting cases for in-depth study in the context of the US economic sphere. Moreover, there is currently no actual, relevant, detailed, and comprehensive investigation of Citigroup compared with the Credit Crunch circumstances; there is a need to fill the existing gap. Accordingly, the author’s interest in this company is manifested based on the abovementioned aspects.
The Firm’s Capital Structure
Before the Bankruptcy
Before the bankruptcy, Citigroup was the most prominent financial organization in the United States regarding assets. According to the experts from the board of directors of Citigroup, the bank, for the most part, was focused on a combination of assets and business aimed at maximizing returns for shareholders (Citigroup, no date, p. 5). This structure was primarily intended to support an adequate and correct system of financing and capital; as a rule, it was also based on the dynamic characteristics of the liquidity of the financed assets (Citigroup, no date, p. 68). In general, the company’s capital structure before the bankruptcy was based on the “traditional” model in terms of debt-to-equity ratio. Thus, according to Dao and Ta (2020, p. 111), such a “capital structure” implies a combination of debt and equity capital aimed at financing assets, operations, and a firm’s future growth. This correlation may be random or the outcome of a purposeful choice due to the financing decisions made.
The enterprise attracted the borrowed capital from third-party financing sources under certain conditions, for example, through an interest rate or collateral. In turn, the firm’s equity was the total value of the organization’s property, which Citigroup owned; it included preferred and ordinary shares and retained earnings. At a certain period, it is known that the debt consisted of both long-term and short-term borrowings and included commercial and preferred securities, loans, and bonds (Citigroup, no date, p. 68). Furthermore, Citigroup maintained its excellent capitalized position, taking into account the capital adequacy ratio of around 7% for 2007 (Citigroup, no date, p. 4). Therefore, this method of financing focused on the relationship between the firm’s capital costs and the transfer ratio (Lumby and Jones, 2019, p. 463). Consequently, Citigroup has an optimal capital structure that minimizes its WACC and thus maximizes its total market value.
One should emphasize that this capital structure — one of the essential strategic parameters of Citigroup. On the one hand, a meager share of debt capital would mean underutilizing a potentially cheaper financing source than equity. In turn, this structure means that the firm will have higher capital costs and creates excessive requirements for the profitability of future investments for it. On the other hand, a capital structure overloaded with debt funds would impose too high requirements on the return on capital since the probability of non-payment growth and risks for an investor increases.
The Capital Structure’s Role
Without any doubt, one can assume that such a system and structure of financial management influenced the unfavorable outcome of the corporation. Hence, it is no secret that the contradictions that caused the emergence and development of the crisis have affected all economic relations in the formation and development of the firm’s capital structure. The usual, well-established, and unchanged methods of work in the conditions of the global financial crisis due to its international nature have become especially dangerous for Citigroup. The unstable economic situation forced some organizations to reconsider the sources of capital structure formation and prefer less risky components. As several people know, Citigroup has not shown any special efforts and aspirations in changing such aspects.
Moreover, establishing an optimal capital structure presupposed such a competent, correct, and most appropriate ratio of the enterprise’s debt and equity sources of capital formation. This would make it possible to fully ensure the growth of the return on equity with acceptable risks. On the one hand, the enterprise can have the highest financial stability by relying solely on its own capital. However, at the same time, the firm would not use the economic opportunities to increase profits on invested capital, thereby limiting the pace of its development. On the other hand, using borrowed money would give Citigroup a higher potential for growth and expansion of the scale of financial and economic activities. This would help increase the return on capital; still, at the same time, the bank will face a significant increase in financial risks, with the likelihood of bankruptcy, which should not be overlooked when choosing a particular policy regarding the formation of the capital structure. Consequently, Citigroup could not find the “golden mean” and feel the edges of optimizing the capital structure in a crisis.
The Costs and the Bailout
Costs of Financial Distress
It is no secret that the 2008 crisis left indelible traces on most of Citigroup’s capital, and one can identify signs of this phenomenon even today. According to Asquith and Weiss (2019, p. 326), it should be assumed the main costs of the company in distress included risky behavior, intimidation of stakeholders, loss of management focus, debt burden, competitive attack, and legal expenses. Thus, $2 billion is still behind the inherited assets, and financial experts think about increasing the organization’s profitability (Davies, 2022, para. 8). The company’s losses in the total amount for at least two years exceeded more than $28 billion. However, such calculations and figures are approximate and indicative in these cases.
WIth the onset of unfavorable economic circumstances, the market value of Citigroup began to melt literally before people’s eyes. Simultaneously with the loss of capitalization, Citigroup started to incur financial losses, which at the end of 2007 amounted to $9.83 billion; most of them were related to the write-off of mortgage assets (Citi reports, undated, para. 1). Subsequently, the bank’s losses for 2008 amounted to $18.72 billion (Citi to split itself, 2018, para. 12). FINRA Corporation fined the organization $2 million for violations in transaction documentation (Mattera, 2020, para. 17). FINRA subsequently fined Citigroup $175,000 for failing to control communication with customers during the placement of Vonage shares and $600,000 for shortcomings in trading strategies (Mattera, 2020, para. 20). In particular, there was a special need for indirect costs, for instance, in the remuneration of tens of thousands of employees, 50 thousand of whom had to be subsequently dismissed.
The Subsequent Bailout
The data indicate that, for the most part, the government took responsibility for the circumstances that developed with Citigroup during the Credit Crunch. The U.S. federal government reimbursed the company’s potential losses during the crisis by $306 billion (Mattera, 2020, paragraph 17). The country’s leaders provided additional funds for $ 20 billion. In addition, it is possible that commercial banks such as JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America also played a significant role in providing financial assistance and support to the company (Cohan, 2018, para. 2). Generally, Citigroup narrowly avoided financial collapse during the acute phase of the global economic trouble. In any case, no matter how events develop, Citigroup is unlikely to be the same as the world has known it for almost 200 years of the bank’s existence.
The Issues
The author determined and identified the following shortcomings, difficulties, and obstacles in calculating gearing and estimating the cost of bankruptcy of Citigroup. First of all, it is essential to focus on the lack of chances, opportunities, and access to a more accurate and objective comparison and correlation of the company’s data in the Credit Crunch period and the pre-crisis situations. In brief, such issues were mainly based on lacking more actual, reliable, and objective facts. It is necessary to understand and accept the fact that the figures related to the bank’s activities are not subject to publicity, especially due to special laws, norms, and standards about information confidentiality. As practice shows, there is no single correct and universal solution and answer if one relies solely on network capabilities.
Secondly, it is important to highlight the limited set of parameters and indicators available to the author used to determine financial insolvency reduced the effectiveness of calculations within the framework of market volatility conditions. Most of the relevant and useful formulas have been developed for the conditions of a stable country’s economy. Therefore, their direct application without taking into account the American characteristics of the transition economy (significant inflation rates and high risk of long-term investments, hence high discount rates) can lead to significant errors in calculations.
Thirdly, one should note that there are no universal criteria for calculating the value of a firm and bankruptcy. The approach to each organization should be individual and consider both the industry specifics of the business and the firm’s stage of development. What is typical for the capital structure of a corporation specializing in real estate management, for illustration, is not quite suitable for a trading or service firm. These companies have different needs for their own working capital and different intensity of financing.
Fourthly, it is important to understand that the choice of criteria for assessing the level of costs depends on a wide range of elements. For example, as a rule, bankruptcy means a lengthy and complex process that imposes direct and indirect costs on the company and interested parties (Berk and DeMarzo, 2016, p. 586). In this case, it is necessary to consider both internal and external factors responsible for saving and property, which are not always visible. Moreover, during the process of specifying gearing and the cost of bankruptcy, considering the situation, conceptual problems were identified concerning such aspects as structure, essence, specificity, and cost of capital, as well as its historical and probable determinants. Working with such tasks requires planning and a well-structured bankruptcy risk management process. As a rule, it begins with the organization of a correct and timely analysis of document flow within the company and with counterparties.
The Key Strategic Mistakes
Based on the situation, it should be emphasized that Citigroup actively appealed to rather risky, dangerous, and adventurous capital growth strategies, which ultimately led to an inevitable catastrophe. It is no secret that at the beginning of the bank’s existence, Citigroup was involved in a series of high-profile scandals that gave rise to rumors about the company’s unfair activities. Market manipulation, corruption and bribes, “dirty deals” with WorldCom or Enron, embezzlement of funds and deceptions – all this and not only runs like a red thread through the history of the existence of Citigroup. Quite a few characters in this story have played their part by deliberately lowering credit standards, packaging substandard mortgages, and then selling them for large commissions (Cohan, 2018, para. 5). Despite warnings about possible risks and consequences, the firm continued to insist on obtaining higher profits, including through speculation, leveraged loans, or “toxic loans.” According to Asquith and Weiss (2019, p. 326), this kind of company behavior is typical and common during a crisis. Therefore, the corporation has lost hundreds of billions of dollars in losses on loans and investments in just three years.
Moreover, during the Credit Crunch from 2007 to 2009, the structure of the Citigroup organization changed several times. In particular, it should be emphasized that the bank was built on the will of a strong leader whose personal qualities and experience allowed us to create and promote services that are in demand in the market. Nevertheless, the management and the concept of doing business changed; a storm began in the firm, which new employees could not cope with. In this case, as people say, “a fish rots from the head down.”
The euphoria of success often pushed company executives to rash actions and profit without careful planning and presenting possible consequences. As a result, they had to face the harsh reality and loss of control over the situation due to hasty actions. Debts were growing, and Citigroup began to delay payments to internal and external stakeholders: payments to partners and salaries to employees. Accordingly, it can be assumed that inefficient acquisitions and destructive financial policies caused the bankruptcy. Moreover, the incorrectly calculated debt burden had far-reaching consequences. For example, Citigroup has not yet coped with the problems and continues restructuring “toxic assets” and loans.
The adaptation of Citigroup to the rapidly changing conditions in the United States in some way turned out to be a failure. Most likely, Citigroup did not consider such problems within the country as default and tensions in the economic system, falling housing prices, regulatory policy errors, and much more. Each of the banks sought to benefit themselves, sometimes not in the most honest way.
The historic merger that led to the creation of Citigroup can also be called a “mistake” since it did not give many benefits to investors, customers, and employees of the bank. Since the beginning of the mortgage crisis in the United States, Citigroup’s capitalization has more than halved. It is still not entirely clear what caused the problems in the bank – the company’s model, management miscalculations, the management, or several strategic management decisions during the crisis. Nevertheless, the financial crisis showed that the most significant problems are noted in the largest banks, the size of which was supposed to be a guarantee against losses. Smaller banks, which turned out to be more flexible in terms of management and strategy, were able to cope with problems with significantly fewer losses.
The work of Citigroup, perhaps, can be compared to a roller coaster. The financial component of the company was literally teetering on the verge of a foul, and high-ranking friends repeatedly came to the rescue (Cohan, 2018, para. 3). In general, the situation with Citigroup was so intertwined with the rest of the central U.S. banks that hold the bulk of financial derivatives in the world that the collapse of any one major U.S. financial institution could lead to losses in the OTC derivatives market. Citigroup is a systemically important American bank, represented in more than 100 countries worldwide, and its fall could cause chaos in the global financial markets. Consequently, toxic securities, mortgage assets, and bad investments in derivatives, in fact, caused the collapse and the consequence of a terrible strategy of banking for Citigroup. The corporation hardly miraculously avoided even greater estimated financial losses due to the assumption of significant mistakes. However, great political connections helped the bank survive and stay afloat at a time when Citigroup was destined for a disappointing fate.
The Impact of Financial Distress on Stakeholders
Without any doubt, one can state with complete confidence that financial difficulties within Citigroup have had a specific effect on both internal and external stakeholders. It is known that during the Credit Crunch, there was a massive dismissal and reduction of employees, starting with the “ordinary workers” and finishing with the first-class managers. Some business processes have been restructuring by removing “extra” people to save costs and from external economic threats.
For example, in November 2008, Citigroup announced the impending layoff of 50,000 employees. At the same time, in the second half of last year, about 30 thousand people lost their jobs in a financial organization, and for the whole year – 52 thousand people. In addition, to save money, the management of Citigroup even banned its employees from holding official meetings outside the offices and established strict control over the use of color copiers. Hence, it was planned to reduce the volume of work in the trading division. In the future, the largest U.S. bank, Citigroup, will increase the salaries of its employees by 50 percent to compensate them for the reduction in annual bonuses.
Furthermore, this situation has also affected external stakeholders: shareholders, society, customers, and the U.S. government. Each of the mentioned parties, in turn, also made some sacrifices. For instance, it is also known that shareholders accused the bank of hiding the extent of the damage suffered by Citigroup from the mortgage crisis. Nevertheless, the bank denied these accusations but declared its readiness to settle in order to avoid further legal costs. Moreover, the bank was saved by the state’s intervention, which bought its preferred shares for $ 45 billion. In exchange for this assistance, the U.S. administration demanded a significant bonus reduction to the bank’s management.
In general, in the conditions of economic and financial downturns, stakeholder management, on the one hand, retained its classical essence – the organization of effective interaction with stakeholders and, on the other — underwent essential changes. These changes were caused by a decrease in the level of trust in business during periods of economic downturns and the transformation of stakeholders’ motives during these periods. In the process of the growing crisis of financial and economic etymology, there was an aggravation of social problems. In this situation, social initiatives became much more critical for Citigroup than before. The company sought by all means to form a high level of stakeholders’ trust in the company, involving the maximum number of stakeholders in achieving well-being through the development of the company and improving financial performance. Consequently, during the crisis, the concept of common value worked quite well, assuming the unity of the company and all stakeholders in solving the external environment’s most critical socio-economic tasks.
Conclusions
Summarizing the above, it is required to identify the following critical and significant aspects of Citigroup’s financial components during the Credit Crunch (2007-2009). It is important to emphasize that the author fully realized the designated goals and completed the assigned objectives successfully. Moreover, while analyzing literature and other sources, the student learned a lot of valuable and interesting facts about several vital components. They include the capital structure, the expenses of the crisis, issues in calculating the gearing and bankruptcy costs, typical strategic mistakes, and the consequences of the financial troubles for stakeholders.
Citigroup is one of the largest and world-famous corporations providing various financial services to individuals and legal entities. The corporation’s capital structure largely corresponds to the “traditional format” based on the debt-to-equity ratio. In this case, cash receipts to the bank occur at the expense of third-party sources of financing, shares, or retained earnings. In general, such a capital distribution model is the most optimal choice, but, unfortunately, it does not always and not in all cases take into account external factors.
Nevertheless, today’s company’s success is primarily due to the assistance of the U.S. government during the Credit Crunch. Thus, from 2007 to 2009, the firm was on the verge of bankruptcy but managed to survive such terrible events in the economic sphere. Thus, it was a challenging period of “reconstruction” and “modernization” of internal systems and processes. Risky capital gains strategies, suspicious transactions, and adventurous decisions are just a few of the actions of Citigroup that have led to tragic consequences in the first decades of the 21st century. Citigroup lost most of its capital, and the reflection of this phenomenon can be observed inside the company to this day. In just two years, the bank has lost more than $28 billion, but, probably, this figure could have become much higher. For example, the U.S. Federal Government took over most of the organization’s financial problems and solved them on time under certain conditions. Citigroup miraculously avoided collapse, and the history associated with the corporation in some way can serve as an example and a lesson.
Reference List
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