Introduction
Since ancient times, democracy has been considered a favorable way of ruling which permits freedom and participation in state of affairs by all citizens. Still, within it conflicts of interest are neither eliminated nor stilled. They are rather transferred to a different battleground and the contenders are supplied with different weapons. Where, in some states, the arena is restricted to a select group that commands the instruments of coercion in sufficient degree to forestall effective opposition to the promotion of its interests, in democratic states that arena is thrown open to all men and to all interests, and the instruments of persuasion are, or ought to be, sufficiently undisturbed as to permit that interest or coalition of interests which can marshal the support of a majority of the people to prevail. Thus, while all men are equal and the interests of all are, in principle, given an equal opportunity to be heard, not all can expect equal satisfaction. In spite of benefits and opportunities proposed by democracy for modern states, democracy leads to abuses of power and unequal distribution of resources.
Main body
In their writings, Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli and Hobbes underline that there is a conflict of interests in democracy–and some interests, though not all, inevitably are in conflict. The populace can do no more than strive to protect the interests of some and not of all men. Unlike oligarchy, however, the democratic state makes it possible to secure the interests of the many, or at least of the majority, rather than the interests of a privileged few (Burns 43). Democracy makes such conflicts of interest possible, what sustains the state under whose aegis they occur, is clearly a broad and underlying consensus on the fundamentals of the social order. No state –least of all a democratic state–can hope to survive where the masses of the people are not united on and attached to those essential principles, and in this respect there is a common interest at the heart of, and that is furthered by, democratic governments (Carstairs and McLaren 12). There are many things–e.g., the preservation of the peace, the maintenance of the vital liberties, the advancement of learning, the cultivation of the arts, and the like–which are advantageous and (avowedly at least) of concern to all; and the commitment to such Nevertheless, those dividing interests remain, and their proponents struggle for power. Majorities–even if but temporary and shifting majorities–are formed over against minorities. And in the pursuit of their own interests, aggravated at times by the heat of political passion, majorities–and, where they can, minorities too–resort now and again to arbitrary and oppressive measures. It is not surprising, therefore, that governments representative of and responsible to those majorities should common values overrides and makes tolerable the lesser conflicts of separate and dividing interests serve as instruments through which such oppressive actions can be effectively imposed. It would seem unnecessary to catalogue here the ways in which democratic governments–both directly through the laws (or through the bidding of legal authorities) and indirectly through the sanctioned imposition of non-legal penalties–have behaved despotically toward certain racial, national, and religious minorities. The record is all too clear, whether political leaders look at the Negro, at the American Indian, or at other oppressed minority groups (Farrar 87). Thus, while the political worth of the American Indian is no longer computed as but three-fifths of that of the white man, the latter continues (by fraud and by superior force of arms, sanctified by law) to divest the Indian of his lands, to abrogate his political and religious freedoms, and to subject him to various forms of discrimination–ranging from laws forbidding the sale of intoxicating liquors to Indians to laws outlawing their intermarriage with white citizens (Etzioni 54). Following Plato the rule of the people remains a partial rule. Plato might fear the “views” of minority he was far more impressed by the dangers to a government that is too dependent on them. When laying out his concept of an ideal state, Plato emphasized that this state should be ruled by a philosopher. He saw the philosopher as an ideal person encompassing virtue and wisdom and thus able to lead people in the right direction. Ad he says in his fundamental work The Republic, because people have many wants political leaders are needed to provide them. Plato defined a philosopher first of all as a kind of occupation wisdom-lover (this is the literal translation of the term philosopher from Ancient Greek). After putting ahead this concept, Plato stresses on a difference between one who loves true knowledge as opposed to simple sights or education. In this case, the excesses of the minority, he thought, would easily be curbed by the power of the majority, exercised through regular vote (Downs 71).
Even where the political system approximates a full realization of the principle of responsibility, it may still be used to uphold rather than to remove an oppressive government. Where it is employed, its application in a particular situation may be such as to serve as a restraint on political oppressors only, neglecting thereby the oppressive acts of other–but not necessarily lesser–men who exercise power in other fields. Finally, the facts of political life may make it all too clear that, whatever the stipulated lines of political and administrative responsibility may be, in practice only those political despots who occupy the highest rather than the intermediary places of power are likely to be seriously affected by the interventions of the popular will (Plattner 87). The principle of responsibility is limited, secondly, by the fact that in practice democratic governments are not and cannot be held accountable to the will of all of the people. Researches admit that not all of the people can express themselves; nor, even if they could and were to do so, would they display any unanimity of sentiment. Where conflicts of interest abound, there differences of doctrine and of loyalty follow. Clearly, responsibility cannot be lodged in a literal majority of the people, or even in a majority of those who are interested, for in every modern democratic state a considerable portion of the population (interested and otherwise) is excluded from the suffrage on what are alleged to be “reasonable” grounds–e.g., immaturity as measured by chronological age, mental deficiency, lack of citizenship or of a prescribed period of residence in a particular locality, illiteracy, conviction for certain heinous crimes, and so on. A very large proportion of the eligible voters (in local elections it is commonly more than a majority of them) fails through negligence or indifference to exercise its right of suffrage. The majority in a democratic state, consequently, is a shifting rather than a fixed and permanent majority, and its “rule” is limited to the expression of a yea or nay with respect to the general rather than the specific policies of a government. This being so, the idea of majority rule in a democratic state must be understood to mean not rule by the majority in any literal sense, but rule by a government accountable to the majority, which is a quite different thing, especially since the majority is one that is formed only for that particular function, only at that particular time, and only out of that part of the people that then happens to express itself at the polls. In contrast, the American political system seems almost chaotically to blur the lines of responsibility. Elections are regularly held to discover the will of the people, which is then to be translated into the law of the land. For instance, Americans have shown themselves to be marvelously adept at manipulating voting districts in such a way as to give disproportionate representation to minorities and thereby to distort what is still (if euphemistically) called the will of the people (Hague et al 71).
Abuses of power were clearly defined and explained by Machiavelli. Machiavelli claims that a political leaders should act in his own interests and: “should therefore have no other aim or thought, nor take up any other thing for his study, but war and its organization structure” (Machiavelli, 87). The problem of power is reduced, in the real world, to the control of specific acts of particular powers. It is not one problem but many problems; for there is no one abuse of power, there are only abuses, various in form and often markedly different in degree. Our quest, then, is the quest for solutions to the problems generated by the multiple abuses of power. Now of such abuses a necessary distinction must be drawn between those abuses associated with the acquisition of power and those resulting from the way in which that power, once acquired, is exercised. In the first instance, the fundamental abuse is the usurpation of the legal authority itself, the acquisition of power by unconstitutional or wrongful means (Crozier 53).
Similar considerations are raised by the American application of the separation of powers doctrine, by which I mean not the division of powers between governments but the distribution of powers among the various branches of a particular government, most commonly among the legislative, executive, judicial, and (some would contend) the administrative branches. It would be a grave error to infer from this that if only the majority did rule, or if only the majority were in fact able to hold accountable the government that rules, abuses of power would be unknown in the democratic state. For one thing, it does not follow from the circumstance that the majority is not assured that it will always have its way, that the American system does in fact always prevent it from having its way. Franklin Roosevelt did not have his way in all things in the early years of the New Deal, but he did secure some things; and with the collapse of the Supreme Court as a resisting force in his second term, he was able to achieve a number of additional purposes. And surely it cannot be denied that his was a government selected and supported by a majority of the people. It is true that a strong sense of tradition, an abiding respect for the common ways, will frequently serve to deter such oppressive action (Coleman 87).
Conclusion
In sum, democracy implies that the way in which men adjust or resolve their differences is of crucial importance, that conflicts of opinion as to what constitutes the right moral and political ends are not to be resolved arbitrarily–i.e., by fiat of a stronger or allegedly superior group–but are to be mediated and temporarily adjusted through a political process that builds on the free exchange of opposing ideas and on the periodic resort to the ballot box; accordingly, those who accept democracy must respect the principle that men are not to be penalized merely for holding or for expressing nonconformist views (Cronin 98). Thus, the appeal to democracy is no more than the quite legitimate demand that men practice what they preach, that they not merely seek to understand what democracy is but that they observe its values in their day-to-day relationships. From this standpoint, abuses of power can only be controlled by man’s submission to divine truth, to God’s will. From this standpoint, it is the tragic failure of secular democracies–and the explanation of their oppressive acts–that they have reversed this elementary principle and have confounded God’s will with man’s will. They have forgotten that the will of God is a rational will, and that it is, consequently, not what men will but what they rationally will that can alone claim legitimacy. This, in political view, is but the vain and empty freedom to do what one wants, even if what one wants to do is wrong. Just as men pick from among the gods such as may please them, so men pick from among the multiplicity of traditions those traditions that are most congenial to their interests and pleasures.
Works Cited
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