Conceived in lectures, seminars, and discussions with students, Robert Dahl’s Democracy and its critics is addressed to a broad readership. In this work, the author now crosses the bridge between applied political science and political philosophy. Accordingly, the theoretical context of the study has also become broader, including not only modern nation-states but also the political experience of such different historical formations as ancient city-states and Italian Renaissance republics.
The author clearly defines his own theoretical position, viewing democracy primarily as a process of political decision-making. Dahl deals in detail and consistently with such fundamental questions of the theory of democracy as inclusion, the definition of the circle of persons who are members of the demos or corps of citizens, political equality, the common good, and civic competence. A special place is given to the analysis and criticism of two alternative theories of political government: anarchism and trusteeship (Dahl, 1991). At the same time, the interpretation of democracy is not reduced to the creation of some ideal image of “perfect government.” Dahl identifies two fundamental dimensions of the political process: public contestation and participation, the optimal combination of which characterizes polyarchy or real democracy. This approach makes it possible to define a set of comparable empirical referents, but the question of which combination of the distinguished indicators should be considered optimal is solved by using the criteria of the democratic process. In fact, the idea of polyarchy was used to overcome the traditional dilemma of democratic theory between normative and explanatory approaches to describing the phenomenon of democracy.
Polyarchy is a political system, in its broadest form, marked by two common characteristics. Citizenship is extended to a relatively large proportion of the adult population. Citizenship rights include the ability to oppose the highest officials in government and to remove them by vote. The first characteristic separates polyarchy from more restrictive systems of government in which, although opposition is allowed, access to governments and their legal opposition is limited to members of small groups, as was the case in Britain, Belgium, Italy, and elsewhere before the introduction of mass suffrage. The second characteristic separates polyarchy from regimes in which the majority of adults are citizens, but citizenship does not imply the right to opposition and to remove the government by vote, as occurs in modern authoritarian regimes.
The political experience of the new democracies revealed the vulnerability of representative government institutions that formally met the criteria of polyarchy. It turned out, for example, that the institutional design of politically and culturally different countries such as Russia and Peru creates similar obstacles to political compromise, both between different political forces and between different branches of government. However, it was Dahl’s mechanism for analyzing political systems that made it possible to identify gaps in the field of institutional design theory and to preserve, along with the rhetorical elegance of political discourse on the prospects of democracy, the empirical clarity and methodological consistency of the democratic theory.
In the historical analysis of the phenomenon of democracy, R. Dahl notes several major trends. Firstly, it is a cyclical character (ups and downs of democracy), which has reached its peak by the modern stage. Secondly, each democracy in history has its own specific character, and not only is it not repeated in its entirety, but the understanding of the essence of its basic categories is different. Thirdly, democracy manifested itself under certain conditions, contributing to society’s economic well-being. At the same time, Dahl is a supporter of the fact that if there is something common for all democracies in history, it is a set of conditions necessary for its emergence and development (Dahl, 1991). And these conditions are manifested almost at the stage of the primitive communal and tribal system.
Still, the most important stages in the development of ancient democracy were Ancient Greece and Ancient Rome (the republican period), whose social and political thought generated the key principles and values of democracy. The fall of the republican system in Rome ended the ancient period of democracy. The next stage manifested itself already in the Middle Ages, where small city-states in the territories of Northern Italy were built on democratic principles. And all these cycles of democracy turned out to be powerless before the hardest test – the economic crisis.
A qualitatively new stage in the development of democracy began in Northern Europe during the New Age. Here in England, Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and a number of other countries. This period is characterized by the appearance of three fundamental, in R. Dahl’s opinion, democratic institutions: national parliament, elected representatives of the people, and local self-government, which is formed again on the basis of national elections. Besides, as R. Dahl concludes, it is almost a golden age of European democracy, which arouses the admiration of contemporaries (Dahl, 1991). It was here that the basis was laid on which the process of democratization began. Despite this, a number of conditions were not achieved, which makes it impossible to call these democracies genuine:
- Inequality was not preserved.
- The minimum democratic norms were not observed.
- Representatives of the people did not represent all the people.
- Democracy was not shared by the broad layers of the population.
Since the 18th century, democracy has been the ideology of entire countries, and in terms of territories and populations large enough. This demanded certain transformations of democratic institutions because those variants of democracy which worked in city-states were not suitable for empires.
It should be noted that the interpretation proposed by R. Dahl interpretation of the evolution of democracy, in general, is rather superficial. Without penetrating into the essence of Greek, Roman, or European political and social history, he makes a number of rather populist statements, the purpose of which is to prove the organic nature of the democratic system in human society. Without denying the latter, these fragmentary theses on democracy, sometimes taken out of the context of history, are insufficient for the development of democracy.
In the book, the author pays special attention to Robert Dahl and sees his task as defining the criteria of democracy. The political scientist is convinced that throughout the process of binding decisions, citizens should have adequate as well as equal opportunities to express their preferences regarding the end result (Dahl, 1991). They must also have adequate as well as equal opportunities in putting issues on the agenda and in expressing reasons for approving one result over the other.
Denying any citizen adequate opportunity for effective participation means that their preferences are not taken into account because they are not known or are incorrectly taken into account. Likewise, to disregard their preferences regarding the final outcome is tantamount to abandoning the principle of equal consideration of interests.
At the decisive stage of collective decision-making, every citizen must be given an equal opportunity to express their choice, which is recognized as equal to that of any other citizen. In determining the outcome at the decisive stage, these, and only these, are the choices that must be taken into account (Dahl, 1991). Since this election is what is commonly called a vote, this criterion, one might say, requires an equal vote at the decisive stage.
- An adequate opportunity to determine and justify the preference on the issue to be decided in the best interest of the citizens.
This criterion implies that alternative decision-making procedures should be evaluated according to the opportunities they provide for citizens to understand the means and ends. As the good or interest of citizens draws attention to the public good and the common interest, people must have the chance to reach an understanding of these concerns.
- Demos must have the exclusive power to decide how problems should be placed in the general list of problems to be solved through the democratic process.
The criterion of ultimate control means that in a democracy, the people must have the last word; hence the people must be sovereign. A system that satisfies this criterion, as well as the other three, should be regarded as having a fully democratic process with respect to its demos (Dahl, 1991). According to this indicator, a political system will use a fully democratic process even if the demos decide not to make every decision on every issue but instead prefer that decisions on some issues be made hierarchically by judges and administrators. As long as the demos retain the ability to actually return to every issue for their own decision, this criterion is fully satisfied.
- Elected authorities.
The Constitution vests elected authorities with the right to control governmental decisions about policy. Free and fair elections. Elected authorities are elected in free and fair elections, where abuses are relatively rare. Virtually the entire adult population has the right to vote when authorities are elected.
- The right to run for election.
Almost all adults have the right to run for government office, although existing restrictions on holding office may exceed those set for voting.
- Freedom of expression.
Citizens have the right to express their opinions without fear of severe punishment by political motives in the broad sense, including criticism of the authorities, government, regime, socio-economic order, and dominant ideology.
- Alternative Information.
Citizens have the right to seek alternative sources of information. Moreover, alternative sources of information exist and are protected by law.
- Organizational autonomy.
Citizens also have the right to form relatively independent associations or organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups, in order to achieve various rights, including those listed above. It is important to understand that these statements characterize validly, not merely nominal, rights, institutions, and processes. In fact, the countries of the world can be ranked nominally according to the degree to which each of the institutions is present in practice. Consequently, institutions are capable of serving as criteria for deciding which countries are governed by polyarchy today or in earlier times (Dahl, 1991). These rankings and classifications can be used, as we shall see below, to investigate conditions that favor or hinder the prospects for strengthening polyarchy.
Next, the author seeks to answer the question of the relationship between the phenomenon and democracy. The institutions of polyarchy are necessary for democracy on a large scale, especially the size of the modern nation-state. In other words, all the institutions of polyarchy are necessary for the highest achievements in the democratic process of governing a country. To say that all seven institutions are necessary is not to say that they are sufficient. In the following chapters, I would like to consider some possibilities for the further democratization of countries governed by the institutions of polyarchy.
The political scientist forces readers to consider why we need democracy and why citizens advocate it. Based on the analysis of the main beneficial effects of democracy according to the author, one can draw the general conclusion that it is the most desirable society because it provides only the best in their life. However, despite the pretty words, one should not make exaggerated demands on democracy. It cannot guarantee the best results in all spheres of people’s life. For example, as the author notes, even modern democracy has many shortcomings.
In a later part of the book, the author turns to the real state of affairs since, up to this point, we have mostly talked about the higher purposes of democracy. The Constitution, as the author notes, has a multifaceted effect on a country’s democracy. Stability, fundamental rights, the balance of interests, accountability, honest representation, consensus, good governance, competent decisions, publicity and transparency, flexibility, and legality are all criteria of the Constitution, which affect the country in one way or another in various ways, attracting consequences (Dahl, 1991). It should be noted that the criteria will not be successful under all conditions. On the contrary, it depends again on the data of our territory – favorable or unfavorable conditions of the territory decide everything. A different conclusion can be drawn from the criteria – well drafted Constitution has the potential to help strengthen democratic institutions, while mistakes in its drafting can lead to very dire and disastrous consequences with respect to the democratic system as a whole. Thus, the success of a constitution lies in the careful design of its system.
Dahl’s approach flows organically from his understanding of political power and its indicators. According to Dahl, power takes place in situations in which the subject forces the object to do something that the object would not otherwise do (Dahl, 1991). It arises in the course of the conflict between the subject and the object when the subject manages to impose his will on the object. In politics, the imposition of will is carried out in the process of political decision-making, in which the parties occupy opposing positions. Therefore, the answer to the question “who rules?” depends on which individuals and groups successfully initiate and enforce political decisions that benefit them, and an analysis of power focuses on the various aspects of decision-making by which its distribution in society can be judged.
Power is not a structural phenomenon independent of its bearers; it is not contained in positions, social status, wealth, or any other social relations and institutions. The latter act only as conditions and resources of power but exists in the process of rivalry between political actors over each specific political decision. There is no “power in general”; the latter always has a specific sphere reflected in the political decision (Dahl, 1991). Therefore, in politics, the number of subjects of power can be very large due to the variability of forms of social interaction.
Democracy is a barrier to any non-democratic regime. In this case, Dahl understands such a regime as one in which governing is the lot of the few who consider themselves competent enough to do so. The majority, in the opinion of this minority, is unable and unwilling to participate in government, and there is no need to force them to.
Dahl’s theory of equality as the key provision of an ideal democracy deserves separate attention. The essence of this phenomenon is innate, and it is natural in its origin. The author’s argumentation of the truth of this statement lies on the plane of the impossibility of any other approach simply because all religions and ethical systems require it; there is no alternative to this principle; it is prudent and acceptable.
Political tutelage is opposed to true political equality, but it cannot ensure effective governance because it does not allow for a competent and comprehensive assessment of political decisions. In order to realize political equality, it is necessary to ensure mechanisms of political participation. One of the fundamental bases of the Dahlian concept is the distinction between potential and real (actualized) power. The mere presence of significant economic resources or positions (potential power) does not necessarily indicate that it is their bearers who exercise power in a social community. Therefore, it is impossible to judge the distribution of power initially – before the empirical testing of various aspects of the decision-making process. Dahl does not accept the term “power structure” introduced by Hunter, which implies the presence in a social community of some pre-determined inherently stable configuration of power (Dahl, 1991). He also rejects the positional and reputational methods of determining the subjects of power because they do not take into account the sphere of ruling and do not actually distinguish between potential and actualized power.
The correct method of research, according to Dahl, is to identify the institutional spheres of the greatest importance for the life of a social community and to consider a set of political decisions characterizing the distribution of power in these spheres. This method, dubbed the “decisional” or “problematic” method, claimed to be a more adequate definition of political leaders than the reputational and positional ones (Dahl, 1991). At the same time, before answering Hunter’s question about who makes up the ruling elite, Dahl considers it necessary to find out whether there is one at all. The positional method implies that the subjects of power are those who occupy certain status positions in the formal social hierarchy. The reputational method defines leaders (subjects of power) by their reputation and by people’s subjective opinions about their ability to influence political processes in the community. Dahl is convinced of the superiority of the positional method over the political and reputational, considering the latter weak in scientific respect.
Thus, the book by the American political scientist Robert Dahl examines the key tenets of democratic theory and critically analyzes their internal contradictions. The profound unbiased analysis allows the author to show convincingly that the improvement of democratic institutions and practices requires an adequate rethinking of democratic theory as applied to the changing conditions. He raises the question of a new, third, in his opinion, democratic transformation, the outlines of which are emerging in the conditions of globalization. The book is addressed not only to specialist-political scientists but also to all those who are concerned with the cardinal problems of contemporary political development.
Reference
Dahl, R. A. (1991). Democracy and its critics. Yale University Press.