Legal Aspect of Juvenile Interrogations

Diversion from the Interrogation Environment and Approach

Formal and Heavy Police Authority

The aspect of juvenile interrogation is that children enjoy diversion from usual formal and intensified questioning where the police use highly skilled people in a team. In Haley v. Ohio, the US Supreme Court held that the evidence obtained through probing of a 15-year-old boy was inadmissible due to failed due process during the interview.¹ The contested fairness was the use of multiple police in turns and a highly specialized interrogation method. A relay of police influences an authoritative atmosphere to the suspect as forensic pressure to get information. As emerges, the aim of restricting an authoritative interrogation is to provide a fair process which is the liberty of confession. Children should be in a neutral environment from psychological influences that affect voluntary confession. Following the case, heavy police authority with such formal organization deprives children of the freedom to communicate. The setting is beyond the child’s maturity to maintain a normal state of mind needed to provide evidence freely.

Haley v. Ohio demonstrates that minors’ interrogation follows a lenient organization of the interview set up in ways that influence authority to a child’s level. According to Birckhead, quizzing young people should be relevant to the child in tone, style of grilling, and interviewers’ demeanor². The factors help maintain the suspect’s familiar environment of typical reasoning to avoid coercion which Justices in the case Haley v. Ohio outlaws.³ Studies show that age is inversely proportional to emotional and cognition skills and their application in different situations.⁴ Age also supports pressures from external factors such as the authority to maintain the right emotions needed to support sound decision-making. Young people’s feelings are not strong enough to withstand such external forces.⁵ A child is likely to use avoidance to such intense forensic interviews such as confession without actual criminal offense. The court in Haley v. Ohio aimed at protecting children from the exploitation of their natural weakness, which fails the due process test and exposes the suspect to false criminal charges. Therefore, the US styles juvenile interrogations from a neutral ground with laws prohibiting interference of the suspect’s mental stability through extreme police authority and grilling structure.

The US’s style to young people’s inquest in a neutral psychological environment is similar to the international criteria. In the Model Law on Juvenile, the United Nations guide that the police should not expose child suspects to coercive probing.⁶ In a different section, the law demonstrates some of the coercive interrogation elements by stating that the court should assess the age and developmental level and other inducements employed during the inquest.⁷ The UN further guides that police officers should consider maturity, personal conditions, and age of a child during examinations. Such guidelines imply that interviewing youngsters should accommodate children’s emotional levels to avoid influencing them towards confessions that would otherwise not come out under normal mental functioning. Like the US through the Haley v. Ohio case, the international governing bodies require the police to develop an exceptional environment for children below adult’s level to maintain mental stability and, therefore, due process.

Duration and Breaks During Interrogations

In the US, the law also requires the police to take appropriate time, which a child can withstand during an interrogation. The US Supreme Court has outlawed prolonged durations in probing children, which applies to adults. In the case, Haley v. Ohio, the court dismissed evidence from a confession obtained through a 5-hour interview with a 15-year-old boy.⁸ Justices argued that the suspect could not withstand such a lengthy interrogation and remain effective.⁹ Extended hours of an interview violate due process in the case following the suspect’s age. The court’s argument on due process relates to forced confession following pressure to have the interrogation closed. Doody v. Ryan’s case demonstrates in detail the aspect of coercion in a prolonged interrogation by indicating that such extensive interviews with children lead to involuntary sharing of information with the police.¹⁰ The court observed that more than 12 hours of grilling affected the child’s sleep which influenced confession to meet the status quo and relieve the stress.¹¹ The cases demonstrate limitation of the time through which police can interrogate a child depending on different factors such as age, health, and mental state.

Following the case, US law recognizes that long hours affect children’s mental state and limit interrogation duration from that which the police applies in adults. According to the US Department of Justice, hunger, fatigue, fright, or shock affects children suspects’ effectiveness in reporting the case.¹² Timing is essential in such situations to ensure the interrogation occurs within a duration where the suspect will manage to control various factors such as fatigue and sleep. Kids are likely to confess against their will following delays to go home or get out of the inquest room¹³. Others can lie a confession, for example, accepting a crime even where they have not committed it due to the pressure of staying in the session. Furthermore, the memory decreases as the interrogation proceeds.¹⁴ A young suspect is likely to confuse and provide contradicting information to the investigating officer due to lost memory to retrieve and order information about the contested incidence. Such errors affect the due process since the child is under external pressures. Thus, the US laws require short cross-examination for underage with breaks and support to ensure normal mental functioning.

The requirement to have a juvenile interrogation duration that is at the child level in the US is similar to the international attitude and guidance on police questioning. Parallel to the US, the UN is concerned with young people’s procedural rights through the duration of cross-examination to safeguard fairness in liberty to share information. The UN regulates a child’s suspect environment to guarantee that time does not influence psychological state and compromise due process. Article 28 of the Model Law on Juvenile provides that the length of grilling should be relevant based on the court’s thinking.¹⁵ The law also provides that the police ensure adequate breaks in consideration of the child’s maturity and age. Unlike US law, the international approach is specific that the quizzing should take place between 8 am and 10 pm with the suspect receiving food at the proper mealtime.¹⁶ Such regulations reflect the international consideration of a child’s mental stability during the interrogation to overcome more extended duration challenges. For example, restriction on inquisition between 8 am and 10 pm implies that the child should be free from the effect of sleep. Provision of breaks and meals mitigates the impact of lengthy grilling, including fatigue and hunger. The requirements allow for frequent breaks for mental stability to allow non-coerced inquiry.

Miranda Rights

Another US legal aspect of minors’ interrogations is the requirement to observe Miranda rights or obtain the consent of waiver from the suspect. Miranda rights give suspects the freedom to remain silent or have an attorney to consult during questioning. In different cases, the US court has shown that Miranda rights are mandatory in children suspects’ examination. Commonwealth v. Truong, a trial court blocked evidence obtained from a 17-year-old girl, which claimed that the police did not observe Miranda rights.¹⁷ The Justice observed that the police did not provide Miranda rights following the girl’s inadequate experience, knowledge, and intelligence to give up the rights. The case shows that the police must guarantee that a child can interpret Miranda rights’ meaning and effect before seeking consent to the waiver. Unlike adults, young people face challenges in understanding Miranda rights since they are less exposed to the police and similar past cases.¹⁸ Moreover, they fear the police to the extent that such privileges might not be sufficient to believe that they can remain silent without harm. As a result, the US requires the authority to make sure that children suspects understand Miranda rights before consenting to waiver or acceptance.

The law also requires the police to avoid influencing understanding of the Miranda rights on suspects to the interrogation’s advantage. In Commonwealth v. Truong, the court overturned the recorded confession because the police hand used false information to lure the girl into accepting, waiving her rights to remain silent.¹⁹ The police informed the suspect that if she agreed to confess, her treatment would be lenient. Such information interferes with the victim’s knowledge of Miranda rights by blocking the rule that the police will use the suspect’s words against them in the case. The girl could have thought that giving out her rights was more protective compared to assuming silence. Influence on the ability to understanding the effect of Miranda rights is coercion and affects the due process. Children are susceptible to misguidance about the impact of the right to remain silent due to their low intelligence. For example, the police had read the rights and related warnings to the girl but managed to affect her decision.²⁰ The US law protects suspects in such young people’s interrogations from confusion about their liberty to talk or remain silent by restricting police interference using false information or wrong interpretation.

Apart from reading and avoiding interference with the suspect’s understanding of Miranda rights, the US law provides that the police apply the provision only where necessary. In the case JDB v. North Carolina, the court rejected the declaration of a 13-year-old boy who gave information after much pressure from the police officer and school administrators.²¹ The court held that such a boy was too young to understand the value of Miranda rights. According to the Justice, police should not read the rights to people who might not have the capacity to make informed decisions.²² The provision recognizes that children can efficiently respond to probe in instances where adults would not. Young people are vulnerable to fear associated with police authority and inquisition techniques such as confrontation. Although suspects might understand the rights and submit to interrogation, they cannot discern information to give and the one to reserve.²³ Reading the Miranda rights is taking advantage of the child’s inability to resist inquiry and providing any information leading to violated due process.

The US matches with the international methodology in ensuring that children get their rights during an interrogation. Although the international bodies do not list the specific rights to protect, they provide structures for ensuring that police adhere to laws within their jurisdictions. For example, the UN states that the police should inform young people about their rights immediately after arrest.²⁴ Information about the rights is one of the approaches towards ensuring observation of Miranda rights, for example, in the US since the suspect will choose to waiver or remain silent. The UN is also similar to the US in ensuring adherence to the suspect’s rights by stating that the police should read the right in a child-friendly way. The US law aspect requires the authority to use due diligence in analyzing the child’s age and development to assess understanding of the individual rights. Where the child does not appear to understand, the police should look for alternatives like a lawyer. On the contrary, the UN requires the police to guarantee that the child understands the right by using any means such as low-level language.²⁵ Both the US and international styles share a common goal of providing that juvenile interrogation serves a child’s rights despite vulnerability to understanding.

Provision of an attorney

The US legal aspect of juvenile interrogations requires that the police include an attorney during interrogation for children who request alongside those under age or immature to make resealable decisions. J. D. B. v. North Carolina is a case law that ruled that police should provide a lawyer where the suspects ask in case of inability to make rational responses.²⁶ The court found that the child’s request to have her mother and other statements showing that he could not withstand the examination was enough to assume immaturity and, therefore, provide for an attorney.²⁷ The law requires the police to use their intelligence in assessing the child’s age, development, and state of mind in deciding whether to have direct questioning and responses or include a lawyer. Exposing children who cannot make logical decisions to interrogation is a violation of the due process since they will be under external pressure when responding or making wrong choices due to misunderstanding of issues such as their Miranda rights. The law requires such suspects to have a lawyer whom they can trust with the information about the incidence and receive guidance on making informed choices and responses. An attorney provides for due process by protecting the child from the police, who would take advantage of the immaturity to get all information and even force some confession.

Apart from protecting the juvenile’s right to a lawyer, US law also ensures that the suspects do not misuse the provision to avoid interrogation. In J. D. B. v. North Carolina, the court clarified circumstances under which a child must have and where an attorney is not necessary even when the child asks.²⁸ According to the Justice, the juvenile suspect’s age should inform the police on an attorney’s need.²⁹ Such a regulation emerged from the idea that the police took advantage of the boy’s immaturity without suggesting a lawyer overcome the deficit in making rational decisions. In a different case, Davis v. the United States, the court argued that a suspect could have the right to a lawyer through an unequivocal request.³⁰ In the case, the suspect had decided to remain silent and asked for an attorney while it was clear that he could reasonably represent himself. The two cases show that the US law provides limits under which a juvenile suspect can demand a lawyer during interrogation. Despite the right to have an attorney, a child should also not misuse the provision. The police can assess the need for a lawyer through age, maturity, and tactic to requesting.

Similar to the US law aspect on the attorney, the international bodies require children to have guidance from a third party. The UN Model Law on Juvenile provides that juveniles have the right to legal guardian, parent, interpreter, or consular assistance. Such provisions align with the US law goals to warrant that young people get appropriate representation to have reasonable repose to police questions.³¹ Guardians, parents, and interpreters allow a sufficient understanding of the questioning session to prevent involuntary responses and waiver individual rights such as Miranda. However, the Model Law on Juvenile also states the need for a lawyer, although not explicit.³² Despite the similarities, the US aspect differs from the international approach on examining juveniles on the limitations of requesting an attorney. While the US restricts situations when a child can demand a lawyer, the UN does not have such a provision and leaves it open for the police and courts to decide.

Bibliography

Legislation

Cases

Commonwealth v. Truong, Mass. Super. LEXIS 61 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2011).

Davis v. United States, 564 US 229 (2011).

Doody v. Ryan, 649 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2011).

Haley v. Ohio, 332 US 596 (1948).

J. D. B. v. North Carolina, 564 US 261 (2011).

Statute

Model Law on Juvenile, (2013).

Secondary Materials

Book

Redlich, Allison D., Melissa Silverman, Julie Chen, and Hans Steiner. “The police interrogation of children and adolescents.” In Interrogations, confessions, and entrapment, pp. 107-125. Springer, Boston, MA, 2004.

Articles

Birckhead, R. Tamar. The age of the child: Interrogating juveniles after Roper v. Simmons. 65 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 385 (2008).

Chris Newlin, Steele Linda Cordisco, Chamberlin Andra, Anderson Jennifer, Kenniston Julie, Russell Amy, Stewart Heather, and Vaughan-Eden Viola, Child forensic interviewing: Best practices, (US Department of Justice Sept., 2015), Web.

Footnotes

1. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 43 (1948).
2. Tamar R. Birckhead, The age of the child: Interrogating juveniles after Roper v. Simmons, 65 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 414 (2008).
3. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 62 (1948).
4. Allison D. Redlich, Melissa Silverman, Julie Chen, and Hans Steiner. “The police interrogation of children and adolescents.” In Interrogations, confessions, and entrapment, pp. 114. (Springer, Boston, MA, 2004).
5. Birckhead, The age of the child: Interrogating juveniles after Roper v. Simmons, 413.
6. Model Law on Juvenile, art. 23 (2013).
7. id. § 23.
8. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 66 (1948).
9. id. at 43.
10. Doody v. Ryan, 649 F.3d 986, 24 (9th Cir. 2011).
11. id. at 24.
12. Newlin Chris, Steele Linda Cordisco, Chamberlin Andra, Anderson Jennifer, Kenniston Julie, Russell Amy, Stewart Heather, and Vaughan-Eden Viola, Child forensic interviewing: Best practices, (U.S. Department of Justice Sept., 2015), Web.
13. Birckhead, The age of the child: Interrogating juveniles after Roper v. Simmons, 417.
14. id. 417.
15. Model Law on Juvenile, art. 28 (2013).
16. Model Law on Juvenile, art. 29 (2013).
17. Commonwealth v. Truong, Mass. Super. LEXIS 61, 15 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2011).
18. Birckhead, The age of the child: Interrogating juveniles after Roper v. Simmons, 418.
19. Commonwealth v. Truong, Mass. Super. LEXIS 61, 54 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2011).
20. id. at 58.
21. J. D. B. v. North Carolina, 564 US 261, 56 (2011).
22. id. at 59.
23. Birckhead, The age of the child: Interrogating juveniles after Roper v. Simmons, 419.
24. Model Law on Juvenile, art. 21 (2013).
25. id. § 32.
26. J. D. B. v. North Carolina, 564 US 261, 68 (2011).
27. id. at 71.
28. J id. at 66.
29. id. at 69.
30. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229,53 (2011).
31. Model Law on Juvenile, art. 23 (2013).
32. id. § 32.