Liberal democracy is often considered one of the best political systems which permit democratic and economic freedom. Liberal values are not the only desirable issues. There are ideals which others share, of unity, efficiency, order, and security. In addition, all societies today, whether democratic or non-democratic, pursue the secular grail of economic growth, and democracy is likely to be judged not only by its merits but its performance. Liberal democracy cannot be the final solution to the political organization as it is limited by the Constitution and strict laws and regulations within the state.
Some account had to be taken of the relationship between political reform and economic freedom–a liberalization of markets and the spread of local wealth to match the dispersal of political power. Alongside John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville, one sees the image of Adam Smith, more emblematic perhaps than substantial, but raising problems of economic as well political change. In practice, political and economic reforms have gone together and it is never easy to say which had the priority (Cotrell, 2008). No society becomes democratic without pain, no state achieves economic growth without struggle; and between the two pursuits, governments are as confused as policies are contorted. There are some who are prepared to adopt political reform in order, as they hope, to secure economic growth; others want economic development to underpin democratic institutions; but many wish the marriage of both–a prosperous democracy as a measure of a fairer, more equal society: one man, one vote, and a chicken in the pot for everybody. The instrumentality of political change as a means to redeem society from its poverty is certainly a recurrent aspect of the accounts given later, but it is also clear that, for many within the former Marxist states and the Third World, democracy has its intrinsic value which it would be ungenerous to dismiss as economics dressed as politics. Society wants it, and leaders must grant it (Eccleshall et. al 2003).
Fifty or more years ago, western democracy was threatened by totalitarian regimes which then exerted their own baleful influence. Today, the reverse is true. Dictatorship is under a challenge from democracy. Democracy has never been a transferable blueprint for political control but simply the name given to a style and form of government evolved out of the experience (Festenstein and Kenny 2006). Because western democracy has been home-grown, formed by local circumstances, it has taken a different shape in Britain, Europe, North America, and Australasia but these are kindred varieties, whereas to seek to transfer their beliefs and habits to an exotic soil will always be difficult. One might as readily try to plant an oak in a plant pot under conditions not native to its growth. Perhaps one might succeed for a period in grafting western democracy onto a different historical stock of beliefs and experience but the likelihood of its not taking will always be great (Eccleshall et. al 2003).
The first is that representative liberal democracy is the most appropriate political system for market economies (capitalist societies), providing that the two central requirements of responsiveness to the interests of economic elites and regular mass participation through elections if the selection of leaders can be reconciled. The second is that these conditions are best achieved through parties supportive of a market-based economy, able to secure popular support, and capable between them of keeping alternative ruling groups continuously available (Festenstein and Kenny 2006). These conclusions are in keeping with those of radical democratic theory, which identifies the same set of characteristics but which tends to emphasize the limitations they entail and to deplore the contradictions between such systems and normative values of participation and equality (Heywood, 2007). They are also fully in keeping with the historical record of the development of democratic institutions in the core democracies in which expansion of suffrage has often come as a consequence of inter-elite rivalry, and where the substantive goals of dominant elites have always taken precedence over commitment to democratic procedures. The presumption would then be that where they fail to do so, some system other than representative liberal democracy will ensue. This suggests in turn that we should pay particular attention to the manner in which such systems were secured in the advanced market economies of today which make up the great majority of the core democracies (Faulks et al 2003).
Liberal democracy is not the final solution to the political organization as the market economy has now become the reverse side of the coin of political freedom, in much the same way as political reforms are beginning to be seen as essential for economic development. The two are said to be inseparable. The danger then is that both will be rejected–political freedom along with the free market. The coupling of market liberalization with democratic reforms has become not only a creed but a packet for export, not so easily tabulated as parliaments, elections, freedom of debate, and a list of civic rights, but broad and detailed enough to sustain a growing volume of advocacy (Faulks et al 2003). Within the general description of a market-led economy are specific recommendations–privatization, convertible currencies, unrestricted markets, and the freeing of the economy from state control. The sweep of argument can be forceful: democracy and capitalism, the free movement of people and free movement of goods, no restrictions on public debate, no restrictions on trade. Such is the new formulae for political stability and economic growth, the golden keys to modernization in the closing years of the century (Festenstein and Kenny 2006). The problem is that we do not know how representative institutions can function in excessively plural societies. There have been numerous attempts to devise new democratic forms by establishing modes of ‘consociation’, but they have run into their own problems since to give special expression to particular groups via an arithmetical federation or schemes of confederation runs the risk of exacerbating, rather than softening, the animosities between them. Some perhaps do not intend to succeed, although even the hypocrisy of politicians who only pretend to favor democracy is something of a tribute to its power, and governments that say they want open to debate but refuse to allow it sometimes find that words can be used to compel action. Other would-be reformers have made little ground against hostile governments (Festenstein and Kenny 2006).
Liberal democracy is not the final solution to the political organization as it is not to everybody’s liking, least of all those on whom it imposes restraints of office. They seek to entrench themselves in power, fearing that any change of regime is likely to insist on the need to punish past misdeeds as a necessary base to the new politics of reform. Although the wish to bury the past may also be there, the capacity to punish is indispensable to the restoration of justice, and governments that fear retribution will do everything they can to avert it. In this case, direct democracy or participatory democracy can be seen as the final solution for political organization.
References
- Cotrell, S. 2008, The Study Skills Handbook. 3rd edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Eccleshall, R. et. al. (eds.) 2003, Political Ideologies: An Introduction. London: Routledge
- Heywood, A. 2007, Political Ideologies: An Introduction – Fourth Edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Faulks, K., Philips, K., and Thomson, A. 2003, Get set for Politics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP
- Festenstein, M. and Kenny, M. (eds.) 2005, Political Ideologies: A Reader and Guide. Oxford: OUP