Introduction
One of the world’s most historical military campaigns occurred in early 2002 and involved Afghanistan forces and American troops. Working with their colleagues, Central Intelligence Agency, paramilitary officers aimed to defeat Al-Qaeda and Taliban troops in the southeast of Zormat at the Shahi-Kot Valley and Arma Mountains on a mission identified as Operation Anaconda. Since the Combat of Tora Bora in December 2001, this mission was the earliest large-scale battle in Afghanistan’s post-2001 war. It was the first execution in the Afghanistan war space in which a considerable number of United States (US) personnel were directly involved in the battle. The war escalated between March 2nd and 16th of the same month in 2002 when 1,700 US troops and 1,000 Afghan militia made serious advances on 300 to 1,000 Al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorist groups as cited by Headquarters in “The Mission Command.” The latter, hiding in fortified positions in the rocky terrain, targeted to seize the valley by firing heavy military weapons at the US soldiers. The specific interdependent tenets blended in the mission command template and implemented during retaliation in the war form the basis of discussion for this paper.
Mission Command and Its Principles
This phenomenon can be defined as the exercise of power by the commanders to enable professional judgment within their capacity to conduct unified land operations. According to Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command, the sustainment of counterinsurgency duties with other warfighting operations must be maintained for troops to achieve objectives. Military personnel, especially generals, use this tool to balance the art of command and the science of control. To implement this technique effectively during the OA, mutual trust between the unified action partners was required. The forces deployed in extreme conditions to achieve national milestones made it necessary for the lessons learned from previous contingency operations to be captured and implemented. The US Central Command Materiel Recovery Element, a combined task force led by a sustainment brigade, had obstacles in the early phases of the withdrawal in Afghanistan until they decided to adopt the mission command strategy. This article leverages the Army’s doctrinal description of this technique and its seven principles outlined in ADP 6-0 for clarity and better comprehension.
Competence
Competence is, without a doubt, the most important principle relating directly to the commander. Knowledge and experience are two factors that contribute to competence. Self-development, training, and realistic simulations all help to enhance knowledge and experience. The conflicts of Operation Anaconda (OA) put the military docket of the United States to the test. OA was a US airstrike on a Taliban and Al-Qaeda stronghold in the Shah-I Kot area. Some activists have questioned the success of American and coalition forces. However, General Tommy Franks, who commanded the 2001 strikes against the Taliban and oversaw the 2003 invasion of Iraq and Saddam Hussein’s collapse, termed OA as a qualified and absolute success. A public statement from such a respected man acknowledges and honors the American militaries for their capabilities. This implies that competence and the idea of mutual trust are unquestionably linked.
Trust
This is a form of shared confidence that must be maintained throughout the chain of commands. Captains earn their subordinates’ trust by demonstrating competence in training, garrison, or combat situations. During Operation Overlord, the Afghan coalition fighting with American troops got disheartened and eventually retreated. American battalions remained together in the struggle because they believed in each other’s resolve to fight while prioritizing bravery, confidence, and a positive warrior mentality. When the troops returned to base for inspections after the first day of battle, they discovered that all of them had been injured by several enemy bullets. In situations like these, the notion of mutual trust amongst soldiers is demonstrated and strengthened.
Shared Understanding
The framework of common understanding is one of the challenges a mission leader may face in a large-scale operation like OA. There was evident cooperation displayed by countries, government agencies, special operations units, military components, inter-organizational bodies, multinational partners, and huge ground force companies during the mission. Therefore, mutual trust should exist between groups to facilitate sharing of intelligence and information about the operating environment. Generals Mikolashek, Hagenbeck, and Franks, for example, clashed during the early planning stages of OA because they exchanged information yet were each in command of their generalship. They also had no authority over the Special Operations Forces (SOF). Their misunderstanding stifled the flow of efficiently shared information across battle components (Milda, 2019). The idea of shared assimilation is demonstrated by multiple generals who later agreed that command and control would be more effective under the conventional leadership of General Franks, with SOF as a support element.
Discipline Initiative and Risk Acceptance
The recurrent motif of military duty is facing decisive action, which forms the two final elements of mission command. In most cases, decisions made when confronted with an operational contradiction are controlled within the confines of the commander’s objective, thus making the initiative considered disciplined. There are numerous instances from various American conflicts accessible, but one, in particular, stands out in OA. Master Chief Britt Slabinski, a Medal of Honor recipient, is a prime illustration. Slabinski’s main job was to lead a troop up a 10,000-foot snowy peak and set up an observation station to keep an eye on any hostile inversions. Their chopper was struck by a Rocket Propelled Grenade while attempting to land at the top of Taku Ghar.
Further Reading
Neil Roberts, one of Slabinski’s comrades, fell from the aircraft onto the top of the enemy-infested mountain. Shortly after, it has reported that the helicopter had crashed. Slabinski decided to shift the primary goal to a rescue operation. He summoned a second aircraft and took the rest of his team back up the mountain, fearing that he would not make it home from this rescue mission. After 14 hours of heavy machine-gun fire, they were finally removed, deep snow, tough terrain, calling in close air support, and caring for his wounded friends (Haris, 2017). In Slabinski’s case, the risk acceptance principle is evident. Any military mission carries the potential of danger, mental and physical harm, and death. Regardless of mitigation, some risk exists, and everyone acknowledges and accepts it, from the highest commander to the soldier in the operating environment. Slabinski was fully aware of the dangers of returning to the point of first contact. He estimated the risk against him and his squad in his thoughts as his team leader. The risk, however, was significant because their colleague was saved with the help of specific directions from him.
Orders
The commander’s intent is frequently communicated through mission orders. This principle explained the mission’s specific aims, the target upon which a given direction should focus, the exact location, and the time when the mission will be executed. The team leaders used this tenet to give directives that highlight to the subordinates the results to be achieved but not how they are supposed to achieve them. In addition, specific duties were occasionally allocated to the juniors and let them decide how they would complete them (Haris, 2017). The orders were plain and straightforward, but not to the point of obstructing subordinates’ decision-making in battle, nor were they vague enough to cause uncertainty and indecision.
Intent
The commander’s motive for OA was very apparent. The Taliban and Al Qaeda were defeated multiple times and were forced to withdraw to Shahikot. The goal was to eradicate the Taliban and Al Qaeda from Shahikot without harming civilians. It was notable that during the operation, leaders kept all soldiers informed on the mission’s goals, obstacles, and expected size of the enemy. This understanding served as guidance for achieving the positive results. Despite the fact that the deployed level of intelligence was insufficient to forecast the correct number and location of the adversary, commanders were eager to deliver relevant information on the mission’s objectives. However, the established plans and advanced surveillance systems could not prevent the enemy’s surprises, forcing the commanders to stay calm and provide evidence-based instructions throughout the process.
Conclusion
Operation Anaconda was the highest elevation engagement the US had ever recorded. It is considered to be one of the few historical confrontations from which one can study and learn from various events and contingencies. Even though the battalions faced a lot of challenges during the intervention, it did not necessarily fail. This was feasible because the commanders used Mission Command concepts to achieve favorable results. The theories embedded herein have grown from commands control channels to a well-thought-out, organized ideology. Therefore, the conjectures form a concrete guide upon which every combat should be based to realize victory.
References
Haris, S. (2017). The Warfighters. Web.
Headquarters, D.o (2019). ADP 6-0 mission command. District of Columbia, Washington, United States.
Midla, G. S. (2019). Lessons learned: Operation Anaconda. Military Medicine, 169(10), 810-813.