Introduction
Operation Anaconda is a military operation carried out by the US Army in Eastern Afghanistan in 2002. This military operation was aimed at destroying the remaining militants of al Qaeda and the Taliban in the Shahikot Valley. Operation Anaconda is an example of using mission command principles to conduct unified land operations. Mission command is “the Army’s approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation” (Headquarters Department of the Army, 2019, p. 1-3). The mission command is based on seven key principles, including competence, mutual trust, shared understanding, mission orders, commander’s intent, disciplined initiative, as well as risk acceptance (Headquarters Department of the Army, 2019). Operation Anaconda is an example of the use of all these principles for the effective conduct of the military land operation.
Mission Command Principles
Competence
The basis for the successful use of mission command is the competence of commanders, subordinates, and operational teams. In particular, in order to successfully complete operations, soldiers and commanders need to have a sufficient level of skills for assignment, as well as learning and development. Kugler et al. (2009) note that Operation Anaconda was different from previous US activities in Afghanistan. If earlier American soldiers performed joint operations with friendly Afghan units, then this operation required a transformation of tactics and adaptation to it. In particular, the forces of the US Army needed to maneuver in unfamiliar terrain and an immature military information structure. Additionally, collaboration with the air force was necessary to complete the successful operation. Thus, the soldiers and command were required not only to be competent in conducting operations but also in adapting to new conditions and learning abilities.
Mutual Trust
The principle of mutual trust provides the military forces with the possibility of effective communication and collaboration in the context of joint military operations. In order to conduct Operation Anaconda, the US Army required collaboration not only with the air force but also with friendly local units from the Northern Alliance (Kugler, 2007). However, in Operation Anaconda, in addition to US soldiers and the Northern Alliance, were used “thousands of Pashtun soldiers” (O’Hanlon, 2002, p. 49). This aspect complicates the collaboration of the combined forces since Pushtun militia, unlike other units, was less skilled. While mutual trust between The Northern Alliance and US Army forces provided the basis for a successful operation, flawed communication with local units made the process difficult.
Shared Understanding
The principle of shared understanding provides a common vision of the goals, objectives, and means of accomplishing the mission among the command, soldiers, and allied units. Kugler (2007) notes that Operation Anaconda “involved many moving parts, all of which had to be coordinated together” (p. 11). Careful planning of the operation required the integration of all available forces of the army and allied units, which also meant good communication. Within the framework of operation, shared understanding, in particular with regard to maintaining a low profile of preparing troops for an attack, became the key to success. In particular, the plan was to encircle the enemy with several detachments consisting of soldiers from the US Army, Afghan allies, and troops from other countries. Operation Anaconda required cooperation from these units and a common understanding of the goals and objectives of the mission, as well as the stages of its implementation.
Mission Orders
Mission orders are a communication channel between the command and soldiers for the distribution of mission tasks, resources, and the formation of plans. In the initial stages of Operation Anaconda, the main problem for achieving the goals was the inefficient allocation of resources. In particular, many soldiers from both the US Army and the Allied forces were not equipped with enough weapons and other equipment (Kugler, 2007). However, through mission orders, the command was able to assess the situation and adapt offensive plans in accordance with the new circumstances. Mission orders in this situation became the basis for the success of Operation Anaconda, as they allowed the soldiers to communicate new instructions in the face of unforeseen circumstances.
Commander’s Intent
Clear command’s intent allows military forces to communicate orders and plans to soldiers on field missions. However, at the beginning of Operation Anaconda, the US Army had several commanders, each of whom was responsible for separate units (Kugler, 2007). In the initial stages of the mission, the command of the army was not unified, which led to conflicting orders and also hampered the planning process (Kugler et al., 2009). Although the US Army had General Hagenbeck as the tactical commander of the ground forces, he had no authority over the air force and allied Afghan forces (Kugler, 2007). As part of the implementation of the initial plan of Operation Anaconda, this aspect was not a problem but became a significant obstacle in need of a change in tactics. In particular, the structure with multiple commanders does not allow effective adaptation to change conditions, which leads to difficulties in formulating the communication of orders.
Disciplined Initiative
The principle of disciplined initiative refers to conditions where soldiers need to respond to challenges in the absence of clear or relevant orders. In particular, within the framework of Operation Anaconda, this aspect became the key to negating the negative influence of the commander’s intent, as well as non-ideal shared understanding. As part of Operation Anaconda, the original plan proved ineffective and presented a series of unforeseen threats to the soldiers (Kugler, 2007). However, the command used the disciplined initiative to dispose of more air force than previously expected to suppress the more fierce resistance of the enemy. Analyzing the situation and adapting the plan allowed Operation Anaconda to succeed in the face of unforeseen threats.
Risk Acceptance
Assessing and accepting risks is an essential part of military operations. This factor allows the command to analyze potential threats and build tactical plans in accordance with the available data. As part of Operation Anaconda, the command had to adapt the plan to the new conditions, as the enemy’s resistance was more fierce than expected. While it was planned to carry out the operation in three days, it lasted seven days (Kugler, 2007; Kugler t al., 2009). However, the command accepted the risks of additional losses and injuries since these aspects justified the purpose of performing Operation Anaconda. Without taking risks, the command would have curtailed the operation, which would have been not only a military but also an economic failure. Despite the additional threats, the command adapted plans to take them into account, which made it possible to complete the operation successfully.
Conclusion
Overall, Operation Anaconda is a great example of using and integrating mission command principles. The main challenge of the operation was the more fierce resistance of the enemy than expected by the command of the US Army. The main shortcomings of the mission were multiple commanders, as well as insufficient shared understanding with allied units. However, the integration of such principles as disciplined initiative, competence, as well as risk acceptance by the command has allowed plans to be adapted to respond to ongoing events. Communication through mission orders, as well as mutual trust between parts of the military forces, made it possible to implement new plans effectively.
References
Headquarters Department of the Army (2019). ADP 6-0. Web.
Kugler, R. L. (2007). Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A case study of adaptation in battle. Case Studies in Defense Transformation, 5, 1-27. Web.
Kugler, R. L., Baranick, M., & Binnendijk, H. (2009). Operation Anaconda: Lessons for joint operations. Center for Technology and National Security Policy National Defense University. Web.
O’Hanlon, M. E. (2002). A flawed masterpiece. Foreign Affairs, 81(3), 47-63. Web.