Introduction
Operation Anaconda was one of the most notable high-profile operations at the start of the Afghan War. Commenced in March of 2002, it exists as a culmination of previous military efforts and a product of collaboration between various parties. A coalition of forces, including the US, UK, and other European nations. Its results have shown the capacity of a unified force to achieve significant results by utilizing information networks and coordinated doctrines. While the operation, in many ways, did not proceed as planned, it nevertheless resulted in overwhelming success. The ability of coalition soldiers and the US army to quickly adapt to circumstances and devise necessary countermeasures was demonstrated most admirably. The implications of the operation reach into the subsequent military operations in the area, understanding of the conflict from the US’s side, and the direction of the War as a whole.
Context on the Start of the Operation
As noted previously, the operation was built upon the context of previous military action and the decisions of both the coalition and their opposition. With the success of previous operations, the forces of al Qaeda were largely forced to retreat and regroup, calling for operations capable of eliminating their forces quickly.
The existing intelligence and other information have pointed to the large number of al Qaeda forces congregating in the Shahikot Valley area, which became a tactical objective for the opposition. The valley, as noted by the report, was an obvious gathering point, judging from its location and the tactical advantage it provides for defense (Kugler, 2007). Many natural caves, crevasses, and other positions are available in the area, making it difficult to infiltrate without suffering casualties. In addition, the weather conditions were sub-par as well, leading to many problems regarding deployment (Midla, 2004). Aside from the natural problems and positioning, the United States, as a strategic force of the coalition, has been suffering from severe issues in setting up the area. In particular, it was difficult to quickly establish a central chain of command.
Due to US’s participation being relatively recent at the time, the proper management strategies and leadership solutions were not implemented. Notably, General Hagenbeck was given control authority over Operation Anaconda, leading most of the US forces in the area except Unit 11(Kugler, 2007). The attribution of control for Unit 11 to a separate command was problematic, as the team played a central role in the operation. In addition, the general did not have any power over the US air forces – which would later prove to be a vital part of Operation Anaconda’s success (Kugler, 2007). The authority for airstrikes and associated air support was out of the hands of the centralized established command.
Joint Warfare, Numbers, and Battle Preparation
In addition to the discussion of mismanagement and leadership issues, it is necessary to touch on the collaborative aspect of the whole operation. Firstly, the central US operation command did not have authority over the friendly Afghan forces, which posed significant coordination problems. These allies worked according to their own command while also assisting closely to United States’ efforts. As noted by the overview, the process of reaching a communication consensus with Afghan allies did not prove to be reliable enough to fully override the need for centralized command (Docauer, 2014). The inability to establish a single communication and control structure for this operation later proved to be extremely detrimental to its execution.
One of the most vital aspects of warfare is numbers – having a necessary amount of people, units, and weapons to handle the necessary operation. In addition to that, proper equipment and tools are necessary for the scope, type, and goals of a mission. In the case of Operation Anaconda, it was decided that a covert strategy utilizing light weaponry would be sufficient, coupled with air support, to compensate for the lack of tanks. In action, neither the US forces nor their Afghan allies expected heavy long-distance action, which proved to be a challenge with available tools. US forces underestimating the role of natural environments and the firepower of their opponents led to unnecessarily prolonged combat.
Despite the lack of heavy firepower and centralized coordination, Operation Anaconda benefitted from one aspect of warfare severely – a well-thought-out plan. A plan consisting of surrounding the enemy and using tactical air support to one’s advantage was designed specifically to compensate for the lack of tanks and other offensive weaponry. The strategy, called “Hammer and Anvil,” was created as a method of controlling the movements of the enemy while continuously putting pressure on al Qaeda. To perfectly execute such a mission, accurate and integrated communication between teams, coupled with good leadership, was needed. As stated previously, the management of the operation and communication between allied forces was less than ideal, leading to a portion of enemy forces escaping their encirclement. However, the overall goal of the operation was achieved nevertheless, allowing the United States to root itself in Afghanistan and continue a trail of military operations.
Analysis in Accordance With Mission Command Principles
In military action, there are a number of core principles that can be used in order to lead a successful operation. In this section, the Mission Command Principles will be applied to Operation Anaconda as a method of evaluation.
Building Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust
Team-building process during Operation Anaconda has faced a number of severe issues. First, the cooperation between the US army and its allies was primarily based on agreements, not a shared line of command. In this case, the creation of a cohesive team is outside of practical possibilities. Furthermore, the US troops, much like its friendly Afghan allies and international soldiers, prioritized their own wellness beyond cooperation and the overall success of the operation.
Create Shared Understanding
Similarly to the previous point, the creation of shared understanding was impossible due to a lack of proper communication channels or centralized command. The US side of the operation could not properly coordinate their air forces and ground troops, signifying a lack of coordination.
Provide Clear Commander’s Intent
A commander’s intent is necessary in order to lead with a united and clear vision. In the case of disorganized troops under the command of multiple agencies, it is impossible to fully display the intended goals and purposes to all involved parties.
Exercise Disciplined Initiative
A lack of clear intent, then, flows into a lack of disciplined initiatives and coordination. While the overall end result of the mission was clear, the intended actions to reach it were far less defined.
Use Mission Orders
Compared to other competencies, mission orders were used effectively during the planning stages of the operation. A lack of central leadership contributed to an inability to fully follow the given orders, but even their presence is still notable.
Accept Prudent Risk
Due to the needs of the operation, certain risks were definitely accounted for and expected. Arming the troops with light weaponry and gear while having to fight in long-range engagements, for example, can be considered taking on and accepting prudent risks.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it can be said that Operation Anaconda is an important case study for military operations and the importance of coordinated efforts. Intelligence work and preparation have allowed the forces to develop a well-informed plan of action. However, problems arose in the field of both coordination and equipment, leading to unexpected outcomes. The military units dispatched were ill-prepared for the scope of operation and heavy resistance, being dispatched in an area of heavy fire. In addition, the coordination between teams, along with the friendly Afghan forces, was not established properly. An inability to establish a central point of command proved to be the most vital mistake made by the US, as it was responsible for the mistakes in deployment, the timeliness of air support, and the actions of the allied forces.
References
Docauer, A. (2014). Why Centralized Control / Decentralized Execution Works. Air & Space Power Journal | 2. Web.
Kugler, R. (2007) Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A Case Study of Adaptation in Battle. ATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON DC CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
Midla, G. (2004). Lessons Learned: Operation Anaconda. MILITARY MEDICINE. Web.