Generally, Muslims in several parts of the world continue to experience cold relations with other members of the society with each side having negating stereotypes of the other. Much of the French and Malaysian communities view the Islamic followers as either fanatical in some way or violent in nature, while very few individuals in these countries opine that Muslims are generally tolerant and respectful in some way.
Alternatively, Muslims in Malaysia and France generally see the other population as selfish, immoral, or a greedy lot. Consequently, these public perceptions against the Muslim population inform public policy in ways that are detrimental in some way.
The public policies prevailing in these countries often seem to pit Muslims against other population in ways that provoke research in areas of employment, education, and social status of the Islamic community.
Muslims constitute nearly one-fifth of the population in both Malaysia and France. Over time, they have been more involved in an inter-group conflict than most groups in these countries and feel obnoxious in some way. In Malaysia, the Islamic cruelties are overwhelming and their shenanigans evidence is commonplace to the effect that public policy continues to affront against their zeal.
For a long time, Muslims in both France and Malaysia have been more involved in vicious armed conflicts than non-Muslim groups while much of the primeval violence thrust against humanity have been directed towards non-Muslims, especially to the Christians.
Perhaps this warlike tendency is informed by the readings in the Holly Quran “Champion the cause of Allah though, do not transgress parameters; for Allah adores not transgressors. And destroy them wherever transposes.” The borderline of Islamic think tank has the mark of blood, and this inspires policy makers to consider stern deliberations in dealing with the Islamic population in these countries.
Over time, education for every citizen has been the state and local responsibility of the government of both France and Malaysia. Primarily it has been the duty of the state, federal governments, as well as communities, including public and private organizations to establish centers for learning, develop educational programs and determine the requisites for their population’s enrolment and graduation among other things.
The structure of the education system in France, for example, reflects these fundamental federal and state ideals that offer Muslims an opportunity to explore their abilities in learning.
In Malaysia, funding for the education sector comes from many sources, such as the local, federal, and state taxes, as well as grants obtained from the governmental and non-governmental bodies, which gives all members of the society the opportunity to explore their abilities regardless of religious affiliation. If anything, education has not been so prejudiced as far as religion is concerned in both France and Malaysia.
Religious and ethnic deprivations in education arise from definite historical considerations, and these tend to change with the complexion in the prevailing political or social order. Generally, Muslims have had a differing orientation under different regimes in both France and Malaysia.
Confronting stereotypes for the Muslim world continues to be the greatest concern for most faithful Islamic believers in both France and Malaysia. In each case, it transcends past the societal constructs and goes over to influence employment upon the completion of education.
Whilst education is considered the foremost equalizer for members of the society in both cases, in practical terms, the policy prevailing in both countries continues to weigh down heavily on the Islamic communities. Graduates from the affluent population and non-Muslim professionals, for example, continue to dominate the employment sector against the thread of the very able-bodied Muslim professionals.
Usually in both counties, power and hierarchy feature substantially as the greatest determinants of employment criteria. Unfortunately in France, for example, learning institutions like colleges and universities have a tendency of insinuating somewhat that since the Muslim groups are less professional and lacking in the capacity making, thus creating well able-bodied Islamic believers to be outwitted in the employment sector.
In both France and Malaysia, the Islamic communities seem not to be contented with their situation, especially those from marginalized backgrounds and would, therefore, keep quiet and let their situation weigh them down along the path of life. It means that, if their situation were not the problem, they would prefer to voice their thoughts, explore their feelings, and make their ideas known.
The policy regulations in these countries seem to be more comfortable with the dictates that do not consider the aspirations of the Muslim world, and the institutions entrusted with policymaking would always want the situation to favor the indigenous population, thus making the Muslim community to wallow in the periphery of the unknown.
In any case, Hooks (136) opines that the Muslim groups feel equally better off with their situation to some extent, and in so doing, they minimize trouble with the establishments prevailing in these countries and lessen the risk of rejection or deportation. Given the prejudice by which the rest of the population perceives the Muslim community in both France and Malaysia, their social statuses are also equally prejudiced.
The traditional foundations that shape the interaction between Muslims and other population in these regions have been for a time so much deeply seated in the mind-set of the aboriginals such that the Muslim population continues to be an encroachment to the Muslim endeavors.
Even so, there has been a good amount of research to believe in the capabilities of the Muslim population as enduring, as much of the policymaking in both France and Malaysia are inclined to the disfavor of the Muslim thinking. In any way, power in the society influences policymaking, and with power, comes influence that is not necessarily within reach to all members of the Muslim groups, especially France, which is not an Islamic state.
In all endeavors, Islam calls for Muslims to readmission of their situation, a mission, and an approach to a deeply rooted call to make the society responsive to Islamic ideals.
If the Muslim population are prepared to make a world that resonates to their ideals, there is a duty for them to work a little bit smarter to make people accept them as harmless members of the society just like all other population that does not provoke outright hatred from civilized opinion.
In the Arab world, there are two problems associated with the leadership choice and selection criteria; this too must seek to resonate with the acceptable norms of the civilized society.
The Muslim population in both France and Malaysia can perform better and improve the lives of the population in these countries by advancing the common national interests under a mind-set that guarantees the inclusivity of purpose. Much of the problem with the Muslim population’s perceptions have to do with the influence of rival groupings in the concept of leadership in the Arab world outside these countries.
The Muslim population in these countries must be responsive and give their respective nations a priority by putting the state at the top. The problem with Islamic faith in both France and Malaysia is the tendency to give faith a priority at the expense of the state. The thinking that informs the Islamic religion seems parochial and unfounded, making policy information tilted against their aspiration.
These two negative nationalistic features are predominant among Islamic followers. As long as they persist in the Islamic mind-set, they will incessantly deprive the Muslim population of representational outlook expected to transform policy-making to resonate to their ideals.
The religious interests that the Islamic groups in these countries pledge places national interest below the mark, hence making the authorities to least consider the Muslim population as a priority. To be more succinct, the Muslim population proffers more respect to the faith than they do to the state; to them, the state is nothing and should be rejected by all determination.
The conflict of interest for the Muslim mind-set put these countries in an extremely precarious situation in dealing with the Islamic population. In both cases, they seem defeated to balance between the larger national interest and their discrete religious mind-set, which make them to underrate the state.
The complexities that inform policymaking in the Islamic community seem tilted because their relationships with state authorities seem less cordial; stern policies are always in the offing, thus making their relationships with the state too stiff.
The rise in poor attitude towards Islam and concerns over cases of separatism and radicalization, as evidenced by little regard for Muslim minorities in Malaysia and France in the past decade, have brought about a heated debate on the need to look into community togetherness and integration policies once again.
In retrospect, the Muslim population thinking has further been infuriated by events like the Rushdie affair, terrorist attacks against non-Muslims, the killing of Theo van Gogh, a film producer and a native of Netherlands, the bombings in Bali Madrid and London in July 2005, and the discussions on Prophet Mohammed or the cartoon crisis.
The big question is how to decrease from perceptive generalizations, eradicate fear, and encourage cohesion in the various kinds of European societies and in the meantime countering seclusion and discrimination based on race, ethnicity and religion or beliefs. For instance, the violent public disorder caused by Muslim youths fuelled their negative representations in France in November 2005.
The prolonged public contention over Mohammed cartoons also portrayed conventional popularity of the idea that Muslims were presenting foreign calls upon European states, including France. These revelations about Muslim opinions seem politically rare and culturally not by practical realities in both France and Malaysia.
It is imperative, however, to understand that the socio-political constructs that inform the policymaking in both France and Malaysia seek to evaluate individuals based on the lenses of the societal perception to the Muslim population.
This view is decided upon by the way individual Muslims relate themselves with other confluences within these societies. Moreover, these societies to some extent, have the most uncanny way of judging the Muslim groups, and in most instances, they evaluate individuals on the outward expression that underpin the Muslim population.
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